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In this dissertation, I examine the role of private sector engagement in environmental 
governance. The relationship between mainstream environmentalism and the private sector has 
moved from one of general hostility to one of constructive engagement in recent times. As a 
result, the traditional distinctions between environmental non-governmental organizations and 
private corporations have become blurred, making way for public-private hybrids, facilitated by 
frameworks of philanthropy, sponsorship, and corporate social responsibility. Connected to these 
broader reconfigurations in environmental governance are simultaneous alterations in the 
normative framework of mainstream environmentalism. Ideologically, environmental policy and 
neoliberalism are now intertwined, entangling assumptions about nature and culture, and 
reflected in the popularization of environmental protection mechanisms that are deeply 
embedded in the values of the market economy. Analyzing particular examples of such 
engagements, and informed by Gramscian theory, I analyze the connections between rising 
corporate presence in mainstream environmentalism and broader normative and practical change, 
focusing, in particular, on the frameworks of ecomodernism and the Green Economy. I argue 
that contemporary private sector engagement in environmentalism leads to the support, 
production and construction of powerful environmentalisms: environmental ideologies and 
practices that gain power from, not in spite of, prevailing dominant interests. As such, these 
powerful environmentalisms tend to produce and reproduce elite processes of capitalist 
production and prioritize instrumental norms of human-nature relations, while marginalizing 
others. I conclude by outlining suggestions in support of a democratic environmental politics that 
 
represents and recognizes a more diverse array of actors, human-nature relationships, and 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
He watched the news. Same as yesterdays. The General Crisis, coming 
along nicely. Nothing new except the commercials full of sly art and eco-
porn. Scenes of the Louisiana bayous, strange birds in slow motion flight, 
cypress tress bearded Spanish moss. Above the primeval scene, the voice 
of Power spoke, reeking with sincerity, in praise of itself, the Exxon Oil 
Company – its tidiness, its fastidious care for all things wild, its concern 
for human needs. 
Edward Abbey 
 
Edward Abbey’s novel The Monkeywrench Gang was published in 1975, a time when 
much environmental activism in the United States demanded sweeping reform of modern 
capitalism. The story tells of four, misfit “eco-warriers” protecting the American West from 
industrial development by acts of sabotage and violence against machinery, including tearing 
down billboards, pouring sand in bulldozers, etc. Towards the end of the story, one of the 
characters, George Hayduke, appears to be shot by police officers in an attempt to escape as the 
group are caught mid-sabotage. Despite the less than heroic ending, the remaining three are 
undeterred in their radical vision going forward. The revolutionary spirit lives on. 
Depictions of environmental activism are often like this: as radical, peripheral action, 
intent on societal and institutional upheavals. Indeed, this account is partly accurate for much 
environmental protest. Although a far cry from the fictional radicalism taking place in Abbey’s 
novels, many place-based movements all around the world assume transformative agendas, often 
on the basis of necessity, and operate largely on the margins of the political process.  
Mainstream environmentalism, however, as practiced and represented in leading 
environmental and conservation organizations, global international conferences, and 
governmental bodies, is markedly, and increasingly, of a different nature. Commentators have 
noted, for example, a growing institutionalization of environmentalism, especially in the global 
2 
North, as environmental agendas tilt ever closer to elite and corporate interests and 
environmental actors and groups adopt market mechanisms of ecological protection founded on 
models of capitalist accumulation and the creation of environmental commodities.1 The latter is 
reflected clearly in novel, ecomodern frameworks of environmental governance, such as the 
Green Economy, neoliberal environmentalism, and new conservation, all of which currently 
enjoy significant support by many of the leading environmental groups and are promoted 
extensively in global environmental conferences.2  
The transformation of mainstream environmentalism, from, what Kenneth MacDonald 
calls a “politics of hope to a politics of containment” has coincided with an ever-growing fluidity 
of boundaries between “public” and “private” in the sphere of environmental governance.3 As 
the relationship between environmentalism and the private sector has gradually moved from one 
of hostility to one of constructive engagement, the traditional distinctions between public 
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private corporations have 
dissipated, making way for public-private hybrids, facilitated by frameworks of philanthropy, 
cause-related marking and corporate social responsibility. This is made manifest on both an 
institutional and practical level. Institutionally, private sector actors, such as CEOs of large 
corporations, increasingly occupy roles in leading positions in environmental and conservation 
groups, sometimes outnumbering those actors with scientific and technical backgrounds, as well 
                                                 
1 See Kenneth Iain MacDonald, “Grabbing ‘Green:’ Cynical Reason, Instrumental Ethics and the Production of the 
Green Economy,” Human Geography 6, no. 1 (2013): 44-62; William Adams, “Sleeping with the Enemy? 
Biodiversity Conservation, Corporations, and the Green Economy,” Political Ecology 24 (2017): 243-25; George 
Holmes, Biodiversity for Billionaires: Capitalism, Conservation, and the Role of Philanthropy in Selling/Saving 
Nature,” Development and Change 43, no. 1 (2012): 185-203. 
2 See George Sessions, “Deep Ecology, New Conservation, and the Anthropocene Worldview,” Trumpeter 30, no. 2 
(2014): 106-114; Adams, “Sleeping with the Enemy? Biodiversity Conservation, Corporations, and the Green 
Economy.” 
3 MacDonald, “Grabbing ‘Green:’ Cynical Reason, Instrumental Ethics and the Production of the Green Economy.” 
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as provide vital funding and partnership on ecological projects.4 Additionally, private sector 
groups, such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, now have growing 
influence and are major stakeholders in global environmental conferences.5 This fluidity is 
witnessed even further on a practical level as the language of “green” has traversed beyond the 
boundary of environmental organizations and into the corporate domain, just as the language and 
practices of the business sector have become more common in many environmental groups.6  
Thus far, however, the connections between the increase of private engagement in 
environmentalism and the growth in popularity of market-based, ecomodern frameworks in 
environmentalism remains under-explored. This is surprising for a couple of reasons. First, the 
rise of market-based frameworks and instrumental environmental ethics coincide, generally 
speaking, with the growth in ecophilanthropy and private sector engagement. Second, 
philanthropy, and other forms of private engagement, have been demonstrated, in other contexts, 
to have a normative effects on its recipients, including social movements in a broader sense.7 In 
this dissertation, then, I seek to understand the consequences of corporate presence in 
mainstream environmentalism, specifically addressing the connections between eco-
philanthropy, private sector engagement, and broader normative change in environmental 
discourse and politics. I argue, ultimately, that contemporary private sector engagement leads to 
the support, production, and construction of certain types of environmentalism that are market-
                                                 
4 George Holmes, “Biodiversity for Billionaires: Capitalism, Conservation, and the Role of Philanthropy in 
Selling/Saving Nature,” Development and Change, 43, no. 1 (2012): 185-203. 
5 William K. Carroll, “Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony in a Global Field,” Studies in Social Justice 1, no. 1 
(2017): 36-66. 
6 Holmes, Biodiversity for Billionaires: Capitalism, Conservation, and the Role of Philanthropy in Selling/Saving 
Nature.” 
7 This is discussed in more detail in chapter 2. See Tim Bartley, “How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The 
Construction of an Organizational Field and the Rise of Forestry Certification,” Social Problems 54, no. 3 (2007): 
229-255.  
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friendly, instrumental, and do not challenge dominant mechanisms of capitalist production. In 
short, private engagement leads to powerful environmentalisms: environmental ideologies and 
practices that get their power from, not in spite of, prevailing dominant interests; and are actively 
reproduced by individuals and institutions that benefit most from the status quo. The broader 
framework of ecomodernism, and the related discourse of the Green Economy, are discussed as 
examples of such powerful environmentalisms.  
As my goal is to understand the relations between the moral, political, and the economic, 
I draw on understandings of ideology, and in particular, on Antonio Gramsci’s notions of 
hegemony and counter-hegemony to provide some guidance. Grounded in particular examples of 
private sector engagement, I analyze whether some forms of private sector engagement in the 
politics of environmentalism can be understood as a form of hegemony, where corporate action 
attempts to contain oppositional environmentalism by controlling what Gramsci calls the “war of 
position;” in this case, the ideological terrain of the environmental movement.8 I conclude, 
ultimately, that powerful environmentalisms, as well as from having internal problems as a result 
of inherent contradictions and conflicts of interests, can also, and perhaps more importantly, have 
a marginalizing effect on other expressions of environmental care and protection.  
  
Chapters Overview 
This dissertation is split roughly into three parts. In chapters two and three, I focus on 
social movements, philanthropy, and corporate social responsibility. In chapter two, I analyze the 
practice of philanthropy, detailing its origins and some critical and positive responses. In 
addition, I outline some of the theories relating to social movements, focusing, in particular, on 
                                                 
8 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). 
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some differences between Resource Mobilization and New Social Movement theory. I conclude 
by exploring the concept of channeling in social movement scholarship: the process of private 
patronage channeling social movements away from radical objectives towards more incremental 
goals. In chapter three, I focus on some of the underlying normative frameworks of philanthropy 
and corporate social responsibility, analyzing the ethic of stewardship in particular. I argue that 
the stewardship ethic underlines both traditional philanthropy and contemporary corporate social 
responsibility and serves to depoliticize corporate action and increase corporate sovereignty. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I focus on examples of private sector engagement in 
environmentalism under the framework of corporate social responsibility and ecophilanthropy, 
more broadly. In chapter 4, I outline the rise of private sector engagement in environmental 
groups and the politics of environmentalism. I maintain that despite tendencies towards 
characterizing the alliances between public environmental groups and private corporations as 
either pragmatic or greenwashing, they are often more closely related to what Bill Adams 
describes as “Faustian bargains,” in that engagements such as these usually entail transactions 
between deeply different power dynamics, where one party benefits more than the other.9 
Informed by a Gramscian analysis, I explore whether private sector engagement in the politics of 
environmentalism can be understood as a form of hegemony, where private sector actions 
contain oppositional environmentalism by controlling what Gramsci calls the “war of position;” 
in this case, the ideological terrain of the environmental movement. I analyze the work of the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WSCSD) as one possible illustration of 
this process.  In chapter 5, I investigate the representation of nature emerging from private-public 
partnerships, and in service of novel, market-oriented, environmental agendas. In particular, I 
                                                 
9 Adams, “Sleeping With The Enemy: Biodiversity, Corporations and the Green Economy.”  
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analyze a recent media campaign from Conservation International, called “Nature is Speaking,” 
in order to ascertain the way in which nature is conceptually produced in novel forms of 
environmental governance.  
In chapter 6 and 7, I focus on powerful environmentalisms in more detail, concentrating 
on ecomodernism as a general framework. In chapter six, I analyze the extent to which the theory 
and practice of ecomodernism is reflective of an infiltration of certain kinds of interests and 
actors within the framework, and within environmentalism more generally. In particular, I 
discuss whether hegemonic ontologies regarding humans and nature, influenced by the presence 
of elite actors in the production and reproduction of ecomodernism, may serve as both a limiting 
factor for the manifestation of alternative forms of environmental protection and social well-
being. In chapter 7, I compare two environmental manifestos that were published in 2015: “An 
Ecomodernist Manifesto,” written by Ted Nordhaus and others, and “Laudato Si,” written by 
Pope Francis. I demonstrate that both manifestos put forth two radically different visons of 
environmental care and conceptualizations of ideal human-nature relations. I assert, ultimately, 
that although most critical responses in environmental ethics focus on inherent contradictions in 
normative environmental frameworks, it is also important to investigate questions of power and 
political economy, specifically addressing the kinds of resources afforded to different 
environmental ideologies and the potential and consequent marginalization of others. I conclude 
by outlining suggestions in support of a democratic environmental politics that represents and 






SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND PHILANTHROPY: THE “CHANNELING” PROCESS 
Recent developments in the global economy has led to enormous growth in multinational 
corporations. Currently, out of the hundred largest economies in the world, fifty one are 
corporations.10 In the United States alone, it has been reported that large firms control about one 
third of the country's wealth and for the first time in history, there are 2,043 billionaires that, in 
total, have a net worth of $7.71 trillion.11  
The corporate sector is also increasingly engaged in philanthropic pursuits. In October 
2010, approximately forty U.S. billionaires signed a “Giving Pledge,” in which they promised to 
donate at least half of their wealth to philanthropic foundations.12 Mark Zuckerberg, founder and 
CEO of Facebook, pledged on a 2016 Facebook post to donate 99 percent of his fortune over his 
lifetime. Bill Gates and Warren Buffet have collectively donated approximately $62 billion to 
poverty reduction goals.13 Other leading philanthropists, many of whom are based in Silicon 
Valley, have developed a collective action framework to tackle the problem of poverty known as 
the “California Consensus,” which attempts to reduce overall poverty by “applying innovation, 
technology and modern management methods.”14  
Much of this wealth is directed towards organizations that support and advocate for 
causes such as poverty reduction, environmental health, and social justice. As a result of 
                                                 
10 Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh, “The Rise of Global Corporate Power,” Corporate Watch (2011), 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221/47211.html. 
11 Barry Ritoholtz, “Map of World Billionaires by Country and by Origin of Wealth – The Big Picture,” 26 
December, 2016, http://ritholtz.com/2016/12/map-world-billionaires-country-origin/ 
12 Behrooz Morvaridi, “Capitalist Philanthropy and Hegemonic Partnerships,” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 




increased capital moving from the private sector to social causes, scholarly attention to 
philanthropy and its relationship to social movements have increased, with particular interest in 
how philanthropic resources affects the objectives and institutional structures of social 
movement organizations (and social movements in general).15 Critical analysts have maintained 
that private patronage leads to a channeling of social movements away from radical objectives 
towards more incremental goals.16 Although accounts of how this process occurs remains 
underdeveloped, existing research points to three mechanisms in particular. First, foundations 
and private actors select more moderate organizations to fund that do not threaten large-scale 
institutional change.17 Subsequently, these organizations, as a result of greater resources, become 
more dominant in the movement overall. Second, private patronage leads to professionalization 
of grassroots mobilization, leading to structural changes.18 Third, scholars point to a process of 
“field building,” where foundations and private actors being critical agents in the construction of 
fields of activity, each of which operate under certain norms, expectations, and values, and serve 
to facilitate certain kinds of social movement mobilization.19    
Although these analyses are critical for understanding the ways in which funding affects 
social movement, their focus is predominantly on institutional aspects and objectives, rather than 
                                                 
15 John Silk, “Caring At A Distance: Gift Theory, Aid Chains and Social Movements,” Social and Cultural 
Geography 5, no. 2 (2004). 
15 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 J. Craig Jenkins, “Channeling Social Protest: Foundation Patronage of Contemporary Social Movements,” in 
Walter Powell and Elizabeth Clemens, ed., Private Action and the Public Good, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1998), 202-16. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Tim Bartley, “How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction of an Organizational Field and The 
Rise of Forestry Certification,” Social Problems 54, no. 3 (2007): 229-255. 
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on underlying normative change. I conclude with some thoughts on the connections between 
money, philanthropy, and ethical realignments in social movement mobilization. 
 
Philanthropy 
In 1875, Thomas Wentworth Higgins observed that the word philanthropy had appeared 
for the first time in an English speaking publication in The Guide to Tongues, published in 
1828.20 It was described as “Philanthropie; Humanitae, a loving of man” and the author of the 
publication, John Dryden, described that he had used the word only because there was no precise 
translation for the Greek original.21  
Although the term was popularized during the Enlightenment, it was not until the 
nineteenth century that it became of common use. It referred, generally speaking, to “love of 
man, charity, benevolence, humanitarianism, social reform.”22 Citing one example, Curli 
discusses a well-known philanthropist at the time, Boston bootmaker John Augustus, who was 
given the label on account of his “help to the helpless and love to the unlovely;”23 more 
specifically, his work as a voluntary probation officer, saving hundreds from lengthy jail time. 
Philanthropists such as Augustus, however, were not always approved of. As noted by Curli, the 
term, philanthropist, sometimes conjured images of an intrusive do-gooder, represented clearly 
                                                 
20 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, The Word Philanthropy: Freedom and Fellowship in Religion (Boston: Roberts 
Brothers, 1875). 
21 Merle Curli, “American Philanthropy and the National Character,” American Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1958): 420-437, 
p. 420. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
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in a piece of advice given by old Count Gorowski to one woman: “Marry thief! Marry murderer! 
But never marry philanthropist!"24 
Generally speaking, however, the term philanthropy has implied, and has been associated 
with, benevolence and altruism. The positive perception of the term only increased as the 
nineteenth century came to a close, as an emerging industrialist class made philanthropic activity 
a routine state of affairs, instituting giving as a fundamental part of business life, and further, a 
moral necessity. Business people such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie established 
philanthropic foundations through which they donated large portions of their fortune to causes 
such as education, housing, and healthcare. Such was the extent of the charitable sentiments of 
the emerging industrialist class that the period was deemed the “golden age of philanthropy.” In 
addition to an increase in generosity, the actions of these turn-of-the-century philanthropists led 
to a shift in philanthropic activity away from a predominantly unorganized series of almsgiving, 
to a structured business on its own terms, run by hired philanthropic advisors and operating 
under well-defined objectives.   
Currently, we are said to be in a second golden age of philanthropy.25 Philanthropic 
donations in the United States have increased in all sectors, and have grown steadily since the 
1970s.26 A report from Paul Schervish and John Havens at Boston College Center on Wealth and 
Philanthropy estimate $6.3 trillion of bequests to charity between 2007 and 2061.27 It is common 
to see news headlines celebrating super donations, in addition to philanthropists “stepping up” in 
                                                 
24 Ibid.  
25 James M. Ferris, “Is This a New Golden Age of Philanthropy: An Assessment of a Changing Landscape,” 
Voluntary Sector Review 7, no. 3 (2016): 315-324. 
26 Ibid.  
27 John J. Havens and Paul G. Schervish, “A Golden Age of Philanthropy Still Beckons: National Wealth Transfer 
and Potential for Philanthropy,” Technical Report, Center on Wealth and Philanthropy, Boston College (2014), 
http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104106. 
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natural disasters to provide funding and other types of aid. Philanthropists are largely recognized 
as crucial agents in the betterment of society overall, providing provisions to important social 
causes. U2 singer Bono’s work in Africa for better healthcare, for example, is widely celebrated, 
as is Richard Branson’s 2016 pledge to use all the profits from his rail and airline to help combat 
global warming. It is also commented on that the current philanthropists are markedly different 
from their predecessors.28 As described by Paul Schervish, for example, while during the first 
golden age, philanthropy was dominated by a handful of people (namely, Carnegie and 
Rockefeller), there are now many philanthropists, corresponding, broadly, to an increase in 
wealth in more general terms. In addition to philanthropists being more numerous, he also 
describes that they tend to be younger, more enthusiast about giving and social change, believe 
that philanthropy is important for self-fulfillment, and that it can lead to happiness of both 
themselves and others.29  
Generally speaking, two understandings with regard to the intentions of philanthropists 
exist: one positive and one critical.  The positive camp usually understands philanthropy and 
philanthropic motive as an expression of altruism driven by religious duty, social obligation, or 
personal moral conviction. Indeed, this is arguably the most common sentiment, with people 
self-identifying as philanthropists with no—or little —apparent hesitation or shame. This 
understanding of philanthropy usually assumes that the giver receives no direct benefit of his or 
her own from the transaction, although there may be an indirect reward. Peter Singer, for 
example, maintains that people who have financial resources to spare have a moral responsibility 
                                                 
28 Paul G. Schervish, Mary A. O’ Herlihy, and John J. Havens, “Agent Accumulated Wealth and Philanthropy: The 




to give to those who have much less, based on the framework of utilitarianism that sees the 
reduction of suffering as an overarching moral objective. In addition, in a Kantian sense, acts of 
benevolence such as the redistribution of wealth in philanthropy, is more so an act of duty than 
kindness, arising from rational conclusions with regard the necessities of social living.  
Critical responses, on the other hand, understand philanthropy, and especially 
philanthropy arising from capitalist agents, as more transactional than altruistic, with the giver 
operating under broader objectives that usually result in direct self-gain. For Michael Edwards, 
the act of helping others arises from aspirations of self-transformation and the rewards of 
positive status—feed the poor, get a name.30 A similar sentiment is put forth by Pierre Bourdieu, 
who argues that “the gratuitous gift does not exist.”31 For Bourdieu, the act of helping others 
through giving assumes reciprocity, or at least, some form of “payback.” In the realm of capital, 
reciprocity does not have to be directly financial in nature, with Bourdieu arguing that economic 
capital can be transformed into other forms of capital, such as social, cultural, and symbolic (and 
back again), through philanthropic pursuits, ultimately leading to the legitimation and advantage 
of the gift giver.  
The idea of philanthropy as an action that is transactional and empowering to the agent 
through direct benefit can also be traced back to Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci argued that a ruling 
class maintains power by securing consent of the subordinated class not only by force, but also 
through a process of cultural hegemony in which elites, from a position of moral authority, 
reproduce and cultivate ideas of “common sense” so as to maintain ideological domination.32 For 
                                                 
30 Michael Edwards, Small Change: Why Business Won’t Save the World (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2010), p 
26. 
31 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason (Oxford: Polity Press, 2001), p. 15. 
32 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 
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Gramsci, philanthropy was a major vehicle of this process. Philanthropists, usually comprising 
members of an elite class, are producers of the status quo by promulgating capitalist ideology 
through funding and presence in social movements and organizations, and thus, preventing large 
scale resistance and social change. Slavok Zizek also follows this line of thinking and argues that 
philanthropy is not just supportive of capitalism, but fundamentally critical for its existence.33 
Philanthropy, veiled in assumptions of moral altruism and expectations of world-saving, emerges 
from wealth created from capitalism, which, in addition to saving the world, is also destroying it. 
This contradiction, however, is important because it allows capital to be circulated to things 
beyond materialism, such as ecological health, poverty eradication, and health care, which is, in 
turn, “fundamental to capitalisms continuation because it prevents a buildup of resentment which 
would inevitably lead to moves to undermine it, such as socialism or war.”34  
 
Social Movements 
Social movements—referring broadly to collective efforts to bring about some kind of 
institutional, legal, or cultural change—and in particular, social movement organizations, are 
increasingly the recipients of philanthropy. This growth in private donations is perceived clearly 
in environmental organizations, the subject of this dissertation. Many environmental 
organizations currently receive over half of their entire budget from corporate and foundation 
sponsorship and funding.35 Environmental problems, such as climate change, are being tackled 
by and spearheaded by popular philanthropists, such as Richard Branson, Leonardo Di Caprio, 
Elon Musk, etc. Environmental philanthropists are also active in aspects of environmental 
                                                 
33 Slavok Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Glances (London: Picador, 2008), pp. 25-40. 
34 Holmes, “Biodiversity for Billionaires,” p. 191. 
35 Ibid. 
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governance, sitting as members of boards of directors in environmental organizations and 
participating in policy development.36  
As a result of this general increase, philanthropy is back on the agenda of academic 
scholarship, with research generally focusing on two main question. (1) Why do elite actors 
provide patronage? (2) What are the effects of that patronage on the recipient social movement? 
To investigate this point further, a brief review of the theoretical assumptions of social 
movements is first necessary. 
The scholarly study of social movements has long centered on the question of 
organizational establishment: in short, why movements form. Classic social-movement theorists 
understand the rise of social movements as a reaction to dissatisfaction and discontent, led by 
noninstitutionalized, irrational agents who collectively orient for social change. From this 
perspective, the degree to which people are aggrieved directly correlates to the force of the 
emergent movement. This traditional conception, however, began to be questioned in the sixties 
and seventies by proponents of a new framework: resource mobilization theory. Resource 
mobilization theory, first formulated by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, maintains that 
traditional theories fail to account for the institutional structures and availability of resources that 
are central to any movement's existence and organization.37 Grievances, they suggest, are 
secondary and continuous. The extent to which a movement is mobilized actually relates to the 
availability of resources at that particular time. They assert that beyond individual 
discontentment, “communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to 
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institutional centers, re-existing organization networks, and occupational structure and growth” 
are the determining factors for a social movement’s establishment and success.38 
From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, then, the social movements of the 
sixties and seventies developed, not because people were especially aggrieved at that time, or 
because social and/or environmental conditions were significantly worse, but rather because 
circumstances aligned so that more resources were available for social-movement activity. The 
climate, in other words, was amenable to the development of social-movement organizations at 
that time. Generally speaking, resource mobilization theorists tend to see affluence as a crucial 
part of social-movement mobilization. Because prosperous societies lead to the emergence of 
other assets, such as an intellectual classes and complex means of communication, they tend to 
be more conducive to mobilization.39 In addition, wealthy communities can also produce “issue 
entrepreneurs,” that can “develop and market new social movement products,” as well as lead to 
“conscience constituents,” wealthy people and organizations that donate resources to the cause.40 
Other notable resources include educational facilities, communication methods, and available 
labor.  
Resource mobilization theory was subsequently subject to critique, however. New social-
movement theories that emerged from Europe maintained that it overemphasized the 
organizational aspects of mobilization, at the expense of normative accounts. Thinkers such as 
Jurgen Habermas, in contrast, emphasized the cultural and symbolic forces that are embedded in 
social mobilization and strategic action. For Habermas, social movements can be understood as 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 1225. 
39  Ibid. 
40 Doug Mc Adam, John D. Mc Carthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Social Movements,” in B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi and 
S. Tarrow, ed., Handbook of Sociology, (Greenwich, Conn.: JAL, 1988), p. 702.  
16 
"processes through which latently available structures of rationality are transposed into social 
practice . . . structured by cultural traditions.”41 In particular, he differentiates between the “life-
world,” the social arena, predominantly structured by communicative rationality, in which our 
day to day lives plays out, and the state and market (or system) that is structured by instrumental 
rationality, i.e., the strategic steering of objectives towards money or power. The expansion of 
instrumental rationality into the life-world is a form of colonization, according to Habermas, 
which monetizes and bureaucratizes human needs, leading them to be dependent on the system. 
Thus, social movements arise as a resistance to these forms of colonization, and seek to reclaim 
and recreate the three components of the life-world from forces of colonization, namely, society, 
personality, and culture (i.e. shared traditions, knowledge, meanings, and memories).42 
New social-movements theorists, therefore, such as Habermas, tend to understand social 
mobilization not merely as representations of institutional and organization ability, but also in 
terms of ideology; as “carriers of a certain critique of society that challenges social relations and 
cultural codes.”43 Social movements, in this sense, are perceived to be collective action 
frameworks not merely made up of rational actors seeking to gain advantage of institutional and 
resource rearrangement, but also embodiments of counter-cultural and alternative visions of 
social life. A similar perspective is shared by Ernesto Laclou and Chantal Mouffe, who maintain 
that social movements are “the expression of forms of resistance to the commodification, 
bureaucratization and increasing homogenization of social life itself.”44 
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Understanding social movement in this manner — as carriers of cultural critique and 
visions of new social configurations—has led some scholars to suggest that external funding and 
other resources provided to social-movement organizations may be attempts by dominant 
economic and social actors to control the mobilization of social movements, and thus may 
potentially harm movements, rather than help them, as implied by advocates of resource 
mobilization theory. Some commentators, for example, assert that the institutional resources 
provided to social movements, in particular the patronage directed by elite actors, may actually 
serve to channel social movements away from radical objectives and towards more moderate 
activism: in short, to alter the original goals of the movement.45 Richard Piven and Frances Fox 
Cloward, for example, in their work in the Poor People’s Movements maintain that “outside 
resources not only shape social movements but they also encourage institution building and 
bureaucratization that ultimately hinders significant organizing and change.”46 This sentiment 
was joined by other scholars in the 1980s who similarly argued that resource mobilization theory 
failed to identify that outside support may have negative impacts on the social movements it 
funds.  
For the remainder of this chapter, I focus on the relationship between social movements 
and external funding, and look at the narrative of channeling as one framing of this.  
 
Philanthropic Engagement in Social Movements:  
The “Channeling” Process 
 
There is significant debate with regard the intentions and effects of social-movement 
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private funding. While some scholars suggest that the resources and funding provided by private 
sector actors are essential for movements to flourish, other scholars argue that private patronage 
can channel social movements away from radical action towards more incremental goals. In this 
section, I analyze the narrative of “channeling” with regard to the impact of philanthropy on 
social movements in more detail. In particular, three aspects of the channeling process are 
discussed: selection, professionalization, and field-building.  
The first process, selection, refers to the tendency of foundations and corporate bodies to 
cherry-pick the organizations for funding that appear to promote the least radical agenda. One 
result of the selection process is that the more moderate elements of a movement gain increased 
traction, and thus exert more power in the movement overall, leading to a process of 
incrementalism that potentially affects entire movements. One example of this process was 
discussed by Doug McAdam and Herbert Haines in relation to the civil rights movement. They 
described that in response to the more radical sections of the civil rights movement that 
advocated for direct protest based on politically and socially transformative agendas, foundations 
and other private institutions shifted their financial support to organizations more concerned with 
incremental goals, such as education.47  
Robert Brulle and Craigs Jenkins make similar reflections in their study of funding in the 
environmental movement in 2005. Their research demonstrates that foundation funding in the 
United States is more likely to be directed at mainstream environmental organizations that 
promulgate capitalist-friendly frameworks, such as conservation and biodiversity protection. The 
more radical organizations that promote significant political and social change, such as 
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environmental justice and ecofeminism organizations, receive a much smaller amount. As Brulle 
and Jenkins describe, while conservation receives approximately ninety percent of funding, the 
“radical environmental discourses that put a priority on transforming the structure of power―the 
environmental justice and deep ecology movement―each receive less than two percent of the 
total grant money.”48 Other discourses, such as eco-feminism and eco-theology, were similarly 
marginalized. A potential consequences of this selection process, according to the authors, is that 
the trajectory of the movement can alter by the empowerment of some organizations over others. 
As described by Eve Pell, “by deciding which organizations get money, the grant-makers help 
set the agenda of the environmental movement and influence the programs that activists carry 
out.” 49 
In addition to selection, a second account proposes that private patronage can alter 
organizations through a process of professionalization. The process usually occurs by 
foundations offering start-up money to organizations for the purpose of hiring professional staff, 
securing non-profit status, and establishing professional fund-raising processes.50 Critics assert, 
however, that professionalization and bureaucratization has the potential to shift organizations 
from their original missions. Suzanne Pharr, for instance, demonstrates this point with her 
experience of working in feminist movements in the nineties. Referencing the “Battered 
Women’s Movement,” she describes that, in many cases, the pressure from funders to hire 
professional, degree-bearing, individuals gradually led to the work of community members being 
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replaced. This was particularly significant for the organization because the community members 
replaced tended to have more personal relations to the struggles within the area than the 
professionals that were trained outside of the community.51 In addition, she notes that the 
pressure from funders to emulate a corporate structure, notably, a hierarchal model, disrupted 
underlying normative narrative ideals of the movement, such as egalitarianism, decentralization, 
and cooperation. Similarly, Pharr remarks that the focus and time spent on fundraising in 
professional organization both serves to detract from direct activism, as well as create a climate 
of competition with other groups, rather than cooperation.    
Similar conclusions were drawn with regard to the professionalization of organizations in 
the Native American movement. Madonna Thunderhawk, an activist in the seventies and 
eighties, recounts organizing around the issue of diabetes in Native American communities. She 
writes that because Indian communities were given unhealthy food from the government when 
they had been relocated and displaced from their original lifestyles, Native American activists 
addressed the epidemic of diabetes within communities through direct protest to government and 
community organizing. When the groups were professionalized by entering into the non-profit 
sector and accepted federal grants to work on diabetes prevention, however, the organization was 
transformed into the creator of events and pamphlets. She writes: 
Activism is relegated to events. Many people will get involved for an event but avoid 
rocking the boat on an ongoing basis because if they do, they might lose their funding. 
For instance, if the government is funding the pamphlet, then an organization is not going 
to address the impact of US colonialization of Native diets because they don’t want to 
lose funding.52 
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Studies of these mechanisms—selection and professionalization—comprise the majority 
of the literature with regard to social movement channeling through foundations. As Tim Bartley 
states, however, although both of these mechanisms “undergird analyses of channeling  . . . they 
do not exhaust the ways in which foundations can shape social movements.”53 In response, he 
articulates a third mechanism, “field-building,” arguing that what is also at play is the deliberate 
transformation of the “organizational field” of movements by foundations and other private 
actors. An organizational field, in this case, refers to groups of organizations that share 
knowledge and institutional norms, described by Bartley as a “socially constructed arena of self-
referencing, mutually dependent organizations.”54 Organizational fields, however, are not just the 
relationships between organizations, but also operate at a “meso-level,” mediating between 
organizations, institutions, regulatory bodies, consumers, and suppliers.55 They exhibit 
“distinctive ‘rules of the game,’ relational networks, and resource distributions that differentiate 
multiple levels of actors and models for action.”56 Bartley’s field-building approach, thus, draws 
on main two insights: (1) that social movements are “embedded in multi-organizational fields,” 
which can in turn, influence its missions, strategies and organizational structure, and (2) that 
private philanthropic agents are often “key structures in the formation and structuration of 
organizational field.”57 
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In discussing the impacts of philanthropy on organizational field-building, Bartley 
examines the field of forestry certification. In the late eighties and early nineties in Europe and 
North America, environmental organizations and members of the forestry industry established 
certification programs to differentiate sustainable from unsustainable practices in industrial 
logging. In 1991, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was created, an international institution 
that sets standards for sustainable and responsible forestry, and allows the use of their label for 
the packaging of products emerging from sources that successfully meet these standards. The 
FSC also led to the creation of similar agencies, such as the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), 
the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), and other European institutions. Although Bartley 
points out that these organization were initially created in an attempt to compete with the FSC, 
he claims that the “ensuing mix of competition and adaptation helped turn forest certification in a 
dynamic, contentious and rapidly growing field.”58 This is reflected further in the malleability of 
each institution in relation to another. He asserts that the competing programs “mutually adjusted 
their practices over time, with the industry sponsored SFI becoming “more FSC like,” and the 
FSC sometimes altering its rules to attract business support.59 Furthermore, as the field 
expanded, education programs grew and disseminated the standards and criteria inherent to the 
field to both a scholarly and industrial audience. 
In the case of forestry certification, Bartley points to substantial foundation and corporate 
involvement in both the early and later stages of the field. In the earlier stages, small private 
donations were made, largely from previously existing corporate officials with ties to the forestry 
industry. Some foundations in particular, such as “The Homeland Institute,” were instrumental in 
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establishing some of the early meetings by providing vital financial support. From 1993 
onwards, philanthropic presence greatly increased, partly due to the increasing incorporation of 
larger philanthropic institutes. As one member of the FSC noted:  
The FSC was founded in ’93 and I think at that point it was clear that the FSC needed a 
lot of funding to get itself off the ground. So that was ’93/’94 and you know, by that time, 
I think the funders like Ford and McArthur and Rockefeller were starting to become 
much more heavily involved.60 
 
As described by Bartley, these larger funders worked together from 1993 onwards, 
participating in collective action to support the forestry certificate. In 1993, for example, the 
Rockefeller, McArthur and Ford Foundations united many other philanthropic organizations 
together in order to provide more robust support. Over time, more sponsorship organizations 
became involved, including the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, 
and others.61 As a result, private funding for the forestry certificate increased greatly though 
those years, increasing from $196,000 in 1994 to 6.1 million in 1996, and further tripling in 
2000, with the U.S. portion of the FSC receiving almost eighty percent of its total funding from 
the private sector.  
The growth of funding and the presence of private actors, therefore, coincided with the 
growth of the field in general. Through strategic funding, foundations helped to establish and 
support forest certification in a way “that built a field of mutually supporting institutions,” which 
led to the foundation being able to “redefine the political space and channel activism in subtle 
but consequential ways.”62 Bartley has noted that the attraction of foundations to forestry 
certification in the first place can be understood through a resonation of certain norms and ideals. 
                                                 




He states, for example, that the certification model resonated with “neoliberal policy scripts 
emphasizing the promise of markets to solve a wide array of problems.”63 Because forest 
certification put forth a form of governance that was private and industry-regulated, and because 
it represented an alternative to the timber consumer boycotts of the late 1980s, certification 
represented a more market-friendly approach. As described by Bartley, it resonated with the 
goals of the larger foundations more so than those alternatives that highlighted the need more 
stringent federal regulation of industry and an overall reduction of logging practices. 
 
Conclusion 
Thus, these three approaches—selection, professionalization, and field-building—
represent the dominant ways in which channeling is explained and understood in social-
movement scholarship. Despite the importance and viability of these analyses for understanding 
the complex relations between private philanthropic activity and social movements, however, the 
topic of how private sector patronage and engagement affects normative aspect of social 
movements remains under-explored. Indeed, the three approaches tend to focus largely on 
institutional and organizational changes, and although normative change is implied in that, it is 
often not explicitly laid out. Research on the processes of selection and professionalization, for 
example, predominantly outline the effects of philanthropy on organizational realignment, 
discussing, for example, how patronage displaces time and resources potentially spent on direct 
activism by leading to financial dependencies which necessitate more focus on fundraising, leads 
to changes in employees and organizational hierarchy, etc. In addition, although the process of 
field-building as articulated by Bartley engages with normative change in a more straightforward 
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way, the main focus is largely on how field-building affects the practices of organizations, rather 
than underlying norms and values.  
Some research does exist, however, that makes more explicit the connections between 
private patronage and ideological change. In a now famous publication, Robert Arnove, for 
example, analyzes the three biggest foundations of the twentieth century, the Carnegie, 
Rockefeller, and Ford Foundation, and details their influence on “worldviews” through funding 
directed towards education. He writes:  
Through funding and promoting research in critical areas, the big three have been able to 
exercise decisive influence over the growing edge of knowledge, the problems that are 
examined and by whom, and the uses to which newly generated information is put. 
Through the education programs they fund, foundations are able to influence the world 
views of the general public as well as the orientations and commitment.64 
 
As he notes, the support of these foundations for social causes was not undertaken 
neutrally, but rather operated under specific norms and with particular objectives. In 
particular, Arnove points out that early educational philanthropy supported public 
institutions in a manner that was consistent with the normative framework and material 
interests of the capitalist class, rather than that of the workers.  
Similarly, a recent publication by Justin Farrell demonstrates that normative 
positions on climate change (whether it is “believed in” or not) are influenced by a network 
of political and financial actors that are involved in funding climate change organizations 
at various levels. Using a computational analysis of climate-change politics in the United 
States, and analyzing 164 organizations, he concludes with two main findings. First, he 
asserts that “organizations with corporate funding were more likely to have written and 
disseminated texts meant to polarize the climate-change issues,” and second, “that 
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corporate funders influence the actual thematic content of these polarization efforts, and 
the discursive prevalence of that thematic content over time.”65 These findings, although in 
one sense, confirming suspicions that many people already had, also disrupt the notion that 
ideological positions and economics exist in an vacuum, uninfluenced by the money that 
supports them. In the conclusion of his paper, Farrell recommends that more work be 
undertaken on the increased role of private funding and particular ideological shifts in the 
United States and elsewhere.  
In the remainder of this dissertation, then, I investigate in more detail the process of 
channeling as it relates to private patronage and engagement in the environmental 
movement, paying close attention to how these forms of engagement affect the ideological 
aspects of the movement. In the next chapter, I address some of the underlying norms 
under which private sector engagement takes place in social movements in the first 
instance, focusing, in particular, on corporate social responsibility and philanthropy. I 
maintain that central to private engagement and patronage in social movements and causes 
are assumptions about ideal business-society relations, and notions about the responsibility 
of private sector actors to alleviating social and ecological problems. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PHILANTHROPY AND THE STEWARDSHIP 
ETHIC 
In March 2015, Starbucks ran a national campaign, Race Together, in an attempt to 
address racial tensions in the US. In reaction to the killings by policemen of two unarmed black 
men, Michael Brown and Eric Garner, Starbucks CEO, Howard Schultz, encouraged his 
employees to write “race together” on the outsides of coffee cups so as to initiate dialogue with 
their customers about race relations in the U.S.  The campaign was a failure. Critics immediately 
began to ridicule it as superficial and badly organized, and shortly after, it was discontinued. 
Despite its lack of success, however, the campaign sparked a debate about the role of the 
corporation and corporate leaders in contemporary society, addressing the question of what 
extent corporations are, or should be, responsible for alleviating negative social issues. Schultz, 
in facing the backlash, was not deterred with his goals, stating that he intends to continue the 
cause [of alleviating racial tensions in the U.S. with the “same vigor he pursues corporate 
profits.”66 This approach is similar to that of other CEOs. Rose Marcario, for example, CEO of 
Patagonia, stated in reaction to the campaign: “we’re at a tipping point where businesses need to 
step up and take a lead with moral and ethical voices.”67  
Campaigns like those, and corporate involvement in matters of the public good in 
general, are one of the most notable developments of recent times in the global political 
economy. Through the framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporations and 
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other private institutions are engaging with the public through a series of initiatives designed to 
“give back” to the communities and environments in which they reside. Such initiatives involve 
adopting standards of best practice, ensuring environmental protection, sponsoring community 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and funding campaigns to address social issues.  
Opinions as to why corporations are acting ethically in this way vary. Perhaps the most 
repeated explanation is that CSR initiatives are a direct response to external social pressure from 
agents such as activists and NGOs. Because multinational corporations are considered to share 
too small of a burden in the just distribution of social goods, and because the contemporary 
economic system creates problems including wage inequality, social injustices, and ecological 
destruction, activists and other counter-hegemonic actors are pressuring the private sector to 
adopt socially responsible behaviors. Boaventura Santos articulates this process by pointing out 
that the very forces of neoliberal globalization “while propagating throughout the globe the same 
system of domination and exclusion, has created the conditions for the counter-hegemonic forces 
to engage in various emancipatory social projects.”68 From this understanding, therefore, CSR is 
recognized as a form of social regulation on the market where public actors apply heat in order to 
“force” corporations to engage in ethical actions. 
Other scholars, however, argue that this understanding of CSR fails to take into account 
the ways in which the private sector itself shapes the development and context of CSR. 
According to Ronan Shamir, “capitalist and capitalist entities do not sit still when faced with 
threats.”69 Private sector actors are adept at managing resistance in order to maintain legitimacy, 
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reflected by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, who posit: “capitalism has always relied on 
critiques of the status quo to alert it to any untrammeled development of its current forms and to 
discover the antidotes required to neutralize opposition and increase the level of profitability 
with in.”70 From this perspective, CSR is not simply a passive process in which the private sector 
is shaped and regulated by outside social critique, but is also an active mechanism in which 
corporations shape and re-shape the normative landscape of CSR internally. Indeed, one of the 
major debates within the CSR community is the very meaning of responsibility itself. Whereas 
on one side, counter-hegemonic actors equate it with definite and enforceable moral duties 
designed to restrain corporate activity, on the other, the private sector associates responsibility 
with voluntariness and self-regulation. Due to the latter understanding being dominant within 
discourses of CSR, corporate actors, rather than accept responsibility in the form legal 
obligations and regulations, usually insist on self-regulatory schemes.71 
Critics argue that this focus on self-regulation in mainstream CSR discourses not only 
enables greenwashing, but can also serve to increase the epistemological legitimacy of 
neoliberalism and consolidate the power of large individual corporations.72 Shamir, for example, 
maintains that CSR, imbued from above with a “voluntary and altruistic spirit,” allows the 
corporate actor to dictate the terms of its own critique, while simultaneously fending off external 
regulatory threats and creating a benevolent public image.73 This is further exacerbated by 
popularized notions of corporate moral agency. Lozano points out that the assumption of an 
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alleged corporate moral agency that is both “individual and self-sufficient” gives the corporation 
the normative tools to fend off external regulation, premised on the idea that private action is 
inherently moral action, and that for a corporation to act morally, it must act voluntarily without 
interference.74 This has led, at times, to peculiar circumstances where corporations are at once 
exemplars of ethical practice from the perspective of the CSR community and the public, while 
simultaneously engaging in immoral and illegal actions to make a profit, as in the case of 
Volkswagen scandal of 2015.75 
Thus, while the connections between CSR and corporate empowerment are beginning to 
be explored in scholarly literature, the means by which the corporate sector shapes and re-shapes 
the normative structure of CSR remains lacking. In this article, I argue that the capacity of the 
private sector to shape the normative framework of CSR is emboldened by the perpetuation of 
narratives that associate private sector activities as inherently moral, specifically, ones that 
bestow moral agency to private institutions. In particular, I focus on one such 
narrative prevalent in early twentieth century philanthropy, namely, the stewardship ethic. I 
argue that the stewardship ethic, the idea that the business leader ought to act as a financial and 
moral steward for broader society, was a foundation for emerging philanthropy and served to 
empower corporations during a time of increased public scrutiny at private actions, acting as a 
buffer for more penetrating critiques of industrial capitalist activity. Finally, I maintain that 
although current CSR frameworks differ in practice and form from the philanthropy of the turn 
of the century, the narrative and normative function of stewardship remains as a major force 
behind CSR and is one of the drivers behind contemporary efforts to maintain CSR as a self-
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regulatory and voluntary practice. The final section undertakes a brief exploration into the 
interactions between corporate stewardship and corporate sovereignty.  
This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I outline a general understanding 
of CSR. Specifically, I locate the discourse of CSR as a result of two merging forces, which 
Peter Utting and Kate Ives describe as the “movement from below and the movement from 
above.”76  I argue that the movement from below represents a form of counter-hegemonic 
resistance to corporate power, whereas the movement from above signals attempts from the 
private sector to neutralize and offset these critiques. The second section provides a historical 
account of early twentieth-century philanthropy. I understand the normative foundations of 
philanthropy to be rooted in notions of stewardship, whereby the corporation is understood as a 
steward for the wellbeing of broader society. I argue that this narrative of stewardship, 
propagated in large part by private sector actors, was vital in the various stages of corporate 
empowerment during that time. In the final section, I analyze the “ethic of stewardship” from the 
perspective of the contemporary discourse of CSR and argues that while, different in form, CSR 
largely relies on assumptions of private stewardship for its validation, and in particular, the 
legitimization of self-regulatory CSR frameworks.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
The practice of CSR has grown substantially in recent times. According to The 
Economist, CSR is now “an industry in itself, with full time staff, newsletters, professional 
associations, and massed armies of consultants.”77 The notion that corporations ought to have 
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social responsibilities to the public has been welcomed not only amongst academics and NGOs, 
but has also blossomed in the private sector as well. As described by David S. Spence, “[O]ne 
would be hard-pressed to find a Fortune 500 company that does not publish some form of annual 
CSR report touting its investments in environmental sustainability, social progress, and the 
like.”78 
Broadly speaking, CSR refers to the custom of extending consideration beyond the direct 
owners of the stock to include a further array of stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, 
customers, local communities, etc. This custom is interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, 
CSR is understood as a means of enforcing accountability for a firms actions. As described by 
Myrna Wulfson, it means that a “corporation should be held accountable for any of its actions 
that affect people, their communities, and their environment.”79 This first point, therefore, is a 
simple statement of answerability, whereby the corporation is expected to take responsibility for 
the costs of their own profit-seeking behaviors, including the cleaning up of industrial pollution, 
compensatory packages for communities they have affected, etc. A second common point, 
however, goes beyond accountability to a deeper meaning of responsibility. Keith Davis and 
Robert Blomstron, for example, define CSR as the obligation of the corporate executives to “take 
action which protects and improves the welfare of society as a whole along with its own 
interests.”80 Based on this understanding, corporations should not only accept responsibility for 
the negative externalities of their own actions, but also actively pursue “social good” beyond the 
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range of their own company. The idea of the Triple Bottom Line is a reflection of this. It works 
on the assumption that the company is a member of a moral community, and consequently 
understands the objectives of corporations as three-fold: (1) to make a profit, (2) to better society 
in some capacity, and (3) to improve environmental conditions overall.  
This latter understanding of the corporation-in-society relationship, sometimes referred to 
as the stakeholder model, is perceived to be a drastic delineation from other forms, namely, the 
shareholder account. According to the shareholder model, the only obligation of business is to 
make money for the shareholders, the owners of the stock. Social responsibilities beyond profit-
making are understood to be counter-intuitive to the essential role of business. Reflected most 
famously in Milton Friedman’s New York Times piece, in 1970 entitled “The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” the shareholder model, as presented in 
Friedman’s argument, states that the discourse of CSR is characterized by an “analytical 
looseness and lack of rigor.”81 To say that a business has responsibilities beyond business, 
according to Friedman, is, at best, no more than shallow prose, but at worse, a deeply 
undemocratic form of governance where un-elected CEOs of firms can perform governmental 
functions by acting as “legislator, executive, and jurist” for broader society.82 As a result, a 
shareholder view of the firm is largely skeptical of all attempts by corporations to ‘improve 
society’ beyond direct financial gains. As described by Bobby Banarjee, “[the] Friedman camp is 
dismissive, in fact, downright suspicious about corporate social responsibility outside the 
shareholder value framework.”83 
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Despite resistance to the stakeholder account, however, it is now regarded as the 
dominant framework of business-society relations. Corporations are not only seen as moral 
agents capable of delivering social “goods” outside of the profit framework, but also as moral 
authorities in their own right. The Starbucks case above may be an example when a corporation 
“gets it wrong” by appearing inauthentic, or not displaying the correct sensitivity to an issue, but 
the assumption that Starbucks should be trying to better society remains intact for the most part.  
 
The View from Below 
As described by Peter Utting and Kate Ives, the popularity that CSR now enjoys can be 
traced back to the eighties and nineties emerging as a result of two forces, described as the 
“movement from below [and the] movement from above.”84 The movement from below 
consisted mostly of non-governmental organizations and activists, described as civil society 
more broadly, and were mobilized by the rise of novel forms of communication, organization 
and transnational advocacy networks, and spurred on by increasing reports  of corporate 
malpractice in the media. In 1989, for example, Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker owned by Exxon 
Shipping Company, spilled approximately eleven million gallons of crude oil after striking 
Prince William Sound in the Gulf of Alaska. At that time, it was the largest oil spill to ever 
occur, eventually covering 2,100 km of coastline, in an area populated with rich marine life, 
including sea otters, seals and seabirds, etc. Further, reports of overseas malpractice with regard 
to other large multi-national corporations were beginning to emerge. Shell, for example, was 
criticized for its involvement in various human and labor rights abuses in its practices of oil 
extraction in Nigeria, culminating in the mid-nineties with allegations that they were allying with 
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the Nigerian government to quell an environmental protest led by the Ogoni people, leading 
ultimately to the execution of Ken Sero-Wiwa and eight other activists. Other allegations of 
malpractice were directed at Coca Cola for its purported involvement in the actions of 
paramilitary units that murdered union organizers at a bottling plant in Colombia that catered to 
its products. 
Corporate scandals such as these, and other instances of overseas human rights violations 
involving large multinationals were widely reported and instigated an organized resistance to 
what was perceived as illegitimate uses of corporate power. This resistance took the form of both 
legal and non-legal action. From a legal perspective, counter-hegemonic actors attempted to 
establish mandatory environmental and social reporting onto multinationals via proposals to the 
European Commission and other international governance bodies to establish legal blueprints 
that would subject multinational corporations to “a set of socially responsible universal standards 
that will apply to corporations above and beyond the demands of any specific locality.”85 
Although these attempts would ultimately prove unsuccessful, they were largely supported by 
NGOs and other civil society actors, with The Global Policy Forum, stating that “multinational 
corporations are too important for their conduct to be left to voluntary and self-generated 
standards.”86 Other activists enlisted the legal systems of Western countries in an effort to 
sanction corporate behavior overseas. Unocal, for example, was sued by plaintiffs for 
involvement in human rights violations in their activities of oil extraction in Burma by invoking 
the Alien Tort Claims Act of the US. 
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In addition to attempted legal reform, alternative forms of resistance focused on publicly 
shaming multinationals to coerce them into voluntarily adopting responsible business practices. 
Actions such as the corporate boycott against Coca Cola in the eighties is one such example, 
where activists predominantly located in the U.S. boycotted Coca Cola products for the 
company’s involvement in the apartheid government of South Africa. Coca Cola responded by 
donating ten million dollars to social housing for black South Africans and also promising to sell 
their operations in South Africa. Further, many new non-profit groups emerged which focused 
on monitoring corporate behavior and fostering increased transparency in the private sector.  
Organizations such as Corporate Watch, for example, established in 1996, provided a critical and 
independent new source, specifically focused on the social and environmental impacts of large 
international corporations. According to Robert Sklair, the amount of corporate surveillance 
increased to such an extent that he describes that the “[t]he contemporary level of monitoring of 
corporate activities is historically unprecedented.” Now, he argues, “there are thousands of 
organizations actively seeking out corporate malpractices all over the world.”87 
Thus, the movement from below, led largely by members of civil society, and brought 
about by the widespread reporting of corporate malpractice, as well as the rising status of 
corporations as global private authorities more generally, has served to mold the early CSR 
movement and bring it to public attention. Activists, unhappy with growing levels of corporate 
power, and the abuses of that power,  have used both legal and non-legal measures to coerce 
corporation into ethical actions. As described by Shamir, the “enhanced powers of MNCs [gave] 
rise to new types of political initiatives that focus[ed] on the inadequate accountability of MNCs 
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to the vast populations effected by their business practices.”88 CSR frameworks, such as 
accountability and ethics annual reporting, sustainability initiatives, and corrections of labor 
rights abuses, were thus developed as a result of these new forms of political initiatives in 
reaction to corporate malpractice.  
 
The View from Above 
CSR, from this perspective, therefore, can be understood as a framework arising from 
counter-hegemonic pressures and one which is forced upon the private sector by civil society 
actors. Other scholars, however, argue that this interpretation of CSR fails to take into account 
the ways in which the private sector itself shapes the development and context of CSR. Indeed, 
as described by Utting and Ives, the CSR agenda in the eighties and nineties was not just 
passively accepted from the private sector, but was largely spearheaded by corporations in a 
manner that was more active than reactive. Indeed, they state that it was the oil industry, one of 
the worst offenders with regard malpractice, which pioneered the new CSR agendas. Shell, for 
example, produced the first report that took social and environmental responsibility into 
consideration in their publication of “People and the Environment: Annual Report 1996,” and 
currently the oil industry remains one of the leaders in social and environmental reporting. Form 
the early 1980s onwards, they describe that multinationals from the oil sector began “vigorous 
advertising, adopting codes of conduct, strengthening environmental management systems, 
investing in renewables, increasing their support for local community projects, producing 
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sustainability reports, and joining or collaborating with various national and international CSR 
initiatives and institutions.”89  
Perhaps understandably, the actions of the corporations immediately became subject to 
scrutiny on charges of “greenwashing.”90 It was argued that rather than genuinely take into 
consideration the critiques from civil society and alter business practices, these companies were 
merely making either shallow adjustments to maintain business-as-usual, or actively deceiving 
and exaggerating environmental and social credentials. CorpWatch bestowed “greenwash 
awards” on the worst offenders, many of which were part of the oil industry. It was found that 
British Petroleum, for example, despite changing their name to “Beyond Petroleum” and 
promoting their involvement in solar energy projects, were simultaneously spending billions on 
oil exploration in Alaska in 2000. Similar circumstances were reported elsewhere, detailing 
either corporate deception or gross exaggeration with regard responsible actions in an attempt to 
maintain a positive public image and distract in the backdrop of corporate scandals.  
Although these efforts on the part of the private sector, and in particular the oil 
companies, was described as greenwash, Utting and Ives argue that this label has the capacity to 
misdirect the issue, stating that the “notion of greenwash tends to suggest that the business is 
simply acting defensively and that it has no genuine interest in CSR apart from reputation 
management.”91 According to the authors, the actions are more accurately located within a wider 
Gramscian understanding of hegemonic resistance insofar as attempts by the private sector to 
adopt socially responsible behavior are efforts to neutralize critique and maintain authority. For 
them, the “movement from above” not only represented a strategic attempt to manage public 
                                                 




disapproval, but also to create a CSR framework that would allow large corporations to maintain 
the epistemological legitimacy of capitalist enterprise at a global scale, writing that the 
companies promoting CSR were not just reacting to pressures from below, but rather “actively 
trying to shape and lead the CSR agenda.”92 This was witnessed specifically in the early stages 
of the movement, with business interests coalescing to influence the outcomes of major 
conferences, such as the UNCED, the United Nations Conference of Environment and 
Development, in 1992, for example. As described by Brockington and Duffy, “business used its 
prior experience with UN activities to prepare the ground for a central role in the UNCED 
process.”93  In response to a perceived threat that these new forms of environmental and social 
governance may have on the framework of neoliberalism, business interests came together to 
shape a more favorable outcome by ensuring corporate presence in the leadership of the 
conference, as well as forming coalitions to block legislation that would potentially affect 
corporate sovereignty. Maurice Strong, for example, a Canadian multi-millionaire with interests 
in the oil and gas industries, was appointed as Secretary General of the conference, and made 
specific reference to the compatibility of free trade and sustainability in his opening speech. 
Further, in reaction to the proposed UN Code of Conduct for multinational corporations devised 
by the UN Economic and Social Council that would see corporations subject to legally binding 
norms and codes of conduct, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the 
International Chamber of Commerce devised an alternative that focuses on corporate sovereignty 
and self-regulation rather than legal regulation. The influx of business influence was also 
apparent in in the World Summit on Sustainability Development (WSSN) ten years later, where, 
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as described by Utting and Ives, “active business mobilization . . . managed to put the idea of 
public-private partnerships firmly on the international agenda, and, in the process, divert 
attention from calls for “corporate accountability” and stronger regulation of transnational 
corporations.”94 
According to Utting and Ives, then, the movement from above highlights the influence 
that business interests have on the framework of sustainability and CSR in general. This 
influence is reflected most poignantly on the continued focus on self-regulation in CSR. Despite 
attempts in the early part of the movement to establish CSR as a legally enforceable framework, 
it has remained stubbornly voluntary and self-regulatory, largely brought about by maintained 
pressure from large governance bodies and the private sector. The European Commission, for 
example, has consistently rejected any proposals to enforce legally binding norms of 
corporations, emphasizing instead the voluntary nature of CSR, stating “it did not intend to 
impose responsible behavior on companies by means of compulsory regulation.”95 Likewise, in 
response to attempts to use the Alien Torts Claim Act (ATCA) as a way to legally condemn 
corporate overseas behavior, large group of corporations formed organizations, such as USA 
Engage, which invested financial resources to actively delegitimize the ACTA and repeal the 
laws surrounding it. Those who attempted to hold corporate overseas behavior accountable to 
American laws were often referred to as “foreign nationals” and “unaccountable actors” by USA 
Engage and accused of “risk[ing] American interests” and posing threats to national security.96  
As Shamir asserts, what these efforts demonstrate is not simply an attempt to change the 
practical workings of CSR, but also to alter its normative foundations, stating that the “major 
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currency that is negotiated in the field [of CSR] is the very meaning and scope of social 
responsibility itself.”97 While on one side, civil society actors usually associate responsibility 
with strict and enforceable norms of behavior and subsequently “invest the idea of CSR with 
binding . . . rules, envisioning it as a set of regulated structures of corporate governance,”98 on 
the other side are those private sector agents who posit an alternative notion of responsibility that 
is more closely associated with a “voluntary and altruistic spirit.”99 For the latter, CSR is best 
achieved by being non-enforceable, self-regulated and voluntary. Subsequently, they work so as 
to create a normative framework for CSR that imbues the private actor with a self-determined 
moral agency that can act ethically, and preferably, without interference. As Shamir describes, 
“the principle of self-regulation has become the corporations most crucial frontline in the 
struggle over meaning and an essential ideological locus for disseminating the neoliberal logic of 
altruistic social participation that is to be governed by good will alone.”100 
This kind of explicit CSR, focusing on self-regulation and moral voluntarism, is now the 
dominant form of corporate social responsibility in the private sector.101 The notion that 
corporate responsibility is inherently altruistic, governing by good will alone, is now largely a 
truism in mainstream CSR discourse. A critical analysis will follow on from the position of 
Richard Marens who states that “understanding why explicit managerial-centered corporate 
social responsibility which first developed in the United States, has recently spread globally 
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requires an examination of the circumstances under which it first emerged.”102 To this end, in the 
next section, I turns to early twentieth-century philanthropy, what has been described as 
theoretical roots of contemporary CSR. In particular, I explore the “stewardship ethic,” a 
dominant narrative in the early twentieth-century philanthropy movement that served to frame 
business-society relations, as well as provide a normative framework for emerging 
manifestations of corporate social responsibility via philanthropy. I suggest, ultimately, that the 
tenets of the stewardship ethic remain a substantial moral force in both framing mainstream 
discourses CSR today and validating currents trends towards self-regulation. 
 
Philanthropy and the Stewardship Ethic 
The rise of philanthropy in the U.S. at the beginning of the twentieth century was 
embedded in the unique socio-economic characteristics of the time. Industrialism was leading to 
large economic growth, causing an increase in the number of wealthy people. In the 1870s, there 
was just 100 millionaires in the U.S., but during the next twenty years, this number increased 
significantly. In 1892, the New York Times reported that the figure was at 4,047 and in 1916, the 
number had reached 40,000 millionaires, and some of them billionaires.103 In addition to the 
upsurge in the wealthy class, there was also a rise in social ills associated with increasing 
industrialism, including growing class disparities, urban poverty, and health problems. Many 
industrialists at the time, aware of burgeoning criticism with regard the growing corporate class, 
established foundations by which to provide charitable contributions to social causes and “give 
back” to their community. Most notably among them were businessman such as John D. 
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Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie and Cornelius Vanderbilt, all of whom were included in the 
“mega-rich” at the time, and whose philanthropic contributions were recognized as providing 
well needed relief to certain sectors of the public. 
Philanthropy was not, of course, a novel activity, but the conceptual foundations of the 
newly emerging philanthropy differed slightly from its predecessors. While previous 
philanthropic tendencies largely participated in a tradition of relief-giving, the new philanthropy 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century moved in a different direction, in part inspired 
by a perceived redundancy of the older form. For many of the new philanthropists, “almsgiving” 
was replaced by initiatives to “maximize human potential.”104 Philanthropy was not so much 
charity, in this new configuration, but rather a direct means to societal improvement. Carnegie, in 
particular, rejected the older philanthropic tradition of charity and instead sought to encourage 
individual and cultural advancement, stating in the Gospel of Wealth, “in bestowing charity, the 
main consideration should be to help those who will help themselves.”105 As a result, the main 
recipients of his donations were largely those institutions designed to improve civilization, such 
as educational and cultural organizations. Frederick Gates, who John D. Rockefeller hired to be 
his head associate of philanthropy, also reflected Rockefeller’s desire that his financial 
contributions would serve as an aid to progress in general, and in 1902, reports that he read 
“intensively about the origins and development of human civilization to find out the best means 
to use the foundation to promote human progress.”106 In 1908, the conclusions were published in 
an article by Rockefeller, specifically outlining the six areas upon which progress depended, “(1) 
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the means of subsistence; (2) government and law; (3) literature and language; (4) science and 
philosophy; (5) art and refinement; (6) morality and religion.”107   
Robert H. Bremmer comments on this phenomenon in his analysis that modern day 
philanthropy reflected a “curious but very important shift in emphasis in succoring the 
unfortunate to assisting the ambitious.”108 To aid, the poor, the cold, and the wretched would 
serve as charity, but it would not be productive economically and it may also encourage 
slothfulness and idleness, according to many of the industrialists. As a result, the new capitalists 
devoted funds to projects and individuals that would, according to Andrew Carnegie, “build 
ladders upon which the aspiring can rise.”109 
Explanations as to why the new found enthusiasm for philanthropy arose during this time 
are plentiful. Adams writes that the wealthy new industrialist American philanthropy was largely 
inspired by the situation in Europe at that time. Many of the European industrialists, seeking 
entry to the political elite, began to distribute some of their wealth in an attempt to integrate 
themselves into a society which was at the time still largely led by the aristocracy.110 According 
to Margaret E. Menninger, devoting parts of their capital to charitable causes allowed them to 
gain “social wealth,” giving them a foot in the door of the political elite by gaining crucial social 
influence.111 In turn, many of the American industrialists traveled to Europe in an effort to 
become better versed in the European cultural and artistic canon which allowed them entry and 
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to claim “membership of a superior social class,”112 and emulated the philanthropic tendencies 
they witnessed there upon return to the U.S. Similar to the understanding of philanthropy as a 
key element to securing a place in society, Simone Lassig describes that the practice of 
philanthropic giving as serving a cleansing role for the giver. Financial sacrifice, in this 
understanding, is a means to the salvation to the philanthropist, which she describes as the act of 
cleans[ing] themselves of the “stink” of new money and becoming integrated into society 
through the acceptance of their gifts.113  This is also reflected in George Simmel’s essay The 
Poor, for example, as he discusses how “the motive for alms then resides exclusively in the 
significance of giving for the giver. When Jesus told the wealthy young man, ‘give your riches to 
the poor,’ what apparently mattered to him was not the poor, but rather the soul of the wealthy 
man.”114 These understandings of philanthropic giving participate in a Bourdieuian interpretation 
of capital-exchange, where one form of capital, in this case, economic, can be exchanged for 
another (i.e.: symbolic/cultural). 
Another predominant explanation, however, is outlined by Wulfson who describes that 
twentieth century philanthropy emerged as a result of corporations getting “too big, too 
powerful, and guilty of antisocial and anticompetitive behaviors.”115 The increase and scope of 
corporate power led to consequent regulations on the part of the government as “anti-trust laws, 
banking regulations, and consumer protection laws” were all written in an attempt to restrict 
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corporate power.116 On the part of the private sector, philanthropy was a means of resistance 
where philanthropists donated money to popular causes as a means to improve their public image 
and fend off top-down regulation on the scope of their size and the scope of their activities. 
As Benjamin Soskis points out, however, the emerging philanthropy at the time suffered 
from some conceptual contradictions; whereas on one hand philanthropy was understood as 
means to reliably protect capital and limit regulations by ensuring garnering community 
acceptance, on the other, it presented uncertainty with regard the appropriate business-society 
relationship.117 The question of whether business as a whole, and large corporations in particular, 
has responsibilities to broader society was one that had been mostly unexamined, largely due to 
the prevalence of small businesses and/or business run exclusively by one person up until that 
point. Within the traditional framework, private corporate giving was an extension of individual 
giving that was located in a Christian-influenced traditional of personal benevolence. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, however, with the rise of large multinational 
corporations, an ethic that laid out institution corporate social responsibilities to society was 
found wanting, and thus the nineteenth century “lacked a concept of the relation of business to 
community—in which social responsibility was clearly seen as charge not merely upon 
individual conscience and concern but upon corporate resources as well.”118 
One such way in which this ethic was formed was through a framework of stewardship. 
As articulated by Benjamin Soskis, American industrialists at that time, engaging in philanthropy 
but lacking an appropriate framework to do so, borrowed tenants of the Christian idea of 
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stewardship, which located themselves in a position of stewards, taking care of their wealth not 
just for themselves but for society in general. Stewardship, coming from the Old English words 
sti, meaning “hall,” and weard, meaning “ward,” is understood as traditionally referring to the 
action of taking care of domestic duties, and has two central premises: first, the capacity to care 
for, manage, or control, a persons or things, and secondly, the act of being accountable for those 
things.  As outlined in the Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, “a steward 
exercises power and authority but does not have license to do so in a self-serving or careless 
manner.’119 From the perspective of the business leader, then, stewardship was taken up to mean 
that the wealth garnered from capitalist enterprise was not for self-interest, but rather, it was the 
role of the business leader to steward that wealth, for the ultimate goal of social betterment in 
general. As Soskis puts it: 
By the dictates of stewardship, men could not claim ultimate ownership over their 
possessions, but held them only as trustees for some higher authority—in the concept’s 
Protestant manifestation, God, and in its secular version, a broadly defined public.120  
 
Perhaps the clearest embodiment of the stewardship ethic in relation to business activities 
is in the actions of the philanthropists mentioned earlier, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew 
Carnegie. In Rockefeller’s interpretation, his capacity as a business man and his subsequent 
success was perceived as a divine gift that was bestowed upon him for good reason. In one 
interview, he states, “it is seemed that I was favored and got great increase because the Lord 
knew that I was going to turn around and give it right back.”121 Rockefeller, thus, perceiving that 
God had granted him the abilities to make money because of his very inclinations toward 
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generosity and pubic benevolence understood this as a sign that his proper role was that of 
steward; making money, and then distributing that wealth for the betterment of society in 
general. He reflects this role further in a conversation with another biographer, stating that 
having been endowed with the gift which I possess, I believe it is my duty to go on 
making money and still more money . . . and to dispose of the money I make for the good 
of my fellow man according to the dictates of my conscience.122  
 
Like Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, the Scottish emigrant and entrepreneur, also 
believed in his duties of stewardship. In his essay, “The Gospel of Wealth,” he stated that it was 
both desirable and inevitable that wealth be concentrated in the hands of a few, and like 
Rockefeller, believed that the extraordinary financial capacities of those earners should be used 
for public good. Unlike Rockefeller, however, he did not think these capacities were divinely 
appointed; rather, he believed that these capacities emerged in particular social conditions and 
consequently the success of the enterprise could not be separated from the society that gave rise 
to it. Due to the enormous opportunities afforded to people in U.S. society, people of great 
ambition and talent would naturally make a fortune, but this fortune wasn’t theirs alone; they 
must consider themselves “the mere agent and trustee for [their] poorer brethren.”123 For 
Carnegie, however, acting as “good steward” meant that the wealth created by business talent 
and financial success must be directed towards such things that serve as advantageous for the 
progress of society at large. For Carnegie, these things included colleges and universities, 
libraries, hospitals, and medical research facilities; public parks and lecture halls; swimming 
pools, etc. It did not include, however, distributing, those profits more evenly in the companies 
themselves, or between the workers within those companies. Keeping firmly within the 
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stewardship tradition, Carnegie states that, “[t]he wealth gathered into one great stream is 
capable of doing more public good than if it had remained scattered in the hands of thousands, 
probably to be frittered away.”124  
The stewardship ethic, thus, became a normative influence at the turn of the century, and 
provided a narrative from which modern philanthropy could emerge and flourish.125 Reasons as 
to why the stewardship became popularized, however, point to a more nuanced analysis of 
philanthropy in general. Indeed, as Soskis outlines, the stewardship ethic served a two-fold 
purpose: to both legitimize the amassing of large amounts of private capital, and to validate the 
transferal of this private wealth to sectors of society decided by the giver.126  Under the 
stewardship ethic, therefore, the mass accumulation of wealth could be justified while remaining 
within the dictates of the Christian tradition of individual benevolence by pointing to the social 
benefits of the profit motive, as well as implying a special or unique status to the business leader 
that was industrious enough to earn the capital. In this way, it served to tie the concept of 
property rights and financial accumulation to public responsibilities, and provided a bond 
between self-interest and social service more generally that was crucial to the conceptual 
foundations of business philanthropy in the United States.127 
 
Stewardship, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Sovereignty 
It is, thus, in this context that a further analysis of CSR can take place. Despite 
differences between turn of the century philanthropy and contemporary CSR in both scale and 
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form, the marriage between business and benevolence inherent to the corporate stewardship 
framework, and the focus on the business leader as a public steward, remains an underlying 
assumption in CSR practices today. In one prominent business ethics text book, it is described 
that:  
Many of today’s corporate executives see themselves as stewards, or trustees, who act in 
the general public’s interest. Although their companies are privately owned and they try 
to make profits for the stockholders, business leaders who follow the stewardship 
principle believe they have an obligation to see that everyone—particularly those in need 
or at risk—benefits from their firms’ actions.128 
 
 “Stewardship” forms a seminal part of the CSR lexicon with many companies, including 
REI and Hyatt, publishing yearly “stewardship reports,” in which they outline their 
responsibilities and goals for the global community. Others, such as Schlumberger, a leading 
technology provider for the oil and gas sector, argues that their commitment to minimizing social 
and environmental impacts “forms the basis of our vision of Global Stewardship, which includes 
a social responsibility to the people in the communities where we live and work.”129 In a large 
2017 meeting in Singapore for the investment managing industry, one commentator describes 
that the “overarching theme wasn’t stability or security, as one might reasonably expect given 
the geopolitical situation. Instead, the audience sat down to discussions on stewardship.”130         
Perhaps the most apparent example of the stewardship ethic in contemporary CSR is in 
the framework of “conscious capitalism.” Conscious Capitalism, a discourse pioneered and 
popularized by John Mackey, CEO of Wholefoods, asserts that the free market model can, and 
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must, be directed for social betterment. Mackey writes that “business needs to become holistic 
and integral with deeper comprehensive purposes,”131 stating that conscious capitalism has four 
main tenets, it must be: “spiritually evolved, [have] self-effacing servant leaders; a conscious 
culture; a stakeholder orientation; and a higher purpose, one that transcends profit 
maximization.”132  
Although heralded as a new paradigm, there are significant similarities between earlier 
notions of stewardship and contemporary conscious capitalism. Both frameworks, for example, 
focus on the importance of value creation beyond the financial, and both perceive the betterment 
of society as a goal that is compatible with that of profit creation. Indeed, according to both 
discourses, not only are business and social betterment compatible, but business, corporate 
stewardship, and the profit motive are essential for the improvement of society.  As one 
proponent describes, it is the “profit motive, not government or charity [that] will create the kind 
of socially responsible world we want our kids and grandkids to grow up in . . . creating a win-
win business model . . . is the only way to optimize value.”133 This is also reflected poignantly in 
the title of Mackey’s book, Conscious Capitalism: Liberating the Heroic Spirit of Business. In 
this case, the heroic spirit of business is in the innate capacity of business to be redirected, under 
the right hands, towards social improvement, and away from shallow profit-seeking behavior. 
According to Mackay, however, although the goals of the conscious capitalist is towards more 
noble ends than mere profit, this refocus will not lead to a compromise on the financial bottom 
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line either. In a recent debate with Milton Friedman, Mackey emphasizes the point particularly, 
stating that there can be “little doubt that a certain amount of corporate philanthropy is simply 
good business and works for the long term benefit of the investors.”134 Citing the custom of 
holding five, five percent off, days at Wholefoods where, for those days, five percent of all total 
sales are donated to various non-profits, he asserts that is not simply a loss of profits, but rather it 
usually brings in “hundreds of new or lapsed customers into our stores.”135  
In many ways, therefore, the notions of stewardship that formed a large part of the 
ideological basis for twentieth century philanthropy remains a major force in contemporary CSR. 
Many recent scholars, for example, argue that stewardship in CSR offers a positive alternative to 
earlier versions of agency theory, which harkens back to the idea of the rational self-serving 
business leader, intent only on private gain.136 In contrast, stewardship lays out a business-
society framework that understands the business leader as concerned about the well-being of all 
society and the creation of value in a broader sense, beyond mere financial objectives. Thus, like 
the stewardship ethic of the earlier philanthropists, the assumption remains that the business 
leader has a responsibility to act towards the betterment of society, and that the redistribution of 
wealth is best achieved by those that are the most successful economically. 
 
Critiquing Corporate Stewardship 
Despite stewardship presenting a seemingly benevolent gloss on the forces of capitalist 
production, the final section looks at some potential problems and contradictions with regard to 
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the stewardship ethic as normative framework in contemporary business-society relations. 
 
The Stewardship Ethic and Depoliticized Benevolence 
This understanding of stewardship as profit-friendly is evident in its first formulations. 
The marriage of business and public benevolence that stewardship represents not only cemented 
the moral narrative of early twentieth-century philanthropy, but also capitalism in general. Led 
largely by the dictates of the stewardship ethic, Carnegie, for example, argued that it was his 
duty to increase his own personal revenues as much as possible and in The Gospel of Wealth, he 
writes:  
The struggle for more is completely changed from selfish or ambitious talent into a noble 
pursuit. The [the man of wealth] labors not for self, but for others; not to hoard; not to 
spend. The more he makes, the more the public gets.137 
 
This union [between business and benevolence] was also put forth in less demanding 
terms elsewhere. Cornelius Vanderbilt, the railroad tycoon who was known for his distinct lack 
of philanthropic inclinations, was defended upon his death by the a reporter in the New 
York Evening Mail who stated, “it is the part of the Providence that overrules all human efforts 
and events, that such incarnations of energy and enterprise as Mr. Vanderbilt must serve the 
public uses, whether they want to do it or not.”138 Similarly, a speaker at a Baptist conference in 
1893 stated, “the man who possesses a fortune is nolens volens a benefactor to the community. 
He may be a misanthrope and atheist. But if such a man moves into a Western city and begins to 
spend his money in the most selfish and ostentatious luxury, he is an involuntary benefactor to 
that city.”139 
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Thus, using a popular interpretation of Smith’s invisible hand, the stewardship ethic of 
the nineteenth century and early twentieth century framed an understanding of business that was 
in line with Christian thinking, even when the business in question was not explicitly generous or 
concerned with charity in a more traditional sense. There was an accepted compatibility with 
“the [t]he laws of the market and of God” and, as Soskis writes: “this devotion to the invisible 
hand could . . . push aside established notions of Christian service”140 to the point where the 
pursuit of profit alone was a holy act. By arguing that the role of industrialist was that of steward, 
and that stewardship could only take place within the confines of a free and competitive 
capitalistic society, it relocated economic activity as an inherently moral endeavor. In doing so, it 
lauded the profit motive in capitalism as an essential component of stewardship capacities. As 
Rockefeller puts it: 
The best philanthropy, the help that does the most good and the least harm, the help that 
nourishes civilization at its very root, that most widely disseminates health, 
righteousness, and happiness, is not what is usually called charity. It is… the investment 
of effort or time or money, carefully considered with relation to the power of employing 
people at a remunerative wage, to expand and develop the resources at hand, and to give 
opportunity for progress and healthful labour where it did not exist before.141 
 
In this sense, then, not only does the stewardship ethic fail to question the profit drive, 
but it actively supports it, implying that the capacity to steward and the capacity to make profit 
are intimately linked. This connection is also reflected in contemporary discourses on CSR. In a 
recent book analyzing late stage capitalism, for example, Daniel Yankelovich argues that the 
stewardship ethic serves as a promising way forward between agency theory and more extreme 
corporate regulations; that the “stewardship ethics position . . . shares the perspective of the 
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business sector about profit-making. It does not regard profit-making as problematic. On the 
contrary, it appreciates the many uses to which profit can be put.142  
The focus on profit, however, also exposes some inherent contradictions with the concept 
of stewardship itself. Indeed, the first philanthropists–operating under the framework of 
stewardship–were met with substantial criticism from their contemporaries. William Jewit 
Tucker, for example, professor and future president of Dartmouth college, stated that Carnegie’s 
aim was to distribute wealth while “leaving the question of the original distribution unsettled, or 
settled only to the satisfaction of the few.”143 A similar reflection was made by Theodore 
Roosevelt, the president of the United States at the time, as he noted that “no amount of charities 
in spending such fortunes can compensate in any way for the misconduct in acquiring them.”144 
Even some of the intended recipients of Carnegie’s philanthropic endeavors questioned the 
merits of his gifts. One in particular, a steelworker residing in an area where Carnegie just 
established a public library, said, “What good are libraries to me, working nearly eighteen hours 
a day.”145  
Thus, these critique’s illuminate one of the core contradictions of the stewardship ethic: 
the ways in which the capital needed for philanthropic stewardship is accumulated can nullify the 
actual benefits it intended to establish. This contradiction was evident in the early philanthropy 
movement, as the rising industrialism that enabled the rise of philanthropy also led to great social 
inequality, poorer working conditions, and ecological degradation.146  It is also evident in the 
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contemporary CSR movement as while substantial focus is placed on the values of stewardship 
and social responsibility, environmental and social conditions continue to decline in many parts 
of the world. 
The contradiction also, however, exposes one of the core consequences of stewardship in 
terms of its potential to depoliticize corporate behavior. In other words, to strip it of its political 
and social context. Although philanthropy is dependent upon capitalist means of production to 
create large amounts of surplus profit in the first instance, and consequently cannot be separated 
from the impacts of those productive forces, the mask of benevolence that accompanies the 
notion of stewardship serve to “collapse the distance between the market and the negative 
impacts it has on human well-being.”147 Thus, the misconduct involved in acquiring such large 
profit is neutralized; stewardship, in this case, rather than transform society towards overall 
betterment, serves, instead, to “stabilize the very system that results in poverty, disease, and 
environmental destruction.” This is also in line with Ben Agger’s theory of fast capitalism, which 
understands that the “blurred boundary between benevolence and the market is the result of a 
veiled discourse of stabilization that freezes the world falsely into ontological permanence.”148  
 
The Moralization of Corporate Action 
In addition to depoliticization, the stewardship ethic also serves to exacerbate a 
potentially false and problematic synthesis between the economic and the moral. As Shamir 
maintains, the moralization of the economic is an ongoing phenomenon, connected to the 
broader project of neoliberalism, and can be recognized in the observation that “commercial 
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enterprises increasingly perform tasks that were once considered to reside within the civic 
domain of moral entrepreneurship and the political domain of the caring welfare state, dispensing 
social goods other than profits to constituencies other than their shareholders.”149 The 
stewardship ethic seems to exacerbate this process. Indeed, one of the primary functions of the 
stewardship ethic is to associate private and economic activity with moral action. As discussed 
above, in the confines of the stewardship ethic, private activity becomes indistinguishable from 
moral ends, as corporate actors become moral agents through their role as social stewards, a role 
that is perceived to be inseparable from their position as corporate actors. 
The moralization of the economic has direct effects with regard to the ontological status 
of corporations, their consequent governance. As Rebecca De Winter describes, “the manner in 
which the agency of corporations is conceptualized is significant to the extent that it shapes 
public expectations and influences the nature and scope of state regulation.”150 Constructing the 
corporate actor as a moral actor allows the private actor to take on public action in a voluntary 
and self-regulated manner, while also providing a normative framework to resist external 
regulation. This is reflected clearly in how problems and solutions are conceptualized under this 
paradigm. Based on the assumption of a synthesis between the economic and the moral, the 
problem of corporate misbehavior, or indeed, inequality, is perceived, not as the result of 
institutional problems relating to market and private governance, but rather, as the result, of a 
“few bad eggs.” Consequently, the solution does not entail a restructuring of regulatory models, 
but rather a renewed focus on proper stewardship. As Hart describes: 
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Business ethicists rarely appeal to market-failure correction . . . . when proposing more 
rigorous standards for ethical business conduct, but rather appeal to any number of 
principles and values: ideals of social responsibility and stewardship, often via notions of 
social contracts and a ‘‘license to operate;’’ ideals of corporate citizenship . ..  
Sustainable development . . . traditional Judeo-Christian or Aristotelian virtues and vices; 
and sometimes liberal-democratic norms of justice, fairness, equality, and democracy.151 
 
Thus, by focusing on the stewardship capacities of business, the private sector is 
understood as both the problem and the solution to social and economic problems. This is also 
exacerbated by frameworks of meritocracy embedded into the stewardship framework. Because 
stewards are interpreted to be a unique and privileged position, it is maintained the private sector 
actors not only can, but should, be allowed to use their moral judgement in an unregulated way. 
As Lynch Wood et al. puts it, “the voluntary approach encourages the types of innovative CSR 
practices that additional layers of regulation may impede.”152 Within this framework, therefore, 
not only is external regulation unnecessary, but even possibly harmful, with the assumption that 
increased “political control of corporate activities would produce greater negative consequences 
than would the voluntary assumption of responsibility by corporations.”153 
The stewardship ethic, thus, by denoting moral authority to the private sector thus helps 
to “repackage corporate actors as moral agents committed to consensual, deliberate, governance, 
aimed at producing socio-economic goods and opposed to confrontational agonistic governance, 
which allegedly produces more harm than good.”154 As some authors point out, however, the 
equation of the economic and the moral and the construction of the corporate moral actor can be 
dangerous, in that it can create a false ontology of business-society relations. Indeed, as Carl 
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Rhodes notes, corporate business ethics has served to “build corporate sovereignty” by 
empowering the private sector and giving private actors and multinational corporations the 
capacity to “fend off demands for external regulatory control . . . by inculcating a system 
whereby corporations assert that they can regulate themselves.”155 The sovereignty that 
stewardship yields is made more problematic by the assertion that in many cases, corporations 
partake in good deeds only “to the extent that it makes business sense to do so.”156 Indeed, as 
Rhodes points out, “corporations have largely failed to responsibly use whatever autonomy and 
discretion they possessed to produce fair and generous outcomes for their various stakeholder 
groups.”157 
From the perspective of CSR, then, underlying ideas of stewardship may be one reason 
being the contemporary dominance of CSR frameworks that insist upon self-regulatory and 
voluntary mechanisms. Rooted in ideas about corporate meritocracy and notions of the “moral 
corporation,” underlying assumptions of corporate stewardship allow the private sector the 
normative tools to fend off external measures and gain significant influence with regard to the 
very meaning and conditions of contemporary CSR and private sector philanthropy. 
 
Conclusion: Stewardship, Sovereignty, And Social Movements 
Corporate stewardship, then, is closely aligned with corporate sovereignty as stewardship 
both depoliticizes the nature of corporate action by masking it in benevolence, while also 
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constructing a view of the corporation as a moral actor, and thus collapsing the distinction 
between economic and moral action. In this sense, stewardship, as an underlying normative 
framework for business-society relations, may support and help legitimize voluntary and self-
regulatory frameworks of corporate social responsibility. If business leaders are rightfully 
stewards of their wealth for the betterment of broader society, then profit-seeking behavior is 
both necessary for a flourishing society and business leaders ought to be free to act according to 
their will. If corporations are moral, inherently, why regulate them?  
As I have discussed, however, stewardship presents some conceptual and practical 
difficulties. Conceptually, as scholars have pointed out, the ability of private sector actors to 
amass wealth to subsequently steward (for social improvement) is premised on industrial activity 
and profit seeking behavior that can cause harm and more social and ecological destruction. 
Practically, the popular support of corporate stewardship can lead to difficulties in enforcing 
corporate regulation when regulation may be necessary.  
As this pertains to social movements, it also leads to further difficulties. The 
promulgation of voluntary CSR policies has led to an increase in partnerships and cooperation 
between environmental groups and private actors as the private sector shifts to CSR policies in 
place of external environmental regulation. As I discuss in the next chapter, however, rising 
engagement between private actors and environmental NGOs in this manner may have a impact 
on the recipient organizations or movement, leading to undue influence and potential conflicts of 
interest in the domain of environmental governance. 
CHAPTER 4 
PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT AND POWERFUL ENVIRONMENTALISMS:  
A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN 
61 
About halfway through the World Conservation Congress in Barcelona in 2008, a video 
produced by the World Business Council on Sustainable Development was shown to the 
audience. It opens with three people standing on a suspended white platform, hovering over a 
bed of clouds. The platform is tipping perilously to one side and then the other, with the three 
people desperately trying to maintain their balance and not fall off. As the camera draws closer, 
we can see that one man is identified as “Government,” one woman labelled “NGO,” and other, 
“Business.” On the platform with them are three translucent cubes, marked “food,” “water,” and 
“climate,” also sliding ominously from one end of the platform to the next. Although initially 
disorganized and unclear, the people gradually learn that only when they arrange the cubes in the 
middle of the platform can they save themselves. They begin to catch the cubes and push them 
towards the center, dropping two out of the three briefcases they were holding, labelled 
“ignorance” and “fear,” on the way. Finally, they successfully push all three blocks to the center, 
as one final briefcase, marked “trust” remains. The video concludes with a shot of them standing 
by their cubes, on a stable platform, smiling at one another, seemingly happily with the 
teamwork which led to their success.  
The video’s message does not take too much interpretation: ecological stability and 
ecosystem health can be only be achieved if NGOs, businesses, and governments work together. 
It is also not very novel. Messages of collaboration, such as this one, are now dominant in recent 
environmental politics, and, in particular, calls for environmental organizations to “partner” with 
corporations and other agents in the private sector are increasingly common.158 Whereas 
environmental groups were once known for their combative tendencies, a greater number now 
welcome these alliances. Many of the leading environmental NGOs, for example, place 
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significant emphasis on collaborative strategies and highlight the importance of harnessing the 
power of the market and working with their partners in business in mission statements, annual 
reports, and conferences. 
One implication of the rise in partnerships between environmental NGOs and the private 
sector is an increase in capital flowing from the private sector to the NGO sector. Currently, 
some of the larger environmental groups receive over fifty percent of their total funding from 
private foundations and corporate philanthropy, and many organizations list as many as 1,000 
corporate financial sponsors on their websites and annual reports.159 In addition to increases in 
capital, there is a growth in corporate presence in NGOs, manifested through board membership, 
project cooperation, and attendance and organization of international environmental meetings. 
As described by George Holmes, over sixty percent of board members in the largest three 
environmental organizations now come from the private sector, significantly outnumbering those 
board members with scientific backgrounds, and often taking high ranking positions such as 
president and director roles.160 Additionally, major ecological projects have corporate sponsors 
that not only provide money, but also may influence the particularities of the project, as 
evidenced in recent partnerships with Chesapeake Energy and the Sierra Club, and others.161  
There is a substantial literature on this growing engagement between environmental 
groups and the private sector.162 Much of the research, however, is focused on particular 
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partnerships, or on the field of conservation in general. In this chapter, I seek to contribute to the 
debate by investigating the implications of growing private sector engagement on the normative 
structure of environmentalism in a broader sense. I argue that despite tendencies towards 
characterizing these alliances as pragmatic and/or greenwashing, they are often more closely 
related to what Bill Adams describes as “Faustian bargains,” in that engagements such as these 
usually entail transactions between deeply different power dynamics, where one party benefits 
more than the other.163 Informed by a Gramscian analysis, I explore whether private sector 
engagement in the politics of environmentalism can be understood as a form of hegemony, 
where private sector actions contain oppositional environmentalism by controlling what Gramsci 
calls the “war of position;” in this case, the ideological terrain of the environmental movement. 
To this end, I analyze the work of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development as 
one possible illustration of this process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT 
The modern environmental movement in the United States, although dating back to the 
early nineteenth century, came to fruition in the sixties and seventies. During those decades, 
resistance to dams, nuclearization, and broader projects of industrialization increased 
dramatically. In 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, drawing awareness to and 
criticizing the mass use of pesticides, specifically DDT. Carson’s book was joined subsequently 
by a host of others, all warning of the dangers of population increases, unregulated economic 
growth, and industrial activity on the environment, including Steward Udall’s ‘The Quiet 
Crisis,” Paul Ehrlick’s The Population Bomb, etc.164 Messages of ecological harm and calls for a 
restructuring of social principles found willing audiences during this time, with the women, civil 
rights, and anti-war movements reflecting and coalescing to form a wider anti-establishment 
spirit intent on transformative societal change. 
The anti-establishment trend of the movement also informed a generally antagonistic 
attitude towards the private sector, and large corporations in general. The dominant view, at least 
in the early movement, was that the values and objectives of the environmental movement were 
deeply incompatible with the values and objectives of the private sector. The environmentalist 
Edward Abbey famously expressed this critique about the capitalist industrialist economy in 
proclaiming, “growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell.”165 Other anti-
capitalist, anti-corporate, sentiments remained pervasive during the early years, with the overall 
assumption being that to be an environmentalist, you also had to critical of modern industrial 
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capitalism. The techniques of the earlier movement also mirrored its more radical edge, as 
environmentalists adopted combative strategies designed to disrupt commerce and signal 
transformative shifts in social relations. On the first Earth Day, for example, students in Florida 
burned a car to protest the pollution caused by the automobile industry and in San Francisco, 
students poured oil in a water feature at the offices of the Standard Oil Company. Other radical 
strategies manifested more so in content rather than in form. Some early reformers, for example, 
used litigation techniques to attempt to bring about a national constitutional right to a clean 
environment.166 Although this strategy was never achieved, it reflected the loftier goals of earlier 
parts of the movement, as well as the inclinations towards systemic change.  
During the late seventies, eighties and nineties, however, these radical tactics and goals, 
as well as the anti-corporate sentiment, began to subside. Environmentalism achieved 
tremendous success, in both capturing public attention and changing legislation, with fourteen 
major environmental legislations passing between 1970 and 1977 alone. As noted by Cary 
Caglienese, however, as the environmental movement popularized, the kinds of activism and 
forms of protest shifted towards more incremental strategies.167 Instead of following the 
grassroots activism of the earlier movement, environmental groups switched to insider political 
strategies, working within existing power structures, focusing on incremental-based changes and 
emulating legal strategies used by other establishment interest groups in Washington D.C. This 
switch led to, as Caglianese describes, “legislative and administrative lobbying, along with 
strategic use of media and electoral efforts becom[ing] mainstays in the environmentalist 
                                                 
166 Cary Caglienese, “Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental 
Movement,” (2001). Faculty Scholarship, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1404. 
167 Ibid.  
66 
toolkit.”168 The use of litigation also became more incremental. In contrast to the transformative 
objectives of the earlier movement, later environmentalists were more content to “maintain and 
enforce the legislative victories they [already] had” rather than advance a more transformative 
agenda.169  
As the environmental movement became, therefore, a more institutionalized presence in 
the mainstream political domain, it also led to a change in both a methodology (the forms of 
resistance) and goals (what the mainstream movement wanted to achieve). Embedded within this 
institutionalization was a further shift in the relationship to the private sector. While in the 
seventies and eighties the private sector remained a source of contention and corporations were 
perceived to be generally destructive of the cause of environmental protection, things started to 
alter gradually in the eighties and nineties as businesses and environmental groups gained closer 
ties to one another through sponsorship deals, philanthropy, partnerships and corporate social 
responsibility initiatives. One of the first formal alliances was with the Environmental Defense 
Fund and McDonalds in 1990, which had the goal of lessening the impacts of packaging and 
waste without affecting the company’s bottom line. Another prominent example was the 
partnership between Greenpeace and the German company Foron and the Dortmund Institute in 
1992, who famously joined together to design and promote hydrocarbon refrigeration 
technology. At the time, it received substantial criticism from outside, particularly from other 
Greenpeace workers and offices throughout Europe. Many campaigners and supporters 
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perceived the deal to be a corporate “sell out.” It also damaged Greenpeace’s image as an 
“environmental attack dog” on the corporate sector.170  
Despite lingering criticism with regard specific deals, however, the relationship between 
business and environmentalism generally moved from one of hostility to one of constructive 
engagement. The renewed focus on engagement, rather than antagonism, arose in conjunction 
with a decrease in mandatory corporate restrictions as businesses began to voluntarily adopt 
environmental goals, get involved with environmental groups via philanthropy, and establish 
green initiatives. As Katherine Mangu-Ward puts it   
The idea of the rich corporate villain gleefully dirtying Mother Earth is powerful and 
appealing. Children of the 1980s encountered this supervillain in comics, movies, public 
awareness videos, and science textbooks. Times were good for mandatory recycling, for 
mandatory emissions reductions, for anything mandatory aimed at restraining corporate 
polluter. But in the '90s, something peculiar started happening. The men in suits were still 
middle-aged, round, and white. They were still just as concerned with profit and golf. 
Very few of them sported tie-dyed attire, aside from the occasional whimsical Jerry 
Garcia tie. But the men in suits started caring. Or at least acting like they cared. Which, if 
you ask a spotted owl, is the same thing.171 
 
Thus, as the perception of business as eco-villain subsided, coinciding with a decrease in 
mandatory corporate restrictions, businesses became allies, rather than enemies, of the 
environmental cause. This reconfiguration emerged in the backdrop of changing political-
economic structures. In the early movement, for example, it was predominantly the role of the 
state to ensure environmental regulation and monitor corporate activity. As environmental 
governance gradually shifted towards international bodies, however, such as the European Union 
and United Nations, corporations rallied against the command-control regulation of the earlier 
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model, and instead promoted voluntary measures, most notably, non-binding corporate social 
responsibility policies and practices. These led, then, to companies adopting green initiatives on 
their own accord, rather than accepting external regulation.  
From the perspective of many environmental organizations, this alliance with the private 
sector was welcomed as a new and important source of funding. Mac Chapin notes, for example, 
that as funding to environmental non-governmental organizations decreased and membership 
rates declined in the eighties, some of the largest conservation organizations began concerted 
efforts to attract funding from elsewhere, most notably from multilateral organizations and the 
private sector. To do so, he argues, environmental groups, such as the World Wildlife Fund, 
Conservation International, and the Nature Conservancy “reformulated their mission statements 
to focus on what they term large-scale conservation’ approaches.”172 These new approaches, 
described as “ambitious” and even “visionary,” departed from the more traditional place-based 
methods of earlier frameworks and focused instead on large eco-systems (usually in the Southern 
hemisphere) with high biodiversity rates, describing them vividly with terms  such as “hotspots,” 
“ecoregions,” and impressing potential funders with satellite imagery and GIS presentations of 
large expanses of potential conservation areas.173 These attempts proved successful. Although 
some groups, such as The Nature Conservancy, had long received sponsorship from businesses, 
this increased rapidly in the nineties. In 2004, for example, The Nature Conservancy had 1,900 
corporate sponsors, receiving $225 million in 2002, and Conservation International had almost 
250 corporations, donating $9 million in 2003.174 
                                                 




Alliances between environmental groups and the private sector have grown considerably 
since then. Now, not only do the bigger environmental organizations have corporate sponsors, 
but the majority of the leading environmental groups have corporate funders of some kind, with 
only a minority of groups choosing not to partner with corporations.175 In addition to 
sponsorship, corporate-NGO partnerships have also become a mainstay in both conservation and 
sustainable development projects, and private sector groups, such as the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), are often prominent actors in international 
environmental meetings and environmental governance more broadly.176  
Indeed, the extent to which the private sector, and private sector engagements, is now 
normalized into the field of environmental protection is unprecedented. As MacDonald notes 
Even just 20 years ago, the reputations of conservation organizations would have been 
seriously compromised if knowledge of these ‘engagements’ had become public. But 
today the logos of conservation organizations, like IUCN, Conservation International, 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and Birdlife International appear side-by-side on 
the covers of reports or in advertisements, with those of extractive industries like Shell, 
Rio Tinto, Total and Holcim. Appearing in different vernacular guises—sponsorships, 
agreements, partnerships—these private sector engagements have become almost 
ubiquitous among conservation organizations, and it is increasingly common to see senior 
executives of larger organizations sharing convention stages and travelling with senior 
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Pragmatic Progress or … Greenwashing 
Bright Green Pragmatists 
Scholarship that addresses this growing closeness between the corporate sector and 
environmental organizations generally falls into either a positive or negative camp. On the 
positive side, scholars maintain that partnering with the private sector is often simply the 
pragmatic thing to do. Keith Epstein and Alana Conner, for example, delineate two kinds of 
environmental organization: the pragmatic and the pure. While the pragmatic groups tend to have 
closer connections to corporations and engage in more incremental action, the purists usually 
have less financial connections with the private sector and are more involved in radical 
activism.178 Pinpointing two in particular, they write: 
Sea Shepherd is more ideologically pure, with its long history of uncompromising 
stances, radical actions, and contempt for corporations. Greenpeace, in contrast, is 
becoming more pragmatic, with its recent history of working with Coca-Cola, General 
Electric, and other corporate giants to create greener products and processes.179 
 
Dichotomous alignments such as these are not necessarily novel in environmental 
discourse. From the beginning of the modern environmental movement, ideas of weaker and 
stronger environmentalism have existed. Arne Naess, for example, distinguished his deep 
ecology, a call for a radical reconstruction of social norms on the basis of ecological principles, 
by contrasting it with shallow ecology, a more incremental technology-focused response to 
ecological concerns.180 Before that, the conservation-preservation divide of the late nineteenth 
century displayed similar tendencies, with preservation being perceived as a stronger, purer, 
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stance towards environmental protection, while conservation was understood as working within, 
and maintaining, systems of capitalism exploitation of nature. Indeed, even academic debates 
about intrinsic and instrumental valuation of nature are influenced by, and reproduce, traditional 
assumptions of a dualistic response to environmental problems, with philosophers and other 
academics often taking up the position of one side or the other.  
Conner and Epstein maintain, however, that contemporary tensions are heightened by 
growing private sector engagement in environmental organizations and the consequent rising 
schism between the two sides, leading, at times, to significant hostility. Paul Watson, for 
example, director of Sea Shepherd, allegedly called Greenpeace the “Avon ladies of the 
environmental movement” and “a bunch of wimps.”181 Similarly, Timothy G. Hermach, founder 
of the Native Forest Council, criticized the Nature Conservancy for selling land in Texas to 
trustees which ultimately became fodder for the oil and gas sector, calling the organization the 
“real estate company that cares.”182 Hermach also questioned the idea that working with the 
private sector was pragmatic at all, stating, “pragmatism, as the term is being used by most of 
Gang Green, is just a justification for being dishonest.” In response, Steven J. McCormick of the 
Nature Conservancy wrote that “you have to sort of admire the nobility and passion and purity 
behind [Hermach’s stance.] But on the other hands, it’s rare you get much out of it.”183 This 
tension is also commented on by Andrew Hoffman, who puts it this way:   
In the eyes of many, a schism is emerging between two camps of environmentalists: the 
dark greens and the bright greens. The dark greens . . . seek radical social change to 
solve environmental problems, often by confronting corporations. The bright green 
ENGOS—such as Conservational International and the Environmental Defense Fund—





work within the system, often in close alliance with corporations, to solve environmental 
problems.184 
 
Epstein and Conner contend, however, that despite this growing gulf between the dark 
greens and the bright greens, “all social movements need a variety of ideologies.”185 While the 
purer groups call out corporate misbehavior and demand greater accountability, the pragmatic 
groups pursue smaller, incremental changes, which often lead to the most significant 
improvements. The underlying notion of symbiosis here is also perpetuated by the concept of the 
“radical flank effect,” the idea that the more moderate organizations are advantaged by the 
existence of more radical, conflict-oriented groups because they are perceived to be more 
reasonable in relation to their radical counterparts, and consequently, look like more inviting 
partners to governments and corporations. The authors assert, further, that “without the subtle 
legwork of pragmatic organizations, pure nonprofits would enjoy considerably fewer results 
from their actions.”186 In this understanding then, pragmatic groups, although somewhat 
compromised, ultimately get more done for environmental protection. A similar conclusion is 
reached by Andrew Hoffman, who, although demonstrating that there are many kinds of 
organizations, not just pure or pragmatic, contends that all “shades of green” are necessarily for a 
flourishing and successful movement, and that the pragmatic groups tend to be more influential 
overall.187 
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Or… Greenwashing 
Other scholarship, however, is less optimistic about the rise of private sector 
engagements in environmentalism, and label much of the engagement as “greenwashing.” 
Greenwashing, despite having no universal consensus, refers largely to public misinformation or 
miscommunication for the purpose of reputation management. The term itself was coined by Jay 
Westerveld in 1986. As an undergraduate on a research trip in Fiji in 1983, he noticed that a 
hotel nearby his own accommodation had an “eco-friendly” towel policy that seemed in discord 
with their expansionist attitude to development. Three years later, in a critical essay he wrote for 
a New York literary magazine, he described the hotels outward stance of “saving the planet” and 
their simultaneous penchant for development, as greenwashing, writing–“wash my towels please, 
just don’t ‘greenwash’ me.”188 
Magali Delmas and Vanessa Cuerel Burbano describe greenwashing as comprising two 
factors: “poor environmental performance and positive communication about environment 
performance.”189 The logic behind greenwashing is usually understood as operating in the 
intersection between a firm’s recognition that consumers want to buy ecological and socially 
responsible products, but their unwillingness to compromise profit in order to produce 
sustainably. A primary aspect of greenwashing, then, is deception and/or gross exaggeration, 
with greenwashing understood as the ultimate divorce between communication and reality. The 
phenomenon of greenwashing is also understood to be pervasive, and currently reaching “epic 
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proportions.”190 Terra Choice, an environmental marketing agency, conducted a study in 2011 
that analyzed the claims of 1,018 “green” products in the United States and Canada. They found 
that all of the products, bar one, made deceptive claims, that were either “demonstrably false or 
risked misleading consumer.”191  
In addition to greenwashed products, critics often use the term to describe current 
partnership between environmental groups and corporations. Chesapeake Energy’s partnership 
with Sierra Club and the Sierra Clubs subsequent promotion of natural gas as an alternative to 
coal and a “bridge fuel” to renewable energy was described as a classic case of greenwashing by 
many critics who maintained that Chesapeake was partnering with the group in order to put a 
positive sheen on their fracking activities. Further, in Johann Hari’s 2010 exposé in The Nation 
dealing with funding from “Big Oil” to conservation groups, she maintains that the oil 
companies were primarily donating money for the purpose of reputation management, rather 
than authentic ecological concern. She writes: 
They [corporations such as Shell and BP] saw it as valuable reputation insurance: every 
time they were criticized for their massive emissions of warming gases, or for being 
involved in the killing of dissidents who wanted oil funds to go to the local population, or 
an oil spill that had caused irreparable damage, they wheeled out their shiny green 
awards, purchased with "charitable" donations, to ward off the prospect of government 
regulation.192  
 
Additionally, in 2008, Shell dropped a sponsorship campaign with a wildlife photography 
exhibition in the UK because of pressure from environmental groups such as Friends of the 
Earth, who accused the company of “using the event to greenwash its environmental 
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credentials.”193 Indeed, as Corpwash states, we give out “bimonthly Greenwash awards to 
corporations that put more money, time and energy into slick PR campaigns aimed at promoting 
their eco-friendly images, than they do to actually protecting the environment.”194 Under that 
definition, any private sector engagement in mainstream environmentalism that places more 
focus on sponsorship and sustainability “campaigns” than on their own performance can be 
classified as greenwash and consequently critiqued.  
 
Faustian Bargains: The Case of the World Business  
Council for Sustainable Development 
 
Both pragmatism and greenwashing, however, suffer from some conceptual and practical 
limitations as ways to explain and frame contemporary private sector engagement in 
environmentalism. Accounts of pragmatism, for example, although acknowledging the potential 
of co-optation on the part of the environmental organization, generally maintains that the 
threat—and reality—of independence-loss is compensated for by the increase of influence and 
effectiveness the organizations enjoys from their corporate partnership. They tend not to explore 
the effects of co-optation beyond the individual organizations, nor the notion of effectiveness 
(what constitutes “more effective”). Further, accounts of pragmatism generally overlook the 
intent of the corporation or foundation, generally ignoring the question of why the private actor 
is willing to partner with/sponsor the environmental group in the first place.  
Greenwashing, in contrast, tends to over focus on the so-called bad intentions of the 
organizations, and concentrate less on the consequences of the greenwashing behavior on the 
                                                 




recipient organization. Accounts of greenwashing generally perceive it to be a strategy of 
reputation management and stabilization, rather than an active attempt to shape environmental 
agendas.  
Further, both accounts—pragmatism and greenwashing —predominantly assume a 
dichotomous understanding of the NGO-corporate relationship, treating both sectors (the public 
and private) as autonomous actors, often with the NGO representing the “good guys” and the 
private sector “the bad guys.” I maintain, in contrast, that contemporary private sector 
engagement in environmentalism is marked by an ever-growing fluidity of boundaries between 
business and environmental groups as both grow closer in ideology and practice. As MacDonald 
notes,   
The vocabulary of ‘green’ and ‘greens’—have traveled beyond the ideological barricades 
of environmental organizations and been adopted by the corporate sector, just as the 
language and corporate structure of business and management has become common 
parlance within many environmental organizations.195 
 
This is implicit in the concept of “nature 2.0,” as described by Bram Bushcher. As he 
presents it, conservation organizations are increasingly turning to corporate methods to “sell” 
biodiversity and the protection of nature through commodified (online) experiences of pristine 
nature, social media, and ecotourism, leading to new, commodified, and marketized 
representations of nature.196 This approach is further reflected in the growing use of financial 
incentives and market frameworks for nature protection, such as payments for ecosystem 
services and species banking, as well as the simultaneous, but less authentic, “greening” of 
business as highlighted by corporate sustainability reports and environmental stewardship 
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awards. Indeed, many corporations highlight environmental stewardship as an objective on the 
same par with profit-creation. 
From this perspective, private sector engagement in organization may result in broader 
ideological and material re-configurations that are generally unacknowledged in popular 
accounts. Bill Adams, for example, argues that partnership between corporations and 
environmental groups may be accurately described as “Faustian bargains.”197 Like Faust, who 
makes a deal with Mephistopheles (the devil) in order to obtain power and wisdom in return for 
his soul, Adams suggests a similar compromise is being struck when environmental groups 
partner with the corporate sector. Although environmental groups receive more power by 
increased contact with powerful actors, they, too, are at risk of losing their “soul” by “giving up 
their . . . objection to the destructiveness of capitalism,” becoming more corporate-like and 
arguably distancing themselves from much of their membership base.198 As private sector 
engagement in environmentalism is growing in all forms, beyond mere partnerships to include 
business groups taking up places as major stakeholders at international environmental 
conferences, and as market norms and values are increasingly entering into the lexicon and 
practices of environmental policies and frameworks, it is possible that the environmental 
movement as a whole has entered into a Faustian bargain of sorts, “selling its soul” and leading 
to significant normative and practical change in the realm of environmental governance. 
To investigate the potential of private sector engagement in mainstream 
environmentalisms to lead to broader ideological and material change, then, I analyze one 
example of contemporary private sector engagement in environmentalism by way of the World 
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Business Council for Sustainable Development, a prominent business group involved in 
environmental governance through partnership with environmental and conservation groups, 
engagement in international environmental conferences, and sponsorship deals.  
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBSCD) was established in 
January 1995 in response to the first international UN Earth Summit held in Rio De Janeiro in 
1992, with the aim of molding a business response to sustainable development. It was a merger 
of two independent organizations: the Business Council for Sustainable Development and the 
World Industry Council for the Environment. The origins of the first, The Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, can be traced back to the Earth summit of 1992 itself, when Maurice 
Strong, the then Secretary General of the United Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) asked Stephen Schmidheiny, a businessman from Switzerland, to be chief adviser for 
business and industry. Schmidheiny subsequently created a forum called the Business Council 
for Sustainable Development, bringing together a large number of business elites and members 
of industry, under the auspices of gaining a business voice for sustainable development. The 
second organization, the World Industry Council for the Environment, originated in the 
International Chamber of Commerce: in 1990, a working group led by Peter Scupholme of 
British Petroleum and W. Ross Stephen III of Du Pont established a Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development. This was introduced in Rotterdam at the Second World Industry 
Conference on Environmental Management in 1991, and was followed up by a series of other 
document and reports, all designed to craft an industry response to ecological issues. 
79 
The two organizations, then, merged in 1995 into the WBSCD, becoming the “most 
authoritative and pre-eminent business voice on sustainable development.”199 Since then, the 
WBCSD, has grown considerably. It now boasts a 200 company membership, with its member 
companies representing a combined revenue of more than 8.5 trillion US dollars, and employing 
up to nineteen million people.200 Most of the members are American and European companies, 
and include some of the largest in the world, including: Shell International, General Motors, 
Monsanto, British Petroleum, Dow Chemicals, Unilever, Fiat Auto, Johnson & Johnson, General 
Motors, Toyota, Philips Electronics, among others. Although not explicitly stated, the focus of 
the organization is predominantly on large corporate interests. While small companies are not 
prohibited from joining, the high membership rate of approximately 75,000 dollars a year 
provides a barrier, leading, to the “priority and focus of the organization [being] decidedly on 
issues of greater concern to large corporations.”201 Aside from the annual fee, companies also 
have to be explicitly invited to join, and must promise to publish a yearly sustainability report, 
and have it reviewed by the organization.  
On WBSCD’s website, it is described as a “global, CEO-led organization of over 200 
leading businesses working together to accelerate the transition to a sustainable world,”202 and its 
members are invited to join on the basis that “the collective voice of a cross-sectoral and global 
body like the WBSCD offers companies greater weight in the sustainable development debate 
than they would have otherwise have singly.”203 In order to provide this influence, it publishes 
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reports on sustainability, attends and organizes workshops at international meetings, promotes 
corporate social responsibility initiatives, orchestrates education programs at university level, 
publishes books, etc. A main emphasis in the organization is on collaboration, partnership and 
liaison, and the list of organizations and actors it partners includes the World Bank, the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, the European Union, and the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate change, World Wildlife Fund, etc.  
. 
Influence 
The primary goal of the organization is influence, and on this front, it is undoubtedly a 
success. It was identified as the “most influential forum” for companies on CSR by a 2003 
World Bank study. A 2006 survey by Globescan found that fifty four percent of people surveyed 
thought that WBSCD will play a “major role” in sustainable development, with only the 
European Union receiving a higher score.204  
The WBSCD is involved in major conferences both as active participant and organizer. 
As participant, the council is included in higher level negotiations, in the creation of policy 
suggestions and documents, and in the organization of panels and sessions. At the World 
Conservation Congress in 2012, for example, the WBSCD held a series of workshops and events 
designed to promote the role of business and market mechanisms in environmental 
governance.205 At the UN climate conference in the same year in Doha, the council, along with 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), organized a Global Business Day, bringing 
together members of the business community and their “partners” in conservation to provide 
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business perspectives on matters of sustainable development and biodiversity. In addition to the 
council’s prominence in environmental meetings and documents, it is also involved in 
partnerships with governments and other public actors. In 2017, for example, the council 
partnered with Yale University to establish the WBSCD Leadership Program, which sees 
program participants learn and apply concepts of sustainable development in business practices, 
developed by periods of on-location training and group work. In response to the partnership, 
Yale university professor, Brad Gentry, stated that “WBCSD is leading the effort to bring 
actionable science about the resource systems on which we all depend to networks of global and 
local businesses around the world.”206 The council is also an official member of the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), one of the only private sector groups to be so, and it 
frequently partners with conservation groups, such as the World Wildlife Fund and The Nature 
Conservancy, as well as governments and global institutions, to initiate projects and establish 
environmental policy soft law documents.   
The influence of the council, however, is not neutral, nor is the version of sustainable 
development promoted in their policy, conferences, and education programs free of bias. Rather, the 
framework of sustainable development put forth by the WBSDC is embedded in private sector 
norms and values. It places corporate self-regulation and the use of market mechanisms of 
environmental protection as defining features of environmental governance, witnessed most 
apparently in the type of sustainable development schemes established by WBSCD. In 1997, for 
example, the council initiated the Global Mining Initiative in partnership with many leading 
corporations in the mining sector. This initiative advocated a CSR framework of self-regulation 
                                                 
206 Yale News, “For Yale, WBSCD, Sustainability is Good Business,” 8 April, 2014, 
https://news.yale.edu/2014/04/08/yale-wbcsd-sustainability-good-business. 
82 
in the field of mining and was a central advocate for the adoption of “social licensing to operate” 
mechanism: a process that ensures community engagement in mining operations but has few 
objective standards and is often taken up in lieu of stricter regulatory standards.207 The 
promulgation of frameworks of corporate self-regulation is also evident in WBSCD’s 
involvement in the forestry industry. In 1996, WBSCD member, Erling Lorentzen, owner of 
Aracruze Cellulose, a Brazilian paper manufacturing company, concerned with the criticisms 
about the deforestation and ecological degradation occurring as a result of the actions of forestry 
industry, created a project called the “Towards a Sustainable Paper Cycle,” that advocated 
recycling mechanisms and forestry certification in place of stricter regulations on logging.208  
The councils’ objectives and influence, however, go beyond beyond the successful 
promotion of corporate self-regulation in environmental policy, and extend also to ideological 
understandings of sustainability, and environmental protection in general. In 1992, for example, 
the Business Council for Sustainable Development established the concept of “eco-efficiency” in 
their book Changing Course. Eco-efficiency, as articulated by the council, refers to the idea that 
economic growth and ecological wellbeing can be reconciled by increased attention to efficiency and 
technological development, and is described as the production of 
competitively priced goods and services that satisfy human needs and bring quality of life 
while progressively reducing environmental impacts of goods and resource intensity 
throughout the entire life-cycle to a level at least in line with the Earth's estimated 
carrying capacity.209 
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This approach, embedded in the ecomodern understanding that small adjustments, 
facilitated primarily through technological and market progress, can adequately achieve 
ecological health, is largely positioned as an alternative to more transformative change advocated 
by other environmental activists that suggest a larger overhaul in current economic and social 
institutions. In contrast, environmental protection, as advanced by the WBSCD does not have to 
sacrifice economic growth, or change significantly “business-as-usual.” Rather, ecological care 
can be internalized into the market, making profit seeking “work” for nature.  
At the first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio De 
Janeiro, in the same year as Changing Course was published, the Business Council for 
Sustainable Development was able to successfully include this vision of sustainability and “eco-
efficiency” into the final version of Agenda 21, as the council “worked to ensure that Agenda 21 
promoted voluntary self-regulation over other mechanisms to control the activities of TNC 
[transnational corporations].”210 While attempts were made by other actors to impose more 
stringent regulations on larger corporations at the conference and to advance a more radical 
overhaul of the economic status quo, in particular by the UN Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (UNTNC) who outlined a series of regulations on corporate activity to be included 
into the working plan of Agenda 21, this was predominantly overridden by private interest 
groups and Western governments who worked to remove these suggestions and ultimately led to 
the UNCTC proposal dropped from the agenda.211  
Specifically, Maurice Strong, the director general of the conference, asked the Business 
Council on Sustainable Development to outline recommendations on industry involvement in 
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sustainable development. The end result was the promotion of sustainability as comprising of 
voluntary measures of corporate sustainability, the positioning of market actors and market 
frameworks as defining characteristics, and the manifestation of eco-efficiency as a core feature 
of sustainable development—reflected clearly in the final version of Agenda 21: 
(…) leaders in business and industry, including transnational corporations, are 
increasingly taking voluntary initiatives, promoting and implementing self-regulations 
and greater responsibilities in ensuring their activities have minimal impacts on human 
health and the environment. (…) A positive contribution of business and industry, 
including transnational corporations, to sustainable development can increasingly be 
achieved by using economic instruments such as free market mechanisms (…).212 
 
The successful incorporation of eco-efficiency by the council into mainstream 
environmental conferences was also witnessed at the 2012 Earth summit as the WBSCD was 
active in establishing and promoting the concept of the Green Economy, an ecomodern 
framework promoting market mechanisms such as payments for ecosystems services 
(incentivizing the protection of “services”), biodiversity offsetting (where companies can exploit 
one area as long as another area is they make up for it somewhere else), ecotourism, and carbon 
markets as solutions to current ecological crises. Like eco-efficiency, the Green Economy 
initiative holds the basic assumption that nature protection must be imbued with profit potential 
for it to effective, and that contemporary economies have the capacity to divorce, or decouple, 
economic growth and prosperity from environmental degradation through increased “efficiency” 
and technological innovation. Because of the necessary links between profit and ecological 
protection in the approach of the Green Economy, it complements an increase in market 
liberalism and a reduction of state regulations to the private sector. Indeed, one of the core 
                                                 
212 Quoted in ibid. p. 8 
85 
beliefs of the Green Economy approach is that free market frameworks are more conducive to 
ecological protection that those rooted in strict market regulation. 
In addition to other groups, the WBSCD was involved in both the planning and 
implementation of Green Economy frameworks and was a member of the “Green Economy 
Coalition,” established by the United Nations in the run up to the 2012 conference.213 In 2011, 
the Coalition published its “Road to Rio,” submission, which advocated a “recapitalisation of our 
natural resource base” to “incentivize investment.”214 These recommendations ultimately formed 
the “master narrative” of the UNCED conference the following year and currently enjoy a central 
position in mainstream environmental governance.215 The WBSCD is also a founding member of 
the 2016 Natural Capital Protocol, created in partnership between the council, the Nature 
Conservancy, World Bank, IUCN, and Conservation International, and which promotes the use of 
standardized and voluntary Green Economy frameworks to help businesses “measure and value 
natural capital . . . and to benefit from understand their relationship with nature.”216  Indeed, as 
stated by Robert Fletcher, the concept of decoupling—the framework of divorcing ecological health 
from economic growth, and what is described as the “heart of the Green Economy” initiative—is a 
direct descendent of the WBSCD’s version of eco-efficiency established in 1992 and promoted by 
the council since.217  
                                                 
213 James Goodman and Ariel Salleh, “The Green Economy: Class Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony,” 
Globalizations 10, no. 3 (2013): 411-424. 
214 Green Economy Coalition, The Road to Rio (London: IlED, 2011), p. 7. 
215 Kenneth Iain MacDonald, “Grabbing ‘Green:’ Cynical Reason, Instrumental Ethics and the Production of the 
Green Economy.” 
216 See http://naturalcapitalcoalition.org/natural-capital-protocol-launched/ 
217 Robert Fletcher and Crelis Rammelt, “Decoupling: A Key Fantasy of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Agenda,” Globalizations 14, no. 3 (2017): 450-467. 
86 
The council, then, has been tremendously influential in establishing and supporting 
normative approaches that are rooted in understandings of sustainability and environmental 
protection that extend beyond traditional dichotomies of business and the environment and are 
rooted in optimism about “win-win” solutions to ecological degradation.218 As stated by Giorel 
Curran, the WBSCD has been “highly successful in injecting corporate business to the center of 
environmental governance through the globe.”219 Sustainability, for WBSDC, does not entail a 
shift in values nor a change in economic or social institutions. Rather, it is very much “business-
as-usual,” as economic growth can be made complement ecological health by advancing “smart” 
economics and technological fixes. Thus, the previous hostilities between ecological goals and 
economic growth, as reflected by earlier notions of “limits to growth,” are overcome by a 
conceptual marriage between profit-seeking and ecological well-being.  
Arguably, the idea of decoupling and the broader approach of the council now represent 
the dominant framework of environmental governance, as market-based, ecomodern frameworks 
of environmental care, such as the Green Economy, “new” environmentalism and “new” 
conservation, are rapidly growing in popularity.220 These approaches are rooted in notions of a 
reflexive capitalism that can internalize ecological care and spearhead ecological protection and 
all maintain an emphasis on the primacy of market actors and market mechanism of 
environmental governance. Currently, these approaches are not only supported by private sector 
groups but are advocated by many public actors in environmental governance. Mainstream 
conferences, such as UNCED, largely promote the necessity of market actors and market 
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mechanisms in environmental protection and espouse the profit potential of “nature-saving.” 
This is also witnessed in many environmental and conservation NGOs—as Brockington and 
Duffy write, environmental organizations are “increasingly representing themselves as locales in 
which the historic opposites of private interest and environmental well-being–of profit incentive 
and environmental good–might be reconciled.”221  
 
Gramsci and Hegemony: A Theoretical Framework 
The WBSCSD, then, represents a prominent actor in the field of environmental 
governance, supporting and constructing ecomodern approaches to environmental policies. From 
this perspective, private sector engagement, such as that practiced by the WBSCD, may represent 
more than pragmatism on the part of the partnering organizations, or greenwashing on the part of 
the private sector, but also, and more crucially, the “increasing penetration and influence of large 
corporations in the public-policy process.”222 Through partnerships and laisons with NGOs and 
governmental groups, ecomodern approaches such as the Green Economy, and anthropocentric, 
economic-based understandings of sustainable are supported, reproduced and constructed. 
While it may be understandable that private sector groups, such as the WBSCD, are key 
agent that influences environmental policy, some critics are wary, presenting such engagements 
as a “colonization of the sustainable development agenda rather than its promotion.”223 In his 
assessment of the outcomes of the World Strategy on Sustainable Development, von Frantzius 
argues that the partnerships approach strongly promoted by business during the summit was 
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“feared by civil society to lead to undue influence of the business sector in drafting the latest 
global blueprint for global sustainable development.”224 Further, he states that an over focus on 
the establishment of partnerships with the private sector in general may result in the 
“privatization of sustainable development.”225 George Holmes makes this point also, claiming 
that private sector engagement in environmentalism through sponsorship and other philanthropic 
activity can lead to the construction of corporate-friendly environmentalisms through a 
convergence of elite interests and players in the domain of environmentalism that support and 
construct “private versions of the public good,” as well as through a normalization process of 
capitalist enterprise and private forms of wealth distribution.226  
The practice of elite actors engaging in social movements and other parts of civil society 
to promote capitalist interests, and the idea that philanthropic activity produces and reproduces 
the status quo, is discussed by many scholars, and is particularly embedded in Antonio Gramsci’s 
notion of hegemony.227 For Gramsci, hegemony is formed from the distinction between coercion 
and consent. While coercion refers to power that is enforced through violence or threat of 
violence, consent is hegemonic power, i.e., authority that is accepted voluntarily through a 
submission to ideological norms. Hegemonic power works to “convince social classes to 
subscribe to the social values and norms” of dominant groups and it is a mechanism of power 
that relies on voluntary participation rather than the fear of individual physical violence. 228 It 
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creates a discourse of common sense that, according to Gramsci, is adopted and perceived as 
normal, ultimately leading to a kind of “moral and political passivity.” As Gramsci defines it, 
common sense is 
The conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and 
cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is developed. 
Common sense is not a single unique conception, identical in time and space. It is the 
“folklore” of philosophy, and like, folklore, it takes countless forms. Its most 
fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which, even in the brain of one 
individual, is fragmentary, incoherent, and inconsequential, in conformity with the social 
and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy is.229 
 
While coercive power is usually in the realm of the state and specifically, in military and 
police forces, the reproduction of hegemonic power through common sense lies in civil society: 
the media, the Church, school, family, etc. Unlike in Hegelian accounts that understands civil 
society as acting as a barrier against market dominance, for Gramsci, civil society is the arena 
where the state and market produces and reproduces hegemony, a social order where "a common 
social-moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is dominant, informing with its 
spirit all modes of thought and behavior.”230 Thus, dominant institutions and institutional actors 
influence human actions and thought in order to produce and reproduce certain hegemonic 
imaginaries and realities. As David Neusteurer writes, the “strength of hegemonic forces is their 
ability to penetrate society on a structural level and their presence in main societal areas such as 
economy, culture, gender, and class.”231 Through a participation in social activities and other 
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aspects of civil society, the dominant classes, therefore, can “lead the society in certain 
directions.”232 
For Gramsci, hegemonic power is the most common means in which power is made 
manifest, with coercive domination and physical violence as a means of consent remaining 
mostly an exception in Western capitalist societies. By the promulgation of universal norms, 
embodied and supported by specific international institutions and actors, consent is actively 
manufactured on a normative level. For Gramsci, philanthropy and seemingly “benevolent 
actions” of elite, capitalist classes, are a major vehicle of this kind of coercive domination. 
Gramsci maintains, for example, that philanthropy aids capitalist hegemony by granting a veil of 
moral superiority to dominant classes by virtue of their apparent generosity, and by normalizing 
and diverting attention from unequal concentrations of wealth inherent to capitalist enterprise. In 
an article written in December, 1917, entitled “Philanthropy, Good Will and Organization,” 
Gramsci criticizes the idea that “true liberty for the many can develop as a result of concessions 
by those in power,” and maintains instead that only through solidarity and community can 
oppression be ultimately lessened.233 
This hegemony of philanthropy and other capitalist benevolence is reflected most 
apparently in Gramsci’s formulation of “passive revolution.” According to Gramsci, passive 
revolutions refers to situations when “counter-hegemonic challenges to the dominant capitalist 
order are co-opted and neutralized through changes and concessions which re-establish the 
consent in that order.”234 This neutralization, what Gramsci calls “the absorption of the 
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antithesis,” works by realizing small incremental reform in place of larger structural change. 
Passive revolutions are, thus, “revolutions without a revolution,” or “revolutions from above,” 
that are established by the dominant class and occur with the intent of control, rather than 
liberation. Because of the emphasis on control, these kind of dominant actions are more 
accurately referred to as restorations, therefore, where elite groups attempt to restore consent by 
granting concessions and making promises on behalf of subordinate interests. According to 
Gramsci and neo-Gramscian scholars, philanthropy and corporate social responsibility 
frameworks conform to such restoration attempts. For Zizek, for example, philanthropy, and 
redistribution of wealth to social causes, occurs as a means to avoid revolution by masking the 
malevolence of capitalist action and associating profit-making with generosity in a broader 
sense.235 In practice, therefore, the generosity and care promulgated by dominant actors under the 
framework of philanthropy and social responsibility is often superficial. Indeed, in a recent study 
of a French children clothing retailer that developed CSR practices in direct reaction to criticisms 
of poor labor condition and child exploitation, the authors found that the companies response 
was to engage in philanthropic activities and CSR initiatives, such as the publishing 
sustainability reports, while the “core business model based on exploitative low-cost country 
sourcing remain[ed] intact.”236  Similar criticisms have been made in relation to the CSR 
practices of other companies, such as Exxon, Coca Cola, etc.237  
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The WBSCD and Hegemonic Environmentalism 
Gramscian theory represents a critical framework to analyze hegemonic structures, such 
as those of neoliberal capitalism. In contemporary understandings of Gramscian hegemony, 
neoliberal capitalism is rooted in consensual agreements that are both “ensured by international 
institutions and enlarged through a passive revolution on an international scale.”238Analyzing the 
actions of WBSCD, a group embedded in the norms of neoliberalism and comprised of some of 
the most powerful and dominant corporate actors in the world, from the perspective of a critical 
Gramscian approach, is important, then, to understand the various ideological struggles and 
power relations inherent to environmental discourses and embedded in private sector 
engagement in environmentalism. Analyses of this kind are especially crucial given the urgent 
nature of ecological issues and the necessity of effective solutions to increasing environmental 
and social degradation.   
Some way in which the engagement of WBSCD in the realm of environmental politics 
may support and conform to hegemonic action in the Gramscian sense are as follows. First, as 
discussed above, the environmental policies and ideologies supported and produced by the 
council prioritize the economic above all else and ensure that profit creation is not challenged by 
environmental policies or other environmental ideologies. The focus on win-win solutions, 
central to the council’s ideology, and the primacy of the norm of eco-efficiency, demonstrates 
the emphasis placed on the maintenance of economic growth, reflected also in WBSCD’s own 
definition of sustainability—“the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic 
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development.”239 The later framework of the Green Economy supported by the WBSCD extends 
this commitment to capitalist enterprise even further by asserting that the basic tenets of 
neoliberal ideologies—profit creation, the “wealth optimizing” individual, and competition—are 
not only compatible with ecological health, but central to it—we must sell nature to save it! In 
this sense, then, Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony, that concessions granted to counter-
hegemonic pressure much not interfere with economic growth or the broader logic of capitalism, 
is congruent with the work of the council, who, aware that the “transnational corporate enterprise 
must be coupled with consensus over environmental regulation,” does so in a manner that does 
not “touch the essential nucleus of economic relations.”240 
Second, the market-based environmentalism proposed by the council is appealing to 
many actors. Companies and investors are likely to accept it as it ensures consistent economic 
growth and involves the creation of new environmental commodities for investment; labor 
unions support the promise of new jobs associated with increased economic development; and 
“developing” countries are likely to be find it favorable due to the potential it allows for them to 
continue with their current economic growth.241 Thus, as the policies supported by the council do 
not necessitate a radical alteration of people’s behavior and lifestyles, and because they conform 
to normative frameworks of economic progress embedded in the dominant neoliberal imaginary, 
they sit squarely in the realm of the hegemonic, ultimately leading to the advantage of the 
dominant classes as understood by Gramsci. Further, the council itself embodies the current 
hegemonic order on an institutional level. It is comprised of some of the most powerful 
corporations in the world, including Monsanto, Shell, and Hewlett Packard, from some of the 
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most exploitative industries. Its members have a combined revenue of over eight trillion dollars, 
much more than any operating environmental group (or most of the leading environmental 
organizations combined), and more than the GDP of any nation, with the exception of the U.S 
and China.242  
Finally, the council’s work conforms to ideas of passive revolution in its relation to the 
rhetoric of corporate social responsibility. Although the organization is primarily a lobbying 
group, for example, and has worked extensively in the past to ensure “business friendly” 
environmental policy and ideologies, its official claim is that it is operating on the principles of 
benevolent corporate social responsibility, and that it exists to “accelerate the tradition to a 
sustainable world by making more sustainable businesses more successful.”243 The council 
publishes CSR reports and holds CSR conferences, such as the “Responsible Business Forum,” 
and is generally perceived as a “leader” in the CSR field. Despite the CSR approach of the 
organization, however, the actions of the member corporations are exceedingly contradictory to 
these assertions, with many members actively breaking legal and moral codes with regard 
ecological and social behavior.244 From the perspective of a passive revolution, then, the strategic 
use of CSR frameworks, and the associations of benevolence that accompany it, serve to increase 
corporate power and maintain capitalist hegemony by detracting from the corporation’s daily 
activities and exploitative business frameworks, allowing a “moral leverage” of sorts that 
legitimizes corporate influence in policy and legal frameworks, and appeases protestors by 
making small concessions that ultimately do not compromise broader economic growth. 
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According to Gramsci, such influence, when it is exerted on civil society institutions and groups, 
can lead to the absorption and marginalization of “counter-hegemonic” imaginaries that espouse 
more radical change, and the promotion of incremental, capitalist-friendly, visions in their 
place.245 The rise of ecomodern strategies in recent times, correlating with the rise in private 
sector actors in the domain of environmental governance, may be one indication of this.  
The consequences, therefore, of such private sector engagement in mainstream 
environmentalism is significant. Unlike most accounts that see engagement of this kind as 
problematic largely because of its potential to be deceptive, the nature of hegemonic 
interference, such as that practiced by WBSCD and other private sector groups and actions, has a 
distinct normative character and can lead to a reshaping and reframing of the ideological context 
of mainstream environmentalism. Indeed, the WBSCD refers to itself as a “thought-leader” in 
the field of sustainability, and regularly publishes “visions” of the future. These documents, with 
one example being the WBSCD’s “Vision 2050,” advocates ecomodern, market-centered, 
strategies and norms of environmental and social well-being and are exceedingly influential in 
both the private sector and beyond.246  
In a Gramscian sense, then, groups such as the WBSCD, by engagement and purposeful 
normative influence in arenas like environmental governance, may be active in what he refers to 
as the “war of position.” Gramsci used the term “war of position” in contrast with the “war of 
maneuver.” While a war of maneuver refers to physical rebellion and conflict between dominant 
and oppressed classes, the war of position, is a more gradual and subtle conflict, when forces in 
power attempt to gain influence and power in order to maintain hegemonic control. Ultimately, 
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in a war of position then, the dominant group seeks to enforce and reinforce the dominant class’s 
vision of the world, and the understandings of common sense as central to the maintenance of the 
rulings classes’ power.  
The use of the noun “war” is demonstrative of the Gramscian emphasis on ideological 
struggle, and reflects Gramsci’s departure from the understanding of ideology as put forth by 
Marx. Unlike Marx who sees ideology as akin to all-encompassing super structure that cannot be 
penetrated, Gramsci understands hegemonic power as reproduced in a dialectic relationship with 
counter-hegemonic contestation—“hegemony and counter-hegemony exist in a state of tension; 
each gives shape to the other.”247 For the dominant classes, the primary objective is to conserve a 
degree of ideological unity in which to maintain the consent of the dominated classes. For the 
subaltern groups, however, the focus is on resisting the ideological domination of the ruling class 
through a deconstruction of common sense and the creation of an alternative vison of social life. 
Indeed, the actions and rhetoric of WBSCD reflect this ideological struggle as the council 
advertises its membership by promoting by “significant influence” over environmental policy 
that the corporations can glean from their engagement in the council. Further, as William Caroll 
points out, the establishment of the council was ultimately reactive in the first instance as the 
private sector began acknowledge the potential threat of the “counter-hegemonic” aspects, or 
oppositional potential, of environmentalism. As Carroll writes  
[T]he WBCSD reflects a maturing elite awareness that transnational corporate enterprise 
must be coupled with consensus over environmental regulation. What makes the WBCSD 
unique in the global policy field are its efforts to surpass the prevailing dualism of 
“business versus the environment.” It presents a comprehensive vision of capitalist social 
and moral progress – anchored by its central axiom of “eco-efficiency.” Within this 
retooled version of sustainable development, business, governments and environmental 
activists make concessions around a general interest in sustaining both the health of 
nature and the “health” of the global economy. In this way, Gramsci’s formula for ruling 
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class hegemony – that concessions granted in organizing consent must not touch the 
essential nucleus of economic relations – is satisfied.248 
 
Using a Gramscian analysis, then, points to the potential of domination at the core of 
contemporary corporate engagement in environmentalism. The normative influence of the 
council, and the broader “privatization of environmentalism” that accompanies it, may reflect a 
serious conflict of interest in environmental politics. Indeed, the kind of sustainable development 
that a natural gas company supports may be substantially different from the version advocated 
for by a community member living in the area the company operates. Under the current 
framework, however, which allows almost unlimited “engagement” in environmentalism from 
private sector actors, with very little accountability, the gas company, with its significantly larger 
resources, has a distinct advantage in getting their version set in place. Taken on a larger scale, 
the influence of the private sector may lead to marginalization of other kinds of environmental 
ideologies, or in Gramscian terms, an “absorption of the antithesis” where dominant, common 
sense imaginaries suppress counter-hegemonic responses to ecological degradation. 
 
Conclusion 
As the activities of the WBSCD suggest, growing private sector engagement in the 
domain of environmentalism, upheld by frameworks of corporate social responsibility, 
stewardship, and philanthropy, can have consequences beyond the dominant understandings of 
engagement as either pragmatic on the part of the environmental movement, or greenwashing on 
the part of the company. Groups such as the WBSCD reflect the capacity of private sector actors 
to support, construct, and produce certain kinds of environmentalisms and visions of ecological 
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protection that conform, broadly speaking, to private sector interests. The next chapter continues 
with this line of inquiry and analyzes the representations of nature that emerge from corporate 
engagements of this kind, focusing, in particular, on private-public partnerships in the context of 




WHAT “NATURE” IS SPEAKING:” REPRESENTATIONS OF NATURE IN PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND THE GREEN ECONOMY 
It is now somewhat of a truism to say that environmentalism is neoliberalizing.249 The 
convergence of environmentalism and neoliberalism is represented by processes such as 
payments for ecosystem services, biodiversity offsetting and ecotourism, and facilitated through 
mechanisms such as carbon markets, species and wetlands banking, and social media.250 
Scholars point out that the neo-liberalizing of environmentalism not only affects processes of 
environmental governance, but also representations of nature itself, as nature becomes redefined 
to aid accumulation; as an entity that can “pay for its own reproduction.”251  
The neoliberal “turn” in environmental protection is facilitated by the convergence of 
neoliberal actors in the domain of environmental governance.252 As public funding to 
environmental projects and conservation decreases, environmental groups turn to the private 
sector for funding, resources, and techniques, resulting in “market forces [finding] their way into 
conservation policy and practice to a degree unimaginable only a decade ago.”253 George Holmes 
maintains that private sector engagement is neoliberalizing conservation and environmental 
practices as corporate actors become influential in the domain of environmental politics under 
the auspices of public-private partnerships and ecophilanthropy, simultaneously legitimizing 
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capitalist frameworks and reproducing “private visions of the public good” (including the 
“ecological good”).254 Indeed, the influx of corporate actors into the field of environmentalism is 
such that, as MacDonald argues, it is leading to “increasingly fluid boundaries between ‘private’ 
and pseudo public-actors like non-governmental organizations, even as those actors continue to 
invoke a rhetoric of differentiation between business, government, and NGOs.”255 
The complex ways, however, in which nature is being reconfigured and reimagined in the 
context of these broader market forces remains underexplored. In this chapter, I focus on one 
example in a recent Conservation International project, “Nature Is Speaking,” in order to analyze 
the kinds of “nature” being produced and reproduced under contemporary public-private 
partnerships and in service of novel environmental agendas.  
I chose the “Nature Is Speaking” campaign for a couple of reasons. First, Conservation 
International is one the most powerful environmental organization in the world, with hundreds of 
corporate sponsors, including some of the world largest corporations. In 2016, it had revenue of 
$212 million, of which over fifty percent came from the private sector (sixteen percent from 
corporations and thirty four percent from foundations).256 The organization has private sector 
affiliations high up in the organization, with Rob Walton of Walmart serving as chairman of the 
executive committee and many other corporate actors serving as board members. In addition to 
the corporate connections of the organization itself, the project, “Nature is Speaking,” is, in some 
respects, a public-private conglomeration with corporations such as Hewlett Packard, Coca Cola, 
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and Walmart listed as its key “partners.” Second, the organization, and the project, both represent 
and promulgate the framework of “new environmentalism,” a project that seeks to, as described 
by Conservation International director M. Sanjayan, “rebrand environmentalism” away from 
frameworks of intrinsic value and towards market-based techniques based on the instrumental 
valuation of nature; in short, to make nature profitable.257  
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I analyze the rise of market-
based frameworks in environmentalism, with a particular focus on neoliberal environmentalism 
and the recent framework of the Green Economy. I maintain that “neoliberal environmentalism” 
points to both an increase of market techniques in “saving nature,” as well as a growth of market 
actors in the field of environmental governance. In section two, I focus on one public-private 
alliance in Conservation International’s “Nature Is Speaking” campaign in order to ascertain the 
kinds of nature envisioned and reproduced in these new forms of governance and in the service 
of “new” environmentalisms. In the final section, I conclude with some commentary on the 
possible consequences and contradictions with regard to the ongoing reconfiguration of nature 
and nature protection.  
 
Neoliberalism and the Environment 
In the last ten years or so, a plethora of scholarship has emerged examining the varying 
ways that neoliberalism and environmentalism are connected and connecting both in discourse 
and praxis. Neoliberalism, although neither a homogenous nor a unilateral force, is largely 
interpreted in a twofold manner. First, as an economic doctrine that calls for increasing 
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deregulation of market transactions and privatization of property and institutions, and second, 
following from the work of Bram Buscher, Noel Castree, and others, a political ideology that 
attempts to “subject political, social, and ecological affairs to capitalist market dynamics.”258 
Both of these aspects of neoliberalism play out in contemporary environmental 
governance, exemplified poignantly by new forms of environmental protection initiatives that 
rely predominantly on market mechanisms to ensure environmental protection. Frameworks such 
as payment for ecosystem services (NGOs or governments pay landowners for the protection of a 
natural process of species), bioprospecting, (fees paid by industry, usually pharmaceutical 
companies, for the rights to collect specimens of plants and animals), biodiversity offsetting 
(where companies can exploit one area as long as another area is they make up for it somewhere 
else), and eco-tourism, for example, all offer avenues in which nature can be monetized and 
internalized into the market economy. These initiatives give financial incentives for parts of 
nature to be protected and governed, leading to “win-win” scenarios where nature is being 
“saved,” without compromising economic growth. Embedded in this institutional transformation, 
therefore, is a reconfiguration of how nature protection should be carried out, with the underlying 
assumption being that nature can only be “protected” thorough its submission to capital, what 
Kathleen McAfee calls “selling nature to save it.”259 
Financial mechanisms such as these that attempt to internalize the value of nature into 
general accounts are now referred to collectively as the “Green Economy,” and it is fast 
becoming one of the most significant frameworks in environmental governance. The Green 
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Economy was a central feature at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 
Rio De Janeiro in 2012, and was referred to as the “master narrative” of the conference.260 In 
2011, UNEP published a document called “Towards a Green Economy,” asserting that the Green 
Economy could “deliver improved human wellbeing and social equity, while significantly 
reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.”261 Other reports advocating transitions 
to the green economy were subsequently published by the World Bank and the European 
Union.262  
One well-known example of the Green Economy in action is the REDD initiative —
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forests Degradation—that emerged in the United 
Nations climate negotiations held in Bali in 2007, but was first negotiated under the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2005. This objective of the program is the 
reduction of greenhouse gases emission through forest management and financial incentives. 
Because studies suggest that changes to the land, such as industrial logging and forest 
destruction, account for up to twenty-nine percent of greenhouse gas emissions globally, the 
focus on responding to land use change became a major inclusion into the goals of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The REDD framework revolves around the 
reduction of deforestation and the related conservation of carbon sinks through financial 
incentives. In particular, a country will be financially rewarded if they can avoid projected rates 
of deforestation and forest degradation, or reduce current rate. The framework was originally 
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targeted at developing countries and currently there are over 120 countries involved in REDD, 
financed by public, private, bilateral and multilateral sources. In addition, at the 2016 Paris 
Climate Talks, negotiations began for a new carbon market to begin in 2020. Carbon markets 
would allow countries to earn REDD credits, and then choose to either keep them in to offset 
other emissions from fossil fuel and extractive industries in general, or sell them and trade with 
other countries who want to offset their own emissions. 
The framework of REDD emerges from the concept of “ecosystem services,” popularized 
in contemporary literature by Gretchen Daily’s book Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on 
Natural Ecosystems, and defined by the 2006 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment as "the 
benefits people obtain from ecosystems."263 At the heart of the ecosystem approach is “natural 
capital:” the idea that nature provides vital benefits to human societies, and that these benefits 
can be monetized and subsequently recognized in national accounts. Like other ecomodern 
frameworks, advocates of the Green Economy and ecosystem service-based accounting maintain 
that internalizing what has traditionally been externalized in market economies will herald a 
revolution of sorts. “Nature,” once left out, will now be brought back in. This approach is 
summarized succinctly in a statement from the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development in 2012: 
A capitalist is somebody who optimizes returns from capital employed. The mistake is 
that the current economic model is solely focused on optimizing the return on financial 
capital. We need to add two more elements of capital: natural capital and social capital, 
and tell capitalists to go and optimize that.264 
 
Neoliberal forms of environmentalism, then, represents a radically different response to 
                                                 
263Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis (Island Press: Washington, 
D.C., 2005). 
264 Quoted in Najam, “World Business Council for Sustainable Development: The Greening of Business of 
Greenwash,” p. 70. 
105 
other expressions of environmental care that generally seek to regulate corporate behavior and 
decrease capitalist accumulation. In contrast, neoliberal environmentalism, and ecological 
modernization discourses in general, understand ecological destruction as a result of bad 
accounting rather than structural flaws, and as such, advocate incremental reforms that tweak 
economic and social institutions in a more sustainable direction, largely encouraged by financial 
incentivization. Importantly, the assumption in these discourses is that environmental protection 
can be “win-win:” economic growth does not have to be sacrificed for ecological protection, and 
nature protection can be a profitable affair. 
In addition, not only are environmental frameworks of protection altered in the 
reconfiguration of environmental governance, but so too are representations of nature itself, as 
nature becomes enlisted in a broader project of capitalist accumulation.265 In selling nature to 
save it, nature must be (re)defined as a commodity, as an entity that can “pay for its own 
reproduction.”266 This redefinition is achieved largely through an emphasis on natural “services,” 
i.e., the value it provides people, as well as a heightened focus on the commodification and 
marketization of nature. Nature, therefore, in neoliberal accounts, must be nature that capital can 
“see,” in short, a nature that can be traded for capital either through a financialization of its 
“services” or through processes of direct consumption. 
The influx of neoliberal methods and ideologies in environmentalism, represented by the 
Green Economy and other versions of heightened neoliberal environmental strategies, are 
reinforced and perpetuated by the simultaneous rise in private sector actors in the domain of 
environmental governance. As discussed in the previous chapter, groups like the WBSCD have 
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had major influence in the development of Green Economy, as well as on the ideological 
frameworks that underline these novel mechanisms of environmental policy, such as the ideas of 
eco-efficiency and decoupling. A recent report by Friends of the Earth further outlines in detail 
the close links between the United Nations and the private sector in the development of the 
Green Economy,267 and other scholars, such as Robert Sklair, have noted that instrumental, 
market-friendly, frameworks of sustainable development have emerged as a result of a 
convergence of “transnational capitalist class” in environmental governance, what he referred to 
as a Gramscian historic bloc.268 
Indeed, as Holmes maintains, the neoliberalization of environmentalism refers both to the 
rise of market mechanism and market actors in environmentalism, as environmental 
organizations develop closer relationships to the private sector through philanthropic 
engagements and public-private partnerships. As he puts it:  
Leading NGOs have developed closer relationships with corporations, working with 
them, and copying their methods in areas such as marketing, taking their donations, and 
generally developing more positive attitudes about their activities.269 
 
This is further discussed by Brockington and Duffy who state that, through increased 
partnerships with the private sector, environmental groups are “increasingly representing 
themselves as locale in which the historical opposites private interest and environmental well-
being-of profit incentive and environmental good, may be reconciled.”270 In many cases, then, 
the extent of private sector engagement in environmentalism goes beyond narratives of 
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infiltration or “selling out,” but rather involves a broader reconfiguration of the traditional 
boundaries of the public and private sector. As corporations increasingly adopt the discourse of 
sustainability, public NGOs, in turn, become more business-like and corporate in their structure 
and methods, pursuing environmental strategies that are compatible with private interests, 
gaining large swaths of funding from the private sector, and appointing corporate leaders in 
positions of significant power in public environmental groups. This reconfiguration has allowed 
for the domination of market-based strategies such as the Green Economy and sustainable 
development in environmental governance resulting from a convergence of dominant, neoliberal, 
actors in the domain of environmental politics and the subsequent privileging of economic over 
ecological epistemologies.  
The following section, then, examines if, and how, the discourse of the Green Economy, 
and the representations of nature that are embedded in it, are produced and reproduced by 
prominent environmental organizations and their projects. Choosing an environmental group that 
reflects the growing embeddedness of the private sector from the perspective of both funding and 
organizational leadership, I investigate the representations of the natural environmental that are 
supported and produced in these institutional contexts, and how they conform, or do not 
conform, to broader projects of neoliberal environmentalism, such as the Green Economy. 
 
Nature is Speaking: A Closer Look 
I selected the campaign “Nature Is Speaking” to investigate these links—between 
neoliberal environmentalisms, neoliberal environments, and the growth of neoliberal actors in 
environmentalism—for two predominant reasons. First, this campaign, and organization, 
Conservation International, represents the epitome of boundary fluidity in non-governmental 
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organization-private sector relations. Conservation International, one of the largest conservation 
organization in the world, has hundreds of corporate sponsors, including some of the largest in 
the world, such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Monsanto, Coca Cola, Nestle, Starbucks, and Shell. In 
2016, it has a revenue of annual $212 million, of which sixteen percent came from corporations, 
and thirty four percent from foundations. The organization has private sector affiliated people 
high up in the central organization, with Rob Walton of Walmart serving as chairman of the 
executive committee and many of other corporate actors, such as Web Bush, CEO of Northrop 
Grumman, and Robert J. Fischer, chairman of GAP, serving as board members.  
The campaign itself, “Nature Is Speaking,” is similarly connected to the private sector. 
Although it not revealed who funds the project, what is apparent is that is has social media 
partners in Walmart and Coca-Cola, with Walmart hosting the campaign videos on its official 
website. In addition, Hewlett Packard donates one dollar to Conservation International for every 
hashtag use of “Nature Is Speaking” on social media platforms and has donated HP Explore 
technology to monitor the social media impact of the series, and oversee the types of 
conversation being generated about it. In addition to partnership, the series is directed by Lee 
Clow, the creator of Apple’s infamous 1984 and Think Different Campaigns, as well as 
campaigns for other companies, including Nissan and Taco Bell. The hiring of a famous “ad 
man” was purposeful on the part of Conservation International.  As Sanjayan writes, “[the 
campaign] takes a page from smart brands like Apple or Virgin Airlines, who have changed not 
just the perception of a particular product but the conservation around an entire segment of life, 
and in the process created brands we simply want to be around.”271 
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Likewise, the series, “Nature Is Speaking,” is a high intensity campaign, with a similar 
goal of changing the conversation about environmentalism. Consisting of a series of ten 
approximately four minute videos, it features a host of Hollywood celebrities personifying 
different natural entities, such as air, water, flowers, redwoods, over the backdrop of vast 
landscapes.272 The voice of the natural entities personified has a scornful tone, disparaging 
against human-caused destruction of the natural environment. Harrison Ford, as the ocean, asks: 
“I am the ocean, who you think you are?” Kevin Spacey, personifying air, snidely reveals that he 
would like people to make air, like him. The redwood, via Robert Redford asks, “I’ve seen just 
about everything. You don’t impress me.” Julia Roberts, as Mother Nature, quips: “My planet, 
my atmosphere, my rules. Any questions?”273 Aside from nature’s disdainful tones, each video 
emphasizes the various utilities that the particular natural element provides humans; redwoods 
provide wood, the coral reeds provide protein to people, oceans regulate temperature, etc. To 
make that message even clearer, each segment ends with the words “People Need Nature” 
sprawling in large letters across a black screen.  
The message in the videos, therefore, is pretty clear. Nature is not in need of human 
protection, but rather humans need nature. It is not a vulnerable, fragile, or even benevolent 
force. Instead, it is strong and formidable, apathetic to human concerns, and it is in our 
enlightened self-interest to protect it for ourselves, but not for its sake (as is repeatedly stated, 
nature doesn’t need people). This perception of nature conforms to the stated objective of 
Conservation International to “rebrand environmentalism.” Sanjayan states, for example, “we 
need to reframe the debate the change the conversation—in other words, the environmental 
                                                 




movement needs a rebrand. And that’s exactly what Conservation International is doing with our 
“Nature Is Speaking” campaign.”274 This “rebrand” has the goal of reconfiguring the relationship 
of nature to one that emphasizes the necessity of natural entities, rather than their intrinsic worth. 
He explains: “I have become frustrated with the view of nature as a fragile painting: a Sistine 
Chapel dripping with life, to be admired from afar and described in reverent tones.”275 Although 
recognizing that some people may relate to that idea, what is more critical, he asserts, is to focus 
on all the ways that nature serves people, its instrumental worth. Thus, he states, “today our 
mission is based around the ethos that people needs nature to thrive—and we work on that part 
of nature that humans needs most.”276 
The newly branded environmentalism, therefore, is a people-focused one. Notably absent 
are the moral appeals to the intrinsic value of nature, or even the aesthetic and spiritual virtues of 
wild places; now, what is emphasized is strict instrumentality. As Sanjayan repeats, “love is not 
enough, we have got to emphasize that we need this place.”277 On the “about” section on the 
campaign webpage, the broader project is described as “our humanifesto,” with the objectives 
falling in line with other aspects of “new conservation,” a recent framework in conservation that 
emphasizes a human-focused conservation, market based frameworks like ecosystem services, 
business-NGO partnerships, and a focus on novel ecosystems, such as urban and agricultural 
areas.  
Despite the people-centered emphasis in the series, however, the images of nature shown 
in the videos are themselves almost completely devoid of people. There are vast expanses of 
                                                 





seemingly pristine natural areas, tumbling waterfalls, giant uninhabited forests, barren mountain 
peaks, and delicate flowers in wild meadows. Nowhere to be seen is industrial activity, urban 
structures, or any signs of human labor or inhabitation. Despite the assertion in the videos that 
nature serves as a critical utility service for humans, this can be understood only indirectly from 
the images themselves, with actual human interaction with nature seemingly taking place 
elsewhere. 
The apparent incoherence between the message of the video and how nature is actually 
represented may be more intelligible upon further analysis, however. There is much research, for 
example, on the construction of nature as spectacle and the reformulation of nature as a site of 
consumption and capitalist accumulation. Critics of the concept of wilderness argue that ideas of 
vast wilderness spaces that are devoid of humanity in the establishment of the first national 
parks, where the natural spaces in question were represented as “spectacular object[s] rather than 
as inhabitable space[s],” led to the displacement of large amounts of indigenous peoples to create 
sites of consumption for tourists.278 Much work has been done on this in the context of Africa, 
where European fantasies of wild, pristine nature were—and are —transposed onto African lands 
for the purposes of consumption and enjoyment (mostly by Europeans), often to the detriment of 
the people living there.279 Although eco-tourism is not what is being directly promoted here, a 
similar process of commodification is occurring as nature is being reconfigured into a product for 
consumption through the continued emphasis on its essential attributes for human survival. This 
commodification is reflected mainly in the video through the use of aesthetically appealing 
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imagery and the type of language used. Ian Somerhalder, for example, personifying coral reefs, 
describes the reefs as a “protein factory,” while Kevin Spacey, as the rainforest, describes 
himself as a “medicine cabinet.”280 This kind of instrumental language is also reflected in other 
Conservational International campaigns. In a 2008 appeal for the organization, for example, 
George Meyer, writer for The Simpsons, describes the natural world as a “giant utility that cleans 
our water and regulates our temperature,” and Prince Charles cautioned against more ecological 
destruction by stating that “nature, the biggest bank of all, could go bust.”281 
In addition to wilderness areas been reconfigured to sites of consumption through the 
perpetuation of what Stephen Nugent calls “eco-domains,” Jim Igoe argues further that these 
“spectacular” representations of nature also serve to depoliticize the politics of environmentalism 
by concealing relations of inequality. He states, for example, that “pristine virtual representation 
of nature mask . . . and supplant the widespread disruptions to actual nature derived from 
extraction and consumption.”282 This is also discussed by Guy Debord who saw “spectacle” as a 
fundamental feature in late capitalism which points to images becoming “commodified [that are] 
alienated from the relations that produced them and consumed in ignorance of the same.”283 For 
Marx, commodity fetishism depicts the ways in which capitalist production hides the social 
relations behind production. Nature becomes commodity, then, when it is reproduced and 
consumed without reference to the relationships and contexts from which it was produced. Thus, 
the elisions at the center of the spectacularization of nature conceals “the socio-economic 
complexities of tropical deforestation and its connection to Western consumer society, the 
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displacement and impoverishment of people by conservation interventions, and the impacts of 
mass tourism on specific ecosystems, as well as in terms of carbon emissions.”284 In doing so, it 
legitimizes consumption and the capitalist actors dependent on it by glossing over the realities of 
ecological destruction. 
As noted by Dan Brockington, the use of celebrities also features at the heart of these 
new forms of capitalist accumulation in conservation.285 In general, there are many studies 
highlighting the links between capitalism and celebrity. Chris Rojek argues, for example, that 
celebrities perpetuate an “ideology of heroic individualism, upward mobility and choice in social 
conditions where standardization, monotony, and routine prevail.”286 Celebrities, therefore, 
represent the success stories in which people can aspire to, despite the reality of extreme wealth 
being a necessary exception, rather than a realistic norm, in capitalist economies. Other 
viewpoints interpret the existence of celebrities as a “tonic” for alienated masses in which to 
“vicariously live better lives,” rather than an invention created from above to maintain utopian 
delusions of capitalism.287 Importantly, as Brockington points out, both viewpoints “hold that 
celebrities exist to facilitate increase, and encourage consumption” by legitimating capitalist 
norms of accumulation.288 Foucauldian perspectives relate to this in that they understand the 
function of celebrities to be one that reproduces dominant discourses—about the merits of hard 
work or the virtues of obedience, for example—so as to better control populations and limit 
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ideological resistance.289 In the case of environmentalism, Brockington argues that a similar 
process occurs in that celebrities lend moral authority to mainstream discourses of 
environmentalism that conform to already dominant, and dominating, ideals of appropriate 
environmental protection. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the celebrities used in the 
“Nature Is Speaking” campaign are all popular actors with high credibility and are generally well 
received in broader society. 
The depiction of people in the videos also serves to exacerbate these processes of 
depoliticization and oversimplification.  When Harrison Ford (personifying a redwood tree) is 
explaining the history of life to a young sapling, he describes, “all of sudden, there were humans. 
And hell broke loose.”290 Indeed, the withering tone towards human relationships with nature is a 
commonality throughout all the videos. The assumption is innocuous at first glance: if nature 
could speak, it would not be happy with humans. The representation of human activity as 
inherently “bad” in ecological terms, however, is problematic. Notably absent in this depiction, 
for example, are the myriad ways in which how political, economic, and cultural relations 
mediate between humans and their environments; in short, the plurality of human-nature 
relations. Also missing is the recognition that ecological destruction is not carried out by all 
humans equally but that the destruction of the environment is largely carried out by a few distinct 
agents, mostly corporations and governments, and not humans in general terms. Humans, 
therefore, portrayed in the same homogenous terms as nature, represented as equally culpable in 
the destruction of the environment, serves to further gloss over, and depoliticize, the realities of 
ecological destruction.  
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The commodification and connected depoliticization of nature protection, therefore, leads 
to assumptions of easy fixes in solving ecological crises, fixes that do not involve questions of 
power or questions of economic inequality. Indeed, apart from vague warnings about nature not 
needing humans and abstract assertions of the necessity of change, the only hint at a practical 
action is the box that appears when you enter the “Nature Is Speaking” webpage that suggest a 
sixty dollar donation. The apparent message here is that donating money to Conservation 
International will solve, or go some way towards solving, the problem of ecological degradation. 
Thus, there is another similarity to more general corporate advertising campaigns, the objectives 
of which are to persuade consumers to buy (in this case, donate) to the product.  
 
What’s Wrong With “Nature” In the Green Economy 
The representation of nature in the campaign, therefore, is predominantly a commodified 
nature. The campaign emphasizes that human’s need nature (not the other way around) but 
despite the focus on necessity, the images themselves are devoid of people, instead 
demonstrating panoramic shots of pristine nature and vast vistas. The rhetoric of necessity and 
the simultaneous spectacular-ization of nature is connected, however, by a mutual process of 
commodification, where nature is subject to the processes of capitalist appropriation and 
discourse of “nature saving” is imbued with profit potential. This commodification serves, 
therefore, to “sell” nature protection, and engage citizen/consumers to aid in saving nature, in 
this case, donate money. This conforms to Robert Fletcher et al.’s view that 
Conservation and nature [are] increasingly presented to and experienced by people 
through constructed (and commodified) goods and activities such as wildlife safaris, 
(eco)tourism adventures, documentaries, websites, animal memorabilia and so forth . . . . 
Many of these have in common that they are void of (local) people, thus perpetuating a 
heavily criticized nature/culture dichotomy that has long impacted negatively on local 
people’s livelihoods . . . . Representations and experiences of “unspoilt” nature, however, 
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have become the capital on which conservation organizations, and increasingly private 
and governmental actors, depend to engage consumers in issues such as biodiversity loss 
or to promote a ‘green’ image and attract tourists.291 
 
The commodification of nature is not only reinforced through the presentation of 
spectacular nature, but also reflected in the way the natural world is described in the videos. 
Nature is invariably presented through the vantage point of instrumentality; thus, the coral reefs 
are a “protein factory” and the rain forest “a medicine cabinet.” The slogan of the campaign 
“People Need Nature” exacerbates this point, as nature is depicted as useful/critical (providing 
essential services) while simultaneously abstract (something separate to humans). This 
characterization conforms to broader descriptions of neoliberal nature as a “service providers” 
but also, as Arsel and Buschser describe, as a “distinct corpus, an entity, that stands outside of 
society and economy.”292 
In this way, then, the picture of nature, as depicted in the campaign, conforms to, and 
complements, broader processes of neoliberal environmentalism and broader constructions of 
neoliberal natures. Nature become reconfigured under neoliberalism, “co-produced by science in 
this unfolding economic and policy order, and institutionalized by powerful organizations, 
whether the World Bank, international conservation NGOs or the Convention of 
Biodiversity.”293 Neoliberal natures emerge from the neoliberalization of nature conservation as 
natures that are directly commodifiable and primarily identifiable for their instrumental and 
economic worth. The truism of the ecological sciences that “everything in nature hangs together” 
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is replaced by another; namely, that “everything in nature has a price.” As James Fairhead et al. 
write:  
Thus the ‘green gaze’ valuing a tropical forest now sees deep down to its underground 
potential for carbon storage, its solar absorption, its soil and water as a potential for 
biofuel production (palm oil, sugar and Jatropha), its trees as a source of REDD 
(Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) funding (perhaps doubling as a 
potential source of sustainable biochar), and its biodiversity as a source of global 
conservation funding or tourism revenue.294 
 
As described above, this reductionism is also apparent in the depiction of people in the 
campaign. Like in neoliberal environmentalism more broadly, the perception of people is one of 
rational maximizers of utility, as Homo economicus, which, if not given adequate 
incentivization, will continue in a somewhat linear path of ecological destruction. Sanjayan 
asserts, for example, the “love alone is not enough,” we need to emphasize that we need this 
place. The objective in the video, therefore, is to emphasize necessity, to lead people to the 
recognition that it is on our enlightened self-interest to protect nature. Although this is, of course, 
accurate, the depiction of people as rationality maximizers and innately selfish leads to a further 
de-politicization of the relationship between the corporate actors (and the funders of the 
campaign and organization) and ecological harm by assuming that all people are responsible 
equally for ecological degradation, facilitated by the representation of humanity in homogenous 
terms, and the lack of recognition in relation to varying agents and processes of ecological 
degradation.  
Thus, nature is represented as both spectacular product and service provider, essential to, 
and separate from, humans. Indeed, although the stated objective of the videos is to rebrand 
environmentalism, there is also a sense that nature is getting rebranded to, made anew as a (very 
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important) product. The use of celebrities, corporate marketing techniques, and social media 
further exacerbates this process of commodification.  
The process of commodifying nonhuman (and human) nature, however, is not a new 
phenomenon. The depiction and production of nonhumans as commodities has been around for 
as the capitalist mode of production, and arguably before.295 One of the earliest critics with 
regard commodification of natural entities is Karl Polanyi, who asserted that the monetization of 
nature and humans under capitalism leads to ontological transformations in social life, where 
nature becomes “resource” and humans “labor.”296 These are what he calls “fictitious 
commodities,” and occur when things such as trees, water, and people—things that have 
ecological, intrinsic, social, and cultural worth —are treated as having only monetary value.297 
Such commodification, Polanyi argues, is ontologically inherent, because ultimately they are 
“not true commodities that can be managed purely by price signals and controlled by the 
market.” Nature is more than the sum of its benefits to humans, and humans are more than labor. 
When this metaphysical reality is obscured through a domination of market rationale, however, it 
can lead to devastating consequences as human and natural value and worth becomes subject to 
the whims of market pressures and the laws of supply and demand. Taken to the extreme, 
according to Polanyi, it can lead to a double movement, where the economic system, by focusing 
only on market values, degrades the very biophysical conditions it depends on, which, in turn, 
leads to a social counter-reaction which seeks to re-embed and restrain the marketization process 
through social and ecological protection such as labor law and environmental regulations.  
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By and large, however, it seems that a Polanyian double movement has been replaced, or 
marginalized, by a focus on hyper commodification in environmental protection, represented by 
neoliberal environmentalisms that assert that only when you put a price on nature, when you 
emphasize its blunt instrumentality, can it be “saved.” What is relatively new, in other words, is 
the “widespread effort on the part of capitalist industry to internalize natural resources an integral 
component of production for sustainable management in the long term rather than externalizing 
environmental costs in the interests of short term profit.” Thus, nature, as made manifest in the 
narrative of the green economy and other novel environmental frameworks, is transformed into 
natural capital: a nature that is monetized and subsequently made accountable in the global 
market.  
Selling nature to save it, however, has some problems. Somewhat in line with a 
Polanyian critique, for example, Morgan Robinson points out that one consequence of submitting 
nature to capital is that the natural environment must be transformed in order to be visible to the 
demands of capital.298 Commenting on the flower, Aster Simplex, a plant in the sunflower family, 
she notes that Aster has never been taxonomically simple due to complications in morphological 
distinction. Attempts to define and categorize the species has led to a varying arrays of 
descriptions, with “no current consensus on the very existence of a coherent and discrete species 
called Aster simplex.” Although usually taxonomical complications such as this would be an 
engaging matter for botanists only, Robinson argues that scientific debates about taxonomy are 
increasingly important beyond the scope of scientific concern. With the rise of ecosystem 
services as the guiding framework for environmental protection, the group of plants in the genus 
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Aster are now significant because the federal government understands only certain plants as 
serving as indicators of a functioning wetland ecosystem that, in turn, provides critical services 
to humans, such as detoxification, climate change mitigation, and flood regulation. Wetland 
ecosystems matching the federal description, thus, “produce ecosystem services that can now be 
sold on the market.”299 Ones that do not are not subject to internalization, or indeed, any form of 
accounting. Thus, she notes:  
The methods and techniques of ecosystem assessment must describe a nature that capital 
can “see” —that has an uncontroversial measure—in order for trade to occur. However, 
these assessment methods currently produce unstable data that are rendered meaningful 
in economic terms only by dint of creative and ad hoc efforts at translation by field 
technicians. It is suggested that this may represent a practical limit or crisis point in the 
expansion of capital relations, or at least a complication in the streamlined neoliberal 
narratives about the commodification of ecosystem services.300 
 
Problems with fitting nature to conform to capital is also evident in the Green Economy 
approach of biodiversity offsetting, the mechanism of compensating for ecological losses in one 
place by establishing or creating net gains in biodiversity elsewhere (at another time). As 
Evangelina Apostolopoulu and William Adams point out, however, the idea of natural systems 
and nature embedded in this approach is significantly at odds with broader principles of 
ecology.301 The system works, for example, by creating metrics that score biodiversity losses and 
gains in a numerical framework and advocates that biodiversity losses in one place must be made 
up elsewhere (at another time). According to the authors, however, creating metrics that score 
biodiversity losses and gains and assert that biodiversity loss in one place, at one time, is 
equivalent to a biodiversity gain somewhere else at another time leads to a reductionist approach 
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to ecosystems and reproduces misleading notions of simplicity, potentially leading to a “retreat 
from the study of intrinsically complex systems.”302 In addition, the notion of “equivalent 
natures” reinforces perceptions of nature as a system of divisible and distinct units, an 
understanding that is deeply contrary to the basic principles of biology. In contrast, the authors 
maintain that “ecosystems are dialectically composed, multi-layered systems that do not form 
simply mappable units, and biodiversity is non-interchangeable in terms of type, space and 
time.”303 
Conclusion  
Recent frameworks of the Green Economy are part of a wider shift towards ecomodern 
strategies in environmental governance, connected to a growing fluidity of boundaries between 
public and private actors in the domain of environmentalism. As I analyzed in chapter four, the 
growth of private sector engagement in environmental politics can lead to a shift in ecological 
frameworks and ideologies towards more market-friendly mechanisms. It may also, as I have 
suggested in this chapter, have consequences with regard to how nature is perceived, imagined, 
and produced in mainstream environmental organizations. The representation of nature and 
human-nature relationships in the “Nature Is Speaking” campaign by Conservation International 
succeeds in satisfying the intentions of the organization: to “rebrand environmentalism” and 
encourage recognition of the instrumental value of nature. It also, however, conforms to larger 
ecomodern projects that center on the creation of environmental commodities and the pricing of 
ecosystem services.  
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The following chapter examines ecomodernism in a more general way. I analyze the 
extent to which the theory and success of ecomodernism is reflective of an infiltration of certain 
kinds of interests and actors within the framework, and within environmentalism more generally. 
Specifically, I suggest that ecomodernism represents a powerful environmentalism, insofar as it 
has both strong institutional and ideological attachments to the dominant social and economic 





ECOMODERNISM AS POWERFUL ENVIRONMENTALISM 
Ecomodernism is now understood to be one of the dominant frameworks to address 
current ecological concerns.304 It emphasizes economic incentives, technological advancements, 
and the monetization of ecological services as means to solve environmental problems. Popular 
discourses such as “sustainable development,” “green consumption,” and the more recent “Green 
Economy” provide examples of ecomodern frameworks, as do the use of economic incentives, 
such as the Polluters Pay Principles, the introduction of carbon taxes, etc. 
At its core, ecomodernism expresses a faith in current political and economic structures 
to re-orient themselves to achieve environmental sustainability. It differs from other 
environmental discourses, such as many laid out—and lived—by indigenous, ecofeminist, and 
environmental justice groups, who advocate a radical restructuring of contemporary society on 
the basis of ecological principles. In contrast, advocates of ecomodernism argue that incremental, 
modern, strategies are satisfactory to achieve positive environmental ends. As described by 
Maarten Hajer, ecomodernism “recognizes the structural character of environmental problems 
but nonetheless assumes that existing political, economic and social structures can internalize the 
care for the environment.”305 As reflected in these structures, ecomodernism supposes that our 
current institutions can correct a “design fault” of modernity which has traditionally led to the 
externalizing of negatives, such as pollution and waste, onto other cultures, species, locations 
and times. Through this correction, environmental negatives can be correctly accounted for, and 
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economic incentives can encourage ecologically responsible behavior without sacrificing 
economic growth. Ecological care, once left out, is now brought back in.  
Ecomodernism, therefore, ostensibly placing priority on environmental concern, is 
recognized by many as an ecological shift in contemporary thinking. Its critics, however, 
question the efficacy, strength, and authenticity of this shift. Frederick Buttel, for example, 
argues that ecomodernism lacks an “identifiable set of postulates,”306 while John Bellamy Foster 
posits that “ecological modernization skirts some of the main challenges that ecological 
problems pose for social democratic thought.”307 Further, Bobby Banarjee argues that rather that 
represent a challenge to the logic of modern capitalist society, eco-modernization narratives 
emerge from capitalist and elite interests, and thereby produce and reproduce the inequalities 
inherent to the neoliberal process.308  
In this chapter, therefore, I wants to draw and elaborate on some of these critiques. I 
agree with critical ecomodernism theorists who argue that its focus on economic, over 
ecological, rationality may be counterproductive to the stated goals of ecomoderism. Along these 
veins, I analyze the extent to which the theory and success of ecomodernism is reflective of an 
infiltration of certain kinds of interests and actors within the framework, and within 
environmentalism more generally. Specifically, I suggest that ecomodernism represents a 
powerful environmentalism, insofar as it has both strong institutional and ideological attachments 
to the dominant social and economic forces; and is supported, reproduced and constructed by 
some of the most powerful actors in society. Ecomoderism gains its power from, not in spite, 
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dominant prevailing interests, and thus tends to produce and reproduce mechanisms of ecological 
protection and frameworks of human/non-human co-inhabitation that conform to the status quo. 
How this domination affects other expression of environmental care, as well as some problems 
with its own implementation, is discussed towards the end of the chapter. 
 
Industrial Caterpillars and the Institutionalization of Environmentalism 




One popular narrative of environmentalism is that it has become institutionalized. While 
the early environmental movement was perceived as radical, intent on subverting the social, 
economic, and political order, more contemporary versions of environmentalism are 
incremental, happy to work with existing political and economic structures and/or to rely on 
technological fixes. Cary Coglianese claims that environmentalism moved from being a “small 
constituency” to a “major force” 309  in culture, but as it grew and institutionalized, its normative 
structure began to change. It did not continue the radical, anti-establishment, protests of the 
sixties and seventies, but rather followed a more gradual route of seeking reform from within. It 
went from “outside” to “inside,” from demanding transformational change to being content with 
the compatibility of the environmental agenda with other dominant spheres of the political 
spectrum. The position of the environmental movement changed from subversion to one of 
friendly diplomacy with one environmental lawyer remarking at the time “before, we filed law 
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suits, and held press conferences. Now we have lunch with the assistant secretary to discuss the 
program.”310 
Although the narrative of institutionalization is somewhat flawed in its 
overgeneralization as well as its Western focus (the trajectory of radical-to-institutionalized is 
somewhat particular to Western environmentalism and does not necessarily reflect 
environmentalism in the global south or that of indigenous communities, etc.), it can be helpful 
for understanding contemporary mainstream environmentalism in some of its forms. Indeed, 
narratives of sustainable development, green/ethical consumption and free-market 
environmentalism, are all increasingly popular environmental frameworks, while discourses of 
biocentrism, deep ecology, and ecofeminism are somewhat more marginalized.  
Part of the “success” of environmentalisms institutionalization is an optimism in the 
ability of modernity to fix some of the flaws that have led to environmental degradation. 
Modernity, as defined by Anthony Giddens, refers to “modes of social life or organization 
which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently 
became more or less worldwide in their influence.”311 It is both a conceptual framework and 
living system which emphasizes scientific rationality over spirituality, expresses an optimism 
with regard technological changes, advocates democracy, free markets, and maintains an overall 
confident in the ability of the human mind to perpetuate a constant and linear manifestation of 
progress. Indeed, Max Weber describes that central to the adoption of modernization theory is a 
“metaphysical . . .  belief in progress.”312 This progress, as John Bellamy Foster and others point 
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out, is intimately linked to ideas pertaining to the conquest of nature. Indeed, “to be modern,” as 
Jeffrey Alexander describes, “is to believe that the masterful transformation of the world 
[including all of nature] is possible, indeed that it is likely.”313  
Although more radical forms of environmentalism reject many aspects of modernity, the 
institutionalized environmentalism that emerged in the late seventies and is dominant today is 
confident in the potential of reconfiguring contemporary institutions to make them more 
“green,” sustainable, and ecologically just. Reflecting this confidence, Joseph Huber notes that 
the “dirty and ugly industrial caterpillar will transform into a[n] ecological butterfly.”314 
 
Internalizing Care: Eco-Modernization as a  
“New” Theory of Environmentalism 
 
One of the central frameworks that reflected this transformation was ecomodernism (also 
called eco-modernization and ecological modernization). The theory of ecomodernism was first 
developed in the early 1980s in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Its early 
theorists include Martin Janicke, Volker von Prittwitz, Klaus Zimmermann, Gert Spaargaren, 
Maartin Hajer, Arthur P. Mol, Albert Weale and Maurie Cohen.315 Maurie Cohen, a leading 
proponent, describes ecomodernism as a framework which “aims to harness the power of human 
ingenuity for the purpose of harmonizing economic advancement with environmental 
improvement.”316  In that respect, it poses a classic win-win scenario, in line with both 
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environmental concerns and with economic advancement. We can “do good” for the 
environment without having to sacrifice modern understandings of progress. In short, without 
having to compromise economic growth. One of the base assumptions of ecomodernism, 
therefore, is that the solution to the environmental crisis lies in the advancement of the 
“reflexive knowledge that characterizes modern thinking.”317 This faith in modernity and the 
market represents the cornerstone of the theory of ecomodernism. The project of modernity is 
viewed as inherently reflexive, capable of adjusting to faults and reorienting itself in the face of 
novel concerns.  
Notions of “reflexive modernity” arise in the work Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and 
Scott Lash.318 Beck, for example, in his idea of “risk society” claims that the project of 
modernity has resulted in two central features. One is the taming of nature by modern 
technology and science. Examples include flood control and electricity production. The other is 
the creation of the industry that creates new risks, replacing natural dangers with those emerging 
as a result of modern technology. He states that the production of nuclear power establishments, 
the disposal of harmful substances into the natural environment and the increase of scientific 
discoveries all pose, in the words of Maurie Cohen, a “daily threat of catastrophic 
proportions.”319 These technological advances, initially emerging as a reaction to problems of 
economic scarcity now override all other risks, economic or otherwise, in their effect on the 
general population. According to Beck, however, the second phase of modernity, or 
“modernizing modernity,” is one that reacts, reflex-like, to the problems of the earlier forms.320 
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Modernity can deal with the problems of its own creation by constant improvement through 
reflection. As described by Foster, “some have characterized the reflex-like response, stipulated 
by reflexive modernity (and ecological modernization) theory, as a “new automatism,” in which 
industrialization is both self-generating and self-improving.”321 
Thus, the idea of reflexity, that modernity can improve itself, is the central defining 
feature of ecomodernism. Through this feature, the capitalist inclinations towards economic 
growth, do not have to be discarded, but rather they can be resolved with environmental goals.  
With ecomodernism, “economic growth and the resolution of ecological problems can, in 
principle, be reconciled.”322 
 
Ecomodernism as Powerful Environmentalism 
Ecomodernism has been described as a paradigm shift in contemporary thinking 
involving environmental management. Indeed, central to the concept of ecomodernism is the 
idea of transformation; that our current societal and economic structures can be transformed on 
the basis of new principles. While traditionally the principles were exclusively economic, these 
novel principles give equal attention to ecological and cultural well-being. Thus, the changes in 
our value systems would encourage transformation shifts, but not upheavals, in our 
contemporary institutions.  
Despite the rhetoric of change, however, critics of ecomodernism focus on how distinctly 
un-radical the theory is in practice. One common thread embedded in both the normative 
structure and the policy implications of ecomodernism is that is explicitly fails to challenge the 
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“capitalist juggernaut of production.”323 As Fisher and Freudenburg note, ecomodernism is 
largely successful due to its “political foesibility.”324 In contrast to alternative environmental 
discourses that emphasize broad structural adjustments, ecomodernism is characterized by its 
belief and confidence in existing political and economic institutions, especially the institutions of 
the free market. Indeed, advocates of ecomodernism generally embrace private sector 
partnerships with open arms rather than with the skepticism that one might expect given the 
impacts of industrial activity on the environment. Additionally, private sector mechanisms, such 
as payment for ecosystem services, often governed by private sector actors, are increasingly a 
significant aspect of contemporary environmental governance.  
 Cooperation, therefore, is a central element in this process. Sheldon Kamienicki reflects 
this approach in his claim that ecomodernism “is achieved not through adversarial process, but 
by bringing government and business together within a cooperative framework.”325 Political 
feasibility and cooperation with government and corporate bodies, however, is, under any other 
name, an acceptance of prevailing dominant interests. As Foster notes, for example, the 
legitimacy of ecomodernism is correlated with the extent to which it accepts establishment ideas, 
stating that 
ecological modernization exponents frequently point to leading political and corporate 
figures and establishment pundits (as well as to powerful international organizations and 
processes)—rather than to leading natural scientists or environmental social scientists—
as evidence of the dominance, that is, the power within the establishment, and hence the 
“truth,” of their ideas.326  
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Indeed, Schlosberg and Rinfret in their article, Ecological Modernization, American 
Style, singles out celebrities, such as Tom Hanks and corporations such as WalMart as “icons of 
ecological modernization.”327 Hajer reflects the “truths” of ecomodernism further, writing  
The dyed-in-the-wool radicals of the 1970s had a point but failed to get it through. This 
was partly due to the rather unqualified nature of their Totalkritik. The new consensus on 
ecological modernization is here attributed to a process of maturation of the 
environmental movement: after a radical phase the issue was taken off the streets and the 
movement became institutionalized as so many social movements before it. With the 
adoption of the discourse of ecological modernization its protagonists now speak the 
proper language and have been integrated in the advisory boards where they fulfill a 
“tremendously important” role showing how we can design new institutional forms to 
come to terms with environmental problems.328 
 
As Foster describes it, therefore, the consensual nature of ecological modernization 
discourse that Hajer refers here is the “hegemonic consensus of power.”329  Ecomodernism is 
granted legitimacy because of its institutional connections, both normative and descriptive. It 
uses the “proper language,” which Hajer describes as “the language of business,” and in so 
doing, produces and reproduces a narrative of legitimacy and power.  
The connections between ecomodernism and prevailing dominant social interests is also 
reflected financially. As Giorgi and Redclift demonstrate, EU funding of environmental research 
is disproportionately directed at work which intends to further ecomodern perspectives.330 Within 
conservation, Rebecca Goldman and colleagues shows that private sector funding is more likely 
to go to ecomodern projects, specifically those that use the framework of payment for ecosystem 
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services,331 and a similar trend is noted by Robert Brulle and Craig Jenkins who demonstrate that 
private sector funding for environmentalism in the U.S. goes disproportionately to those projects 
which do not challenge the structural components of contemporary society, in other words, 
projects of ecomodernism,332 and thereby exclude discourses that do, including environmental 
justice, ecofeminism, etc. As described by Banarjee, ecomodernist frameworks such as 
sustainable development, are supported and produced by transnational institutions, such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, 
as well as large corporations.333 The Breakthrough Institute, a leading supporter and creator of 
ecomodern policies, and who recently published “A Ecomodernist Manifesto,” was established 
by Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, and among its advisory boards are members of corporate 
institutions, such as Google, etc.  
Additionally, as I have discussed in this dissertation, private sector actors involved in 
environmentalism through frameworks of philanthropy and corporate social responsibility tend 
to support, and construct, ecomodern frameworks of ecological protection. The vision of 
sustainability that was aggressively promoted by the WBSCD, as a “win-win” framework of 
green development that does not challenge economic growth, went on to subsequently become, , 
the dominant way that sustainability is understood and implemented in environmental 
governance. Further, as analyzed in the previous chapter, the representations of the natural 
environment that emerge from public-private organizations, such as Conservation International, 
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tend to be ones that conforms to ecomodern, instrumental understandings of nature that focus on 
the commodifiable aspects of the environment and generally maintain a strict dichotomy between 
human and non-human nature.  
This influence of private sector actors is especially apparent with regard to more novel 
frameworks of ecomodernism, such as the Green Economy, discussed in the previous chapter. 
The green economy promulgates a particularly aggressive form of ecomodernism—an 
ecomodernism 2.0—in that not only is capitalist production perceived to be compatible with 
ecological well-being, but capitalist forces are understood as essential to the cause. Nature, in 
order to be protected, has to be viewed in terms of the logic of capitalist production; nature, in 
order to be “saved,” has to be sold.334 Like “business” versions of sustainable development 
before it, the frameworks of the Green Economy are constructed and supported by private sector 
and other elite actors in environmental governance. The Green Energy Coalition, for example, 
established in 2011 as a precursor to the Rio conference by the United Nations, and that 
promoted the “recapitalization of our natural resource base to ‘incentivize investment,’”335 was 
comprised mostly of private sector associations and NGOs heavily supported by the private 
sector.336 Additionally, private sector alliances, most notably high-ranking officials in Deutsche 
Bank, were central in the creation of other documents, such as the UNEP’s Green Economy 
Report and the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) report, both of which 
promoted the pricing of “natural capital” (the services provided to humans by nature) and led to 
the subsequent creation of the Bank of Natural Capital, and ultimately served as foundational 
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documents for the subsequent formulation of the green economy at Rio + 20.337 
Further, in addition to the promulgation of ecomodern frameworks by powerful actors, 
there are also other aspects of ecomodernism that contributes to its position as a dominant, or 
powerful environmentalism. For Bruno Latour, for example, the very idea of modernism itself 
refers to understandings of the present (and future) that are dependent upon very distinct ideas of 
the past as antithetical to the modern project. He writes 
I have emphasized many times that "modernism" carries with it another idea, that of 
emancipation from some stagnant, archaic and stifling past, so that "modern” is always a 
way to orient action according to an arrow of time that distinguishes the past from the 
future. An essential component of the concept of modernity is the idea of a future toward 
which we travel after a radical rupture with the past. Such an arrow of time orients action 
in a highly specific way and gives to the future a very specific coloration of emancipation 
and to the past a sense of stagnant archaism.338 
 
Thus, modernity, for Latour, is a very specific “orientation of action,” dependent upon 
the perception of a distinct break from the past. Thus, he states, “to modernize is to distribute 
agencies along a gradient that allows the orientation of action in such a way that those who resist 
— who remain backward, who remain archaic, etc. — are beaten into submission.”339 Modernity, 
then, doesn’t just refer to modes of action, but also to particular alignments that are embedded 
within linear notions of progress; and that “carry” the marginalization of counter-modern visions. 
Narratives of ecomodernism often conform to this particular alignment, with environmental 
frameworks that deviate from that the “pragmatism” of ecomodernist accounts critiqued for their 
anti-scientific and/or spiritual frameworks.340 
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The Problem with Powerful Environmentalisms 
Thus, ecomodernism can be understood as powerful environmentalism in that it has both 
strong institutional and ideological attachments to the dominant social and economic forces, and 
is supported, reproduced and constructed by some of the most powerful actors in society. The 
status of ecomodernism as powerful, however, may lead to problems with regard to the 
marginalization of alternative expressions of environmental care.  
Indeed, the domination of one kind of environmentalism over another is not a new 
phenomenon. As discussed at length by Mark Dowie and others, specifically Western 
perceptions of wilderness as vast areas of pristine nature, devoid of humans, manifested in the 
creation of national parks, has conflicted with other expressions of environmental identity, 
specifically environmentalisms that primarily value nature for the provisioning of basic 
resources, such as food, water, shelter, in addition to cultural and symbolic meaning.341 Dan 
Brockington, for example, describes a “dominant environmentalism,” largely emanating from 
conservation organizations, political institutions, and celebrity environmentalists of the global 
North that values “pristine lands untouched—and uninfluenced by people,”342 and that 
promulgates frameworks of environmental protection based on the privatization of natural 
resources and the creation of boundaries between nonhuman and human nature, especially as it 
pertains to human inhabitants. In contrast, he asserts, environmentalisms of the South tend to 
value the environment for, among other things, “their contributions to livelihoods,” and thus 
clash with any frameworks that restrict relationships of co-inhabitation and resource use.  
This clash between what Brockington calls “grounded” and “ungrounded” 
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environmentalisms has led to significant conflict, usually involving conservation organizations 
and governments, and indigenous peoples, and dating back to the creation of the first national 
parks. The establishment of the National Parks in the United States, for example, led to the 
displacement of hundreds of Native American tribes. In 1877, in the creation of the Yellowstone 
National Park, 300 people were killed in the conflict with the U.S. army.343 Although this was 
common with regard to the first parks, events like this are ongoing as people are still being 
displaced for the purposes of the creation of national parks in such places as Thailand344 and 
Botswana.345 Although each situation differs, displacement can refer to physical displacement 
due to forced removal in some capacity, or economic displacement as a result of hunting ban 
and/or a restricted use of other natural resources in general. In a somewhat bizarre situation in 
Uganda, the Batwa pygmy community were removed from their ancestral lands due to the 
establishment of a national park, and are now only allowed back in to perform their old lifestyles 
for the enjoyment of tourists.346 Importantly, in all of these cases, the creation of national parks is 
tied to projected or actual profits from ecotourism, currently one of the fastest growing industries 
in the world.347 In addition to physical and economic displacement, these processes of 
displacement also invariably involve the “obliteration of local histories and associations with the 
land,” and the environmental identities of the people and communities living there. 
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This clash, therefore, is not only between environmentalisms (frameworks of nature 
protection), but also relates to representations of nature itself. As Robert Neuman argues, 
European settlers on the African continent brought with them certain ideals of nature, largely 
influenced by eighteenth century landscape paintings by Claude and others, subsequently 
imposing those aesthetic perceptions of nature onto African lands.348 Thus, Africa was perceived 
as an Eden: the “nature” to Europe’s culture. As David Anderson and Richard Grove explain, “at 
its crudest, Africa has been portrayed as offering the opportunity to experience a wild and natural 
environmental which was no longer available in the domesticated landscapes of Europe.”349 The 
reconfiguration of parts of Africa into culturally constructed ideas of nature from the colonial 
settlers, namely as a nature devoid of human inhabitants, profoundly changed both the material 
reality of the continent itself, as well the social reality of its inhabitants.  
Similarly, ecomodernism as a framework of environmental care also carries with it 
particular ideas of nature and ecological protection that can come into conflict and clash with 
alternative expressions of human-nature relations. As Ariel Salleh writes, for example, the Green 
Economy focus of the United Nations Conference on Sustainability in 2012 was contested by “a 
counter-hegemonic force of environmentalists, social, feminists, peasants, and indigenous 
people,” culminating in a People Summit mediated by the World Social Forum in the same year, 
and ultimately leading to the publication of an alternative document, “Another Future is 
Possible,” centralized on the concept of “bio-civilization.”350 In this document, Salleh states that  
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The capitalist commodification of nature in notions like “climate smart” GMO 
agriculture was contested. Ecosystem pricing in financial initiatives like carbon trading 
was interrogated and the very meaning of “value” was questioned.351  
 
As Salleh notes, however, despite attempts to block the Green Economy frameworks, 
official negotiations proceeded and many aspects of the Green Economy was, and continue to be, 
cemented in place. Indeed, one of the primary characteristics of the opposition to these 
ecomodern frameworks is that it is largely based in grassroots activism, and consequently has 
much fewer resources than the powerfully backed ecomodern frameworks of the global North. 
Although supported by some Southern elites, it is notable that the conference itself, the Peoples 
Summit, had no corporate sponsors, a significant contrast to the UNCED conference in Rio, with 
corporations, such as BMW, Coca Cola, and Petrobras among the conference’s leading partners 
and suppliers.352 
Ecomodern frameworks of the Green Economy may be also involved in the 
marginalization and repression of social rights in a more general sense. Critics argue, for 
example, that the privatization of natural resources as central to the ecomodern, and green 
economy approach, has resulted in a series of “green grabs,” the “appropriation of lands for 
environmental ends,”353 either through ecotourism, biodiversity offsetting, carbon sequestration, 
or biofuel production. Green grabs such as these often disrupt local property rights and 
community sovereignty and lead to a “restructuring of rules and authority over the access, use 
and management of resources, in related labour relations, and in human-ecological relationships, 
that may have profoundly alienating effects.”354 In Honduras, for example, critics of the REDD 
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framework note that it leads to an imposition of a very particular framework of property rights 
that clashes with the collective framework of property ownership as practiced in much of the 
country, as well as encouraging foreign investment that leads to both a direct and indirect loss of 
community sovereignty over land.355 Along this vein, Mary Thomas et al. argues that REDD 
functions as a kind of governance, a “particular framing of the problem of climate change and its 
solutions that validate and legitimizes specific tools, actors, and solutions while marginalizing 
others.”356 The dominant and dominating factors of this process, embedded in Western 
understands of property right and economic liberalism, has caused scholars and activists to 
describe ecomodern frameworks such of the green economy as colonial in nature, with The 
Global Alliance of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities on Climate Change, proclaiming 
After more than 500 years of resistance, we, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, 
peasant farmers, fisherfolk and civil society are not fooled by the so-called Green 
Economy and REDD+ because we know colonialism when we see it. Regardless of its 
cynical disguises and shameful lies, colonialism always results in the rape and pillaging 
of Mother Earth, and the slavery, death, destruction and genocide of her 
peoples. Rio+20’s Green Economy and REDD+ constitute a thinly-veiled, 
wicked, colonialist planet grab that we oppose, denounce and resist.357 
 
Ecomodernism and Its Discontents 
The status of ecomodernism as a powerful environmentalism presents significant 
concerns, therefore, with regard to the marginalization of other expressions of environmental 
care, as well as the marginalization of alternative ways of living and human-nature relationships. 
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As I have discussed above, an increase in ecomodern frameworks has coincided with the growth 
in private sector actors in environmental governance, as these actors construct, support, and 
reproduce “private visions of the (ecological) good,” leading to significant ideological and 
discursive alterations in the field of environmental governance, and thus presenting a significant 
normative challenge to environmentalism and environmental ethics.  
Ecomodernism also suffers from some conceptual issues in and of itself that may affect 
the satisfaction of its objective to “internalize ecological care.” Many scholars question, for 
example, to what extent ecomodernism represents an inauthentic form of environmentalism 
insofar as it is directed by the dictates of the market, rather than that of ecological concerns. 
Indeed, as Banarjee asks, what is being sustained in ecomodern narratives such as sustainable 
development? As he points out, in the Brundtlant Commission, development is given priority 
over the environment, reflected in the statement that “environmental protection constitutes an 
integral part of the development process.”358 Yet, as he writes, “if the debate truly was about 
environmental and social sustainability, surely one would expect the relationship to be reversed, 
on the assumption that development proceeds within the constraints and limits of the biophysical 
environment.”359 
Additionally, skepticism with regard to the intentions of ecomodern advocates is 
exacerbated by the notion that “modernism” (as it exists and is manifested today) and “ecological 
health” are ultimately incompatible with one other, and consequently that ecomodernism is a best 
a comforting rhetorical device, but little else. This is promulgated in particular by Bruno Latour, 
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who has maintained famously that between modernism and ecologism, one must choose.  In 
relation to ecomodernism, he writes: 
And this is where we encounter this strange animal, rather this monster, “ecomodernism”, 
that I am not sure we should learn to love, and that triggers in me, I have to confess, a 
deep antipathy. To me, it sounds much like the news that an electronic cigarette is going 
to save a chain smoker from addiction. A great technical fix which will allow the 
addicted to behave just as before, except now he or she will go on with the benefit of high 
tech product and the happy support of his or her physician, mother and significant other. 
In other words, “ecomodernism” seems to me another version of having ones cake and 
eating it too.360 
 
The notion of incompatibility is influenced predominantly by a picture of modernism that 
has its roots in the domination and exploitation of nature, largely for profit.  As noted by Banarjee, 
Western discourses of development and modernity, dating back to the Enlightenment period, 
construct a view of nature as essentially separate from humanity, and for which humanity uses 
instrumentality for the purposes of civilization. He writes that the transformation of nature 
(depicted in European traditions as “wild, untamed’) into environment (more “manageable and 
goal directed”) is one of the hallmarks of modernity, in which the domination of nature becomes 
a key indicator of human progress.”361 This dichotomous understanding is reproduced in 
ecomodern discourses and reflected in, among other things, its use of economic and instrumental 
language when referring to nature, such as “natural capital,” and “stock,” in addition to its 
suggested frameworks for ecological protection that involve, above all, the financialization of 
natural resources. 
Further, as posited by Ariel Salleh, ecomodernism not only reproduces the dichotomous 
ontologies of traditional modern thought, but also perpetuates a particular understanding of 
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nature as “dead matter” that became commonplace during the European scientific revolution. 
Carolyn Merchant notes that with the advent of the Scientific Revolution in Europe came a 
mechanized nature, wherein the perception of nature was transformed from living and female, to 
inert and dead. This dead matter was then objectified, dissected, and exploited by scientists and 
industrialists for the overall benefit of humanity. Importantly, for Merchant, the perceptive shift 
also had ethical consequences. She stated that a perception of nature as living served as a moral 
constraint to human actions and the environment. She states, “one does not readily slay a mother, 
dig into her entrails for gold or mutilate her body, although commercial mining would soon 
require that.”362 Conversely, however, the transformation of nature from living to inert matter 
served as a way to lift moral obligations towards the environment, and subsequently paved the 
way for a burgeoning capitalist mass appropriation of nature.  
Salleh provides examples of a similar process in ecomodern discourses, arguing that 
populist ecomodern narratives of environmentalism both uncritically accept and reproduce these 
modernist notions of nature as “dead matter.”363 Salleh quotes the German Federal Minister for 
Environment who, in an appeal for increased ecomodern strategies of environmental protection, 
called Russia the “world’s filling pump” and Brazil a “raw material warehouse” and “global 
farmer.” 364 This language, as she points out, is reflective of a peculiarly modern ontology 
towards nature, specifically, the idea of nature as a passive warehouse which is be used (i.e. 
cultivated) by human agents. As described by Banarjee, despite this very framework being 
criticized for being, in a large way, responsible for our current ecological crisis, ecomodern 
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frameworks remain entrenched in it, “plagued by the same modernistic assumptions of 
rationality in their reliance on scientific inquiry and the separation of people from the biophysical 
environment.”365  
From this perspective, then, the extent to which ecomodern discourses can successfully 
internalize an ethic of care for nature in an ontology which places distinct boundaries between 
the human and the nonhuman, and which values nature primarily for its instrumental qualities is 
questionable. In many philosophical analyses of care, it is asserted that care only occurs in 
relationships of mutuality and dependence. As noted by White and Cuomo, for example, the 
ethics of care understands moral agents as “deeply and inextricably embedded in networks of 
ethical significant connections and conceive of caring as exercising responsibilities and virtues 
that maintain and positively influence relationships and general flourishing within these 
overlapping networks.”366 In ecomodern frameworks, in contrast, the internalization of care does 
not involve a process of embedding or of submitting the demands of the economy to the needs of 
the natural environment, but rather, decoupling: the process of separating the human domain 
from the ecological through technology and market mechanisms of ecological governance, with 
the end goal of perpetual economic growth and a flourishing human society disconnected from 
the burdens of ecological scarcity and the threat of ecological destruction. The process of 
decoupling, thus, involves a primacy on strict anthropocentric, and specifically, economic needs. 
As Mol, Sonnefield, and Spaargaren maintain, ecological needs are only brought in when 
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“environmental criteria, instruments, and concepts are reformulated to mesh with the logics of 
market mechanisms.”367  
 
Alternatives to Ecomodernism 
One alternative to the dominant ecomodern model is the notion of “buen vivir,” as 
developed at the People’s World Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 
2010 in Bolivia in 2010. The goal of the conference was to establish an alternative development 
model, a model of climate justice, which challenged the hegemony of capital characteristic of 
modern economies. Unlike ecomodern accounts, the People’s Agreement understood the 
capitalist model as a primary cause of climate change and climate injustice through its imposition 
of the “logic of competition, progress, and limitless growth.” They put forth a new model which 
promoted  
The recovery, revalorization, and strengthening of the knowledge, wisdom, and ancestral 
practices of the Indigenous Peoples, which are affirmed in the thought and living 
practices of Living Well,’ recognizing Mother Earth as a living being with which we 
have an indivisible, interdependent, complementary, and spiritual relationship.  
 
Central to this model, therefore, is the notion of “buen vivir”—living well. The 
framework of “buen vivir” problematizes a strictly anthropocentric and dichotomous 
human/nature ontology. In the preamble to the conference, it was stated, “we are all valuable, we 
all have a space, duties and responsibilities. We all need everybody else.”368 Furthermore, 
against the epistemological hegemonies of the West, it reaffirms the necessity to “recognize the 
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plurality of forms of knowledge and ancestral practices, and transform scientific practices based 
on control over nature toward paradigms oriented toward equilibrium with nature.”369 On a 
practical level, the conference critiqued many of the novel market mechanisms of ecological 
protection, including REDD+, and advocated for more stringent regulations of corporate 
activities, and called for more holistic mechanism of environmental governance, including a 
reevaluation of methods of valuing nature and life, the incorporation of methods of sustainability 
of indigenous groups, and a critique of consumerism. 
What these, and many other ecological frameworks point to, then, are alternative 
environmental expressions and forms of environmental and cultural care. As I have noted in this 
chapter, however, the nature of ecomodernism as powerful environmentalism, as a paradigm that 
is produced and reproduced by dominant and elite actors, presents problems of hegemony within 
environmentalism; problems which are, thus far, underexplored in the literature. Ecomodernism 
gains its power from, not in spite of, its complicit-ness in dominant institutions, and as such, 
necessarily serves the interests of the agents that actively produce and reproduce it. Conversely, 
non-dominant ecological paradigms are marginalized in the wake of an increasing ecomodernism 
that is understood as the sole legitimate means of environmental protection.370 This 
marginalization can be manifested on a practical level, as mentioned above in discussions of 
funding, but it also occurs on an epistemological level in terms of which forms of 
environmentalism are acceptable. As Scott Lash et al. write in Risk, Environment, and 
Modernity, ecomodernism constitutes “a new dominant paradigm in the politics of the 
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environment—that is, a new truth of growth and sustainability.”371 This “truth” of 
ecomodernism, however, if hegemonic, may represent a restrictive and exclusionary type of 
environmental expression that, as stated by McLaughlin, could lead to the “marginaliz[ation] of 
people and projects who depart from that vision by conceptualizing them as deviant, backward, 
or irrational.”372 
The issue of recognition and representation in environmentalism is thus, a crucial one. Of 
primary importance is to understand and analyze the question of who, what groups, parties, and 
interests are defining and representing nature and nature protection in contemporary 
environmental governance—and how, how are these dominant forms of ecological protection 
satisfying, or not satisfying, the ultimate goals of the environmental movement: to live in a 
sustainable and harmonious manner with nonhuman nature, as much as possible, and to create 
safe living conditions for present and future humans.  
I have demonstrated in this dissertation that private sector actors in environmental 
governance present significant challenges to the mainstream environmental movement, both on a 
practical and normative level. Powerful environmental frameworks, such as ecomodernism, are 
supported, constructed, and reproduced by private sector actors and institutions, undergirded by 
frameworks of corporate social responsibility that place a primacy on voluntary partnerships, 
cooperation and sponsorships, rather than in the acceptance of external regulation. In the words 
of George Holmes, private sector engagement and eco-philanthropy “neoliberalizes 
environmentalism, creating “market friendly environmentalisms that do not challenge the 
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capitalist order.”373 As private sector engagement increases in environmentalism, therefore, a 
central question remains. In particular, what might a democratic environmental movement look 
like, where the voices of powerful actors are equal to the voices of the less powerful? 
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CHAPTER 7 
TWO MANIFESTOS: FREEDOM VERSUS HARMONY 
Two manifestos of sort were published in 2015. One, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” was 
written by a group of economists, environmental scientists, philanthropists, filmmakers, and 
philosophers, and published by the Breakthrough Institute.374 The second, “Laudato Si: On Care 
for Our Common Home,” was written by Pope Francis.375 Both manifestos are an expression of 
concern for environmental degradation, and both manifestos propose solutions and future 
objectives. Both, in a sense, provide a “vision” of what a sustainable, healthy, world would look 
like, and include a focus on both humans and nature to varying degrees. Despite broad 
similarities in intent, however, the two manifestos promulgate radically different notions of 
ecological care and ecological well-being. While “Laudato Si” places an emphasis on spiritual, 
social, and cultural change, such foci are almost entirely absent in “An Ecomodernist 
Manifesto,” which, instead, is almost entirely concentrated on technological development. What 
emerges from a close reading of the two, therefore, are two distinct ideas of ecological reform, 
and two distinct environmental (and social) ethics.  
 
Two Different Ideas of the Present (Crisis) 
The two manifestos express wildly divergent interpretations of our current ecological and 
social crises, embedded in contrasting interpretations of the present in a more general sense. In 
An Ecomodernist Manifesto, the present crisis is primarily an ecological crisis, or more precisely, 
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a crisis of resources. We are in, according to the authors, the Anthropocene, a time of profound 
human led change and consequent pressure on natural ecosystems. Currently, over fifty percent 
of current land on the planet is used for human activity, namely, for food production and 
industrial activity. Twenty percent of original forested area has been depleted and converted for 
human use, and the planet is undergoing a mass extinction event, as “populations of many 
mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years 
alone.”376 
While natural life may be disadvantaged from encroaching human activity, however, the 
authors maintain that human life and societies, in contrast, are flourishing. They state, for 
example, that “violence in all forms has declined significantly and is probably at the lowest per 
capita level ever experienced by the human species.”377 In addition, humans now enjoy growing 
freedoms, both personally and at a governmental level, as “personal, economic, and personal 
liberties have spread worldwide and are today largely accepted as universal truths.”378 Women, in 
particular, are liberated from traditional and restricting gender roles due to modernization, and 
consequently have more control of their fertility. Similarly, modernization has led to “large 
number of numbers of humans — both in percentage and in absolute terms — [being] free from 
insecurity, penury and servitude.”379 
In “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” therefore, the message is that although environmental 
degradation is increasing, the quality of human societies and human lives, are gradually 
improving as modern medicine, science, and technology liberates people from the toils 
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associated with premodern life. They write happily that the gifts of modernization have granted 
people freedom from the land, stating that while in 1880, fifty percent of people “worked the 
land,” now that number has reduced to only two percent of the world’s population.380 Further, 
urbanization has led to lower fertility rates, increased development, and an overall higher quality 
of life. Technology has saved innumerable lives, and increased agricultural intensity has fed 
millions. The Anthropocene, in other words, despite its ecological difficulties, is a golden era for 
human existence.  
In “Laudato Si,” however, the picture painted of the present is significantly different. In 
Pope Francis’ account, the optimism of modernity embedded in the former manifesto is absent, 
replaced by a profound concern regarding the stark realities of industrial progress. He discusses 
the pollution faced by many communities as a result of modern industrial activity, as well as the 
extreme wealth inequality faced globally. He points out, for example, that “inequity affects not 
only individuals but entire countries,” continuing that a “true ecological debt exists, particularly 
between the global north and south, connected to commercial imbalances . . . and the 
disproportionate use of natural resources by certain countries.”381 Further, he asserts that 
environmental degradation is not antithetical to, nor separate from, human social degradation, as 
was suggested in the former account. Rather, he speaks of the cultural degradation that occurs 
alongside ecosystem degradation, as “environmental exploitation … not only exhausts the 
resources which provide local communities with their livelihood, but also undoes the social 
structure which, for a long time, shaped cultural identity and their sense of the meaning of life 
and community.”382 
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In “Laudato Si,” then, the idea that human and ecosystem health can exist somewhat 
separately from one another is replaced by a profound sense of interconnectedness, embedded in 
the idea that human nature and nature in general terms have a connected fate. When nature 
suffers, so do humans. For Pope Francis, therefore, “ecological justice is social justice,” 
elaborating that “today … we have to realize that a true ecological approach always becomes a 
social approach; it must integrate questions of justice in debates on the environment, so as to 
hear both the cry of the earth and the cry of the poor.”383 This is apparent also on the level of the 
individual as he argues that not only is the current ecological crisis a crisis of culture, but it is 
also an individual and spiritual crisis, as the rupture between humanity and nature is also a 
rupture within humanity itself, and primarily, a rupture from God. He states, for example:  
[T]he originally harmonious relationship between human beings and nature became 
conflictual (cf. Gen 3:17-19). It is significant that the harmony which Saint Francis of 
Assisi experienced with all creatures was seen as a healing of that rupture. Saint 
Bonaventure held that, through universal reconciliation with every creature, Saint Francis 
in some way returned to the state of original innocence. This is a far cry from our 
situation today, where sin is manifest in all its destructive power in wars, the various 
forms of violence and abuse, the abandonment of the most vulnerable, and attacks on 
nature.384 
 
The Human-Nature Connection 
In “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” as the present situation is good for humans, but more 
negative for nature, the objective is to “decouple” human impacts from ecological wellbeing. 
Decoupling is, arguably, the central idea in the manifesto, and it refers to the process of 
separating human impact from nonhuman ecosystems. Cities, for example, are the perfect 
symbolic representation of decoupling, according to the authors, as they allow large amounts of 
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people to converge in small areas of land, leaving much free space to “re-wild” and “re-green.” 
Thus, many humans can continue to live, and thrive, in cities while nature does not have to bear 
the brunt of the impact. Other examples are electric cars and carbon capture units; things that, 
with technological advancements, can provide and maintain human well-being without the 
ecological cost. In fact, the authors deny the idea almost entirely that there are limits to (human) 
growth, a notion first popularized in the early environmental movement, stating that there is 
“remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the 
capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future,” and “to the 
degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so 
theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant.”385 
The representation of nature here, therefore, is primarily separatist. At a very blunt level, 
human development—through increased development and technology—can, and should, isolate 
itself from nature. This separatist paradigm is evident in the language that is used to describe the 
natural world, referred to mostly as “resource” or “environment.” And it is also present in the 
way that nature is referred to in the modernism framework. “Modernization processes,” they 
assert, “have increasingly liberated humanity from nature.”386 Liberation from nature, according 
to authors, is a positive development, and should be continued into the future, albeit with a 
greater recognition of ecological consequences. 
The ideal human-nature relationship, therefore, is one of efficiency and decoupling, and 
they assert that “humanity’s goal should be to use resources more productively.”387 Further, the 
notion that there are no fixed physical boundaries to human consumption is, primarily, a question 
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of human need. The boundaries that might emerge from a moral relationship to parts of 
nonhuman nature that are not directly necessary for human survival and consumption are not 
mentioned or discussed. Indeed, apart from mentions of the “aesthetic” and “spiritual” values 
some people may glean from nature, nature itself is largely treated instrumentally, and questions 
of normative relations with nature not addressed.  
In “Laudato Si,” in contrast, the human-nature relationship is referred to in ideal terms as 
a fraternity; a broken relationship that must be healed. Pope Francis claims, for example, that “it 
is not enough . . . to think of different species merely as potential resources to be exploited, while 
overlooking the fact that they have value in themselves.”388 Rather, nature, according to Pope 
Francis, is “sister, “mother,” “brother,” and it is an expression of divinity and “joyful 
mystery.”389 
Part of the healing process with nature, then, is not to decouple but rather to re-engage 
with the reality of inherent interconnectedness. He maintains that although there have been 
“misinterpretations” of the Christian doctrine in the past, “nowadays we must forcefully reject 
the notion that our being created in God’s image and given dominion over the earth justifies 
absolute domination over other creatures.”390 The attitude of domination and mastery which has 
informed much of the last two thousand years must be exchanged for kindship, according to 
Pope Francis; now, we must “speak the language of fraternity and beauty in our relationship with 
the world.” Indeed, as stated in the manifesto, the most important recognition is that we are 
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nature, stating “the book of nature is one and indivisible, and includes the environment, life, 
sexuality, the family, social relations, and so forth.”391  
Thus, for Pope Francis, the ecological crisis is directly linked to our disconnection from 
nature, and our consequent abuse and exploitation of natural areas. The extent to which the 
human-nature connection has been ruptured is summarized in the opening quotes of the 
manifesto: 
This sister now cries out to us because of the harm we have inflicted on her by our 
irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which God has endowed her. We have 
come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, entitled to plunder her at will. The 
violence present in our hearts, wounded by sin, is also reflected in the symptoms of 
sickness evident in the soil, in the water, in the air and in all forms of life. This is why the 
earth herself, burdened and laid waste, is among the most abandoned and maltreated of 
our poor; she “groans in travail” (Rom 8:22). We have forgotten that we ourselves are 
dust of the earth (cf. Gen 2:7); our very bodies are made up of her elements, we breathe 
her air and we receive life and refreshment from her waters.392 
 
Where We Go from Here 
The solution in “An Ecomodernist Manifesto” is further decoupling. This is achieved, 
primarily, through increased modernization and technological advances. The authors state, for 
example, “that decoupling human well-being from the destruction of nature requires the 
conscious acceleration of emergence decoupling processes.”393 These emergent decoupling 
includes “urbanization, aquaculture, agricultural intensification, nuclear power, and 
desalination,” all of which are processes with a “demonstrated potential to reduce human 
demands on the environmental, allowing more room for non-human species.”394  
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Ultimately, they argue, therefore, that “modern technologies, by using natural ecosystem 
flows and services more efficiently, offer a real chance of reducing the totality of human impacts 
on the biosphere.”395 As modernization has generally brought positives to human existence, a 
change in lifestyle, consumption and habits is not required. Indeed, they repeatedly emphasize 
the benefits of modernity, and the decoupling potential that modernity has brought, even 
suggesting that although the common assumption is that previous cultures have lived in harmony 
with their harmony, that has only been the case because they have had smaller population—
“insofar as past societies had less impact upon the environment, it was because those societies 
supported vastly smaller populations.”396 The problem, now and in the past, they assert, is human 
dependence on ecosystems. The solution, therefore, is the creation of technologies to lessen that 
dependence. Importantly, however, if there is a situation where development and human growth 
clashes with ecological health, the former should be given precedence, even if that mean 
continued fossil fuel use. They state, for example:  
Climate change and other global ecological challenges are not the most important 
immediate concerns for the majority of the world’s people. Nor should they be. A new 
coal-fired power station in Bangladesh may bring air pollution and rising carbon dioxide 
emissions but will also save lives. For millions living without light and forced to burn 
dung to cook their food, electricity and modern fuels, no matter the source, offer a 
pathway to a better life, even as they also bring new environmental challenges.397 
 
To focus on technology, however, according to Pope Francis, is to “deal only in 
symptoms.”398 Real change, in contrast, is to eliminate the “structural causes of the dysfunctions 
of the world economics, and correct models of growth which have proved incapable of ensuring 
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respect for the environment.”399 Only when we address consumerism, greed, and our conceptual 
and ontological distance with nature can have a sustainable future. Indeed, to be ecological, 
according to Pope Francis is to:  
Replace consumption with sacrifice, greed with generosity, wastefulness with a spirit of 
sharing, an asceticism which entails learning to give, and not simply to give up. It is a 
way of loving, of moving gradually away from what I want to what God’s world needs. It 
is liberation from fear, greed and compulsion.400  
 
Further, change consists of changing ourselves and our relationship with other humans 
and non-human nature. Quoting St. Benedict, he states, “The misuse of creation begins when we 
no longer recognize any higher instance than ourselves, when we see nothing else but 
ourselves.”401 The objective, then, to reinvigorate the bond between the humans and the 
nonhuman, which will lead, necessarily, to ecological care and a radically different way of life—




It is apparent, therefore, that both manifestos express radically different environmental 
ethics. “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” like ecomodernism more broadly, professes an optimism 
in technological ability to redirect current human trajectories, a commitment to human 
(economic) freedom and a dedication to market growth, all of which are embedded in abstract 
and instrumental perceptions of nature, expressed fully in the metaphor of “decoupling.” In 
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contrast, Pope Francis in “Laudato Si” understands the ecological problem as a social, cultural, 
and a spiritual crisis. Nature, in “Laudato Si,” is not an abstract service-provider, but “mother,” 
“sister.” Ecological issues, in the latter account, arise not from an economic miscalculation or not 
yet developed technology, but from a profound social and spiritual sickness, related to inaccurate 
human ontologies and human desires. As such, the solution is a radical change in the way 
societies and individuals relate to nature, towards a relation of harmony.   
In many ways, therefore, the two manifestos represent a kind of classic divide in 
environmental thought: the divide between intrinsic and instrumental value. Whereas Pope 
Francis vehemently upholds the idea of the intrinsic value of nature and critiques the 
anthropocentrism and mastery of Western relations to nature, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto” 
maintains and reproduces these tendencies, upholding the ideals of modernity, market growth, 
and technological development as ways out of the ecological crisis, with no apparent concern for 
the value of nature distinct from human needs and wants.  
As discussed in this dissertation, however, not all normative frameworks are created 
equally. The vast powers behind powerful environmentalisms, such as ecomodernism, facilitated 
by growing private sector engagement in the realm of environmental politics via frameworks of 
philanthropy and corporate social responsibility, creates situations of ideological dominance, 
where one environmental agenda has significantly more resources than others and is put forth as 
the common sense, or indeed, the “pragmatic” way forward. Through a convergence of elite 
actors in environmental politics, and an ever-growing fluidity between public and private spheres 
characteristic of neoliberal economies, private sector actors can exert substantial ideological 
influence in environmental politics, normalizing capitalist interactions and institutionalizing 
organizational norms and codes of conduct. Many of these engagements represent “hegemonic” 
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action in the Gramscian sense, which serve to marginalize and suppress counter-hegemonic 
visions, including different expressions of environmental care and environmental identity as put 
forth by indigenous groups and other less “powerful” communities.  In addition, as I maintained 
in chapter 3, this kind of influence is facilitated and exacerbated by normative assumptions about 
ideal business-society relations, reflected most notably in the “stewardship ethic” which 
positions corporate actors in positions of significant influence and allows the private sector the 
normative tools in which to keep CSR practices voluntary, as well as reduce external regulation 
in a more general way.  
The influence enacted by the private sector is problematic for two main reasons, as I 
discussed in chapter 4 and 6 respectively. First, private sector engagement in environmentalism 
through CSR and philanthropy has the potential to “greenwash” the environmental agenda by 
detracting and diverting attention away from the actual exploitative activities of the companies 
involved. As stated by Behroodi Morvaridi “the capacity of big business to modify its discourse 
is often considerably greater than its capacity to improve its social and environmental 
impacts.”403 These kinds of engagements, through cultivating the image of a “moral 
corporation,” can increase corporate sovereignty and in doing so, exacerbate the negative 
impacts related to corporate activity. Indeed, degrading labor standards and increased amounts of 
environmental pollution are often associated with market liberalization and less stringent state 
regulation.404 This can lead, then, to bizarre situations where companies are considered “ethical” 
from the perspective of the CSR community, but are actually among the highest polluters, as was 
demonstrated in the Volkswagen scandal of 2015. This kind of circumstance is particularly 
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worrying given the frequent positioning of CSR as an “alternative to law” and the dominant 
understanding of CSR as a voluntary and self-regulatory mechanism. 
Second, engagement of this kind can create conflicts of interests where “less powerful” 
views are marginalized in wake of an ever-increasing convergence of elite actors in 
environmental governance. This is problematic from the perspective of an environmentalism that 
seeks to have fair and democratic representation. Indeed, environmental beliefs, and the policies 
that arise from them, affect everyone. It is also problematic given that elite and powerful actors 
tend to have a vested interest in maintaining the norms and institutional arrangement that made 
them powerful in the first place; but these norms and arrangements may also be, in some 
situations, the very ones that are significantly contributing to our worst ecological problems.   
Thus, to have more forms of democratic environmental governance, a move from 
corporate patronage and voluntary benevolence to one of corporate accountability, which sees 
corporations engage in social responsibility frameworks that are publically informed and entail 
legal consequences, is one possible solution. As Morvaridi writes, “the rights and freedoms of 
companies must be balanced not just by responsibilities and voluntary initiatives but also 
obligations.”405 Some recent proposals have been made to usher in a “post-voluntarist” CSR 
framework that include a focus on a transparency measures, complaints procedures, and “hard 
law” mechanisms that “lays down obligation, international standards, rewards, and penalties in 
relation to corporate accountability, and performance.”406 
One example is in the work of environmental organization, Friends of the Earth. They 
have outlined a series of recommendations for the resistance of “corporate capture” in 
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mainstream environmentalism and the United Nations. Acknowledging that the “Convention on 
Biological Diversity is driven by corporate actors interested in the financialization of nature and 
not by the need to conserve biodiversity;” that private sectors interests are “increasingly seeking 
ways to treat water as a tradable commodity;” and that United Nations has been “working very 
closely with big business in developing and promoting the concept of ‘Green Economy,”407 they 
are campaigning for legal framework in which to make private sector actors and interests more 
accountable and restrict corporate influence in environmental policy. Similar to Utting’s 
framework, they maintain that communities should have “rights over the resources they need to 
enjoy a full and healthy life,” and that corporations must “meet the best environmental, social, 
labor, and human rights standards wherever they operate.”408 To enforce the latter point more 
strongly, they proposed that the World Summit on Sustainable Development ought to put into 
place a Corporate Accountability Convention that would “enforce minimum environmental and 
social standards, encourage effective reporting, and provide incentives of corporations taking 
steps to avoid negative impacts.”409 
More specifically with regard to private sector interest in international environmental 
meetings and negotiations, Friends of the Earth suggested that the UN reduce the dominant 
position given to private sector groups in environmental governance by stopping governments set 
up discussion bodies that “grant business a privileged status within official negotiations, such as 
the Mexican dialogues on climate policy,” as well as taking action to “strengthen transparency 
around lobbying and ensure that no business groups are given privileged access over UN policy-
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making.”410 Further, they state that “as the business sector holds significantly larger resources 
than any other sector, there should be a cap on its participation: business should not have more 
representatives than any of the major groups in multilateral negotiation processes.”411 Other 
recommendations they outline recommend include that the UN discloses all existing ties to 
private sector groups, that a code of conduct for UN officials that involves “a cooling off period 
which officials cannot start working for lobby groups,” and that the UN should set in place 
legally behind, non-voluntary frameworks of corporate accountability which include “obligations 
for companies to report on their social and environmental impacts.”412 
In addition to Friends of the Earth, many other organizations are active in their advocacy 
for more stringent forms of corporate accountability. Several trade unions and social NGOs in 
the USA, for example, have begun an International Right to Know campaign to advocate for 
legislation that would force corporations traded on the US stock exchanges to “disclose 
information on the operations of their overseas affiliates and major contractors.”413 The 
International Forum on Globalization has also called for the establishment of a UN Organization 
for Corporate Accountability that would “provide information on corporate practices as a basis 
for legal actions and consumer boycotts.”414 Further, Christian Aid has advocated for a Global 
Regulation Authority that would “establish norms for TNC conduct, monitor compliance, and 
deal with breaches.”415 
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Further, factors for a fair CSR policy that is embedded in corporate accountability rather 
that corporate responsibility ought to outline the necessary conditions for partnership and 
sponsorship deals to avoid conflicts of interest and issues of potential domination. There are 
rules in place, for example, against political lobbying with an understanding of these problems; 
however, similar rules do not exist with regard to corporate sponsorship and patronage to social 
movement organizations. There are significantly less transparency laws, however, that oblige a 
social movement organization to publicly disclose how much they received from a particular 
private sector group, nor are there limits on amounts that may be received. Additionally, there 
are no mechanisms in place that focus specifically on the ethics of private sector sponsors sitting 
on the board of directors for NGOs, or in other top managerial positons. Given the urgency of 
ecological issues, and the centrality of NGOs in responding to local and global ecological and 
social problems, the influence afforded “sponsors” of such groups focusing on such issues ought 
to be a significant area of concern.  
Frameworks of corporate accountability, therefore, are very different from the current 
norms of CSR and private sector philanthropy. As stated by Utting, “rather than placing the 
emphasis on moral compulsion, by saying corporations should assume responsibility for their 
actions, it suggests that they have to answer to their stakeholders and be held to account through 
some element of punishment or sanction.”416 As I discussed in this dissertation, however, 
mechanisms of accountability and answerability are exceedingly different to enforce, both 
because of practical limitations (the penetration of corporate actors and interests in political 
institutions and public policy) and ideological barriers (the underlying normative frameworks in 
existence with regard to “ideal” business-society relations, i.e., ideas of corporate “stewardship, 
                                                 
416 Ibid., p. 386. 
163 
etc.). From a Gramscian perspective, then, the ideological and practical tools at the disposal of 
many private sector actors to exert and maintain dominance relates to the practice of hegemonic 
power in a more general sense. For Gramsci, hegemonic power is reproduced in a dialectic 
relationship with counter-hegemonic contestation—“hegemony and counter-hegemony exist in a 
state of tension; each gives shape to the other.”417 For the dominant classes, the primary 
objective is to conserve a degree of ideological unity in which to maintain the consent of the 
dominated classes. For the subaltern groups, however, the focus is on resisting the ideological 
domination of the ruling class through a deconstruction of common sense and the creation of an 
alternative vison of social life. From the perspective of corporate accountability, then, attempts to 
bring about effective corporate accountability laws must interact with the practical and politic 
aspects of corporate dominance, as well as the normative assumptions embedded in capitalist 
enterprise that aid in that dominance. 
Finally, a democratic environmentalism must be a pluralistic one. Environmental beliefs 
about the value of nature, and ontological understandings of relationships between humans and 
non-human nature, are inherently pluralistic, place-based, and geographically and culturally 
dependent. The universalizing tendencies, inherent in both environmental policy and 
environmental ethics, are, therefore, problematic as they detract from individual and cultural 
experiential understandings of self, nature, and community. Thus, although a degree of 
universality is needed in order to enact policy at a national and international level, facilitating a 
plurality of beliefs that correspond with the daily experiences of people is crucial in order to have 
environmental governance that recognizes and represents a diverse array of people and cultures.  
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Further research, then, could focus on the political, economic, and normative conditions 
for the establishment of a more democratic environmental politics, as well as conditions for a 
fairer and non-dominant eco-philanthropy and CSR. Ultimately, research of this nature must 
continue to take into account that ideological positions relating to environmental norms and 
values cannot be separated from analyses of political economy. There is a tendency in traditional 
philosophical work to treat ideologies as separate from broader political and economic context, 
rather than understand them as inherently situated in political-economic contexts, and reproduced 
by actors with varying levels of power and intent. This is witnessed especially in traditional 
debates with regard to the intrinsic and instrumental value of nature that largely feature no 
mention of political-economy or the social forces behind particular ideological frameworks. 
Thus, what I have suggested in this dissertation is that the much commented on growth in novel 
forms of instrumental environmental ideologies, reflected in the popularization of “new” 
environmentalism, “new” conservation, the Green Economy, and contemporary manifestations 
of ecomodernism, reflects not only changing environmental norms, but are also related to 
changes in environmental governance. In other words, the growth of powerful 
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